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Abstract 
The central issue addressed in this thesis was the validation of a novel risk 
assessment system designed to meet the security requirements of a high secure 
forensic hospital. To this end, three research strands investigating the clinical, 
predictive and preventative utility of the system were pursued. This thesis reports 
the process of the development, adaptation and implementation of a system based on 
the HCR-20, called the Structured Clinical Judgement: Risk (SCJ: Risk). The first 
research strand involved investigation of the processes necessary implement a system 
of structured professional judgement. The conceptual and operational utility of the 
system were investigated, and successful implementation of the system within 
clinical practice was demonstrated by compliance of use by clinical teams. A survey 
was conducted, investigating the perceptions of clinicians in relation to the clinical 
utility and usability of the S CJ : Risk. Overall acceptance of the pilot and 
implementation phase of the system was demonstrated, and the system was perceived 
to assist clinical teams to structure and document risk-related decisions. The second 
research strand studied the validity of the SCJ: Risk in predicting intra-institutional 
behaviour. A prospective investigation of the application of the SCJ: Risk to a 
forensic population detained in conditions of high security was conducted and this 
demonstrated variation in the predictive utility of the system. The predictive 
accuracy of subscale items of the SCJ: Risk, and the individual risk factors 
comprising the subscales of the system were robust for behaviours relevant to 
violence and suicide/self-harm. However, prediction of behaviours relevant to 
escape/abscond, vulnerability to risk from others and subversion of security were not 
demonstrated. The third research strand involved exploration of the preventative 
utility of the system, specifically if the identification of a patient as high-risk would 
13 
minimise the occurrence, or prolong the time to an incident of intra-institutional 
behaviour. Results illustrated the efficacy of the SCJ: Risk system in the 
identification of high risk individuals for behaviours relevant to any intra- 
institutional infraction, violence and self-harm. Patients identified as high-risk 
displayed a higher prevalence and earlier incidence of relevant intra-institutional 
behaviour. It is concluded that the system of Structured Clinical Judgement: Risk (as 
an adaptation of the HCR-20) contributes positively to the overall goals of clarity of 
risk communication, identification and management of high risk patients within 
forensic psychiatric practice. However, the extended risk assessment of the SCJ: 
Risk does not make a significant additional contribution to the parental system on 
which it is based. 
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Chapter One 
General Introduction 
17, 
1.1 Thesis Outline 
The primary aim of the empirical work reported within this thesis is to critically 
examine the application of a system of structured professional judgement within a 
forensic psychiatric setting. 
The thesis begins with an exploration of previous and contemporary 
approaches to risk assessment, and provides the foundation as to why the application 
of a system of structured professional judgement might be an important contribution 
to forensic psychiatric practice. The role of the mental health professional as 
responsible for the accurate assessment of an individual's risk of offending behaviour 
is introduced as a context for understanding the complexities and approaches to risk 
assessment. Three models of risk assessment are discussed which reflect 
developments within the field of risk assessment. The structured professional 
judgement model is introduced as the most effective evidence-based method of risk 
assessment. A range of empirically-based structured clinical decision making 
schemes applied to a range of offending behaviours are reviewed, illustrative of the 
prominence of structured professional approaches within clinical practice. The 
HCR-20 (Webster, Douglas, Eaves and Hart, 1997) as a violence risk assessment 
scheme and structured professional judgement system is introduced to provide the 
reader with a context for subsequent investigations within this thesis. 
The third chapter describes the processes involved in the practical application 
of a structured risk assessment tool within a high secure forensic psychiatric setting. 
This chapter sets the context of subsequent empirical investigations by defining the 
setting, participants and procedure applied within this thesis. Legislation relevant to 
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the need to identify patients presenting as high risk in a number of defined categories 
specific to the needs of a high secure setting is reviewed. This leads to an 
understanding of the need for a clinically viable risk assessment system to document 
risk related decisions. The Structured Clinical Judgement: Risk (SCJ: Risk; 
Richardson and Hogue, 2006) system is introduced as a clinical guideline developed 
to address the security needs of a high secure hospital. The construction of SCJ: 
Risk factors, utilising the existing evidence base of the HCR-20 to structure clinical 
judgements is described. Compliance to the use of the SCJ: Risk within clinical 
practice is investigated. Results are presented and proposed steps for future 
implementation in other forensic settings are addressed. 
In Chapter Four, the first of three empirical investigations designed to establish 
the evidence-base of the SCJ: Risk is presented. The opinions of clinical team 
members of various professional grades are investigated to ascertain the perceived 
clinical usability and utility of the SCJ: Risk. Surveys conducted during a pilot and 
implementation phase designed to investigate nine core areas are presented. The 
results of the survey allow an understanding of the perceived efficiency, 
effectiveness, and practical use of the system within clinical practice. The study 
identifies the processes needed to ensure the successful introduction and 
implementation of a system of structured professional judgement to a forensic 
setting. In this way, the investigation informs guidance as to the applicability of such 
a system to other clinical settings. 
The second empirical study (Chapter Five) is an investigation of the ability of 
the SCJ: Risk to predict behaviours of interest. A review of the literature evidencing 
19 
the predictive validity of the HCR-20 is presented as a context for the conceptual, 
methodological and statistical considerations necessary to establishing the predictive 
validity of the SCJ: Risk within a high secure forensic population. The relationship 
between individual risk factors and subscale items comprising the SCJ: Risk, and 
subsequent intra-institutional infractions relevant to; violence, self-harm/suicide, 
escape, vulnerability of risk from others, and the subversion of security are 
established. Variability of the predictive accuracy of individual risk factors and 
subscales are discussed and recommendations directing future investigations away 
from a prediction-based, toward a prevention-based paradigm are introduced. 
The third empirical investigation (Chapter Six) develops the findings of the 
previous chapter to investigate the utility of the SCJ: Risk system in managing and 
preventing behaviours of interest. The relationship between the identification of 
patients as high risk, presence of high risk behaviours and the time to the first 
incident of intra-institutional infractions is investigated. Results are presented and 
discussed within the framework of a prevention-based paradigm of risk assessment 
and management and recommendations for the development of this research strand 
are considered. 
The final chapter (Chapter Seven) details a summary of the empirical 
investigations, implications of the application of the SCJ: Risk system within clinical 
practice, and provides recommendations for future research. 
20 
Chapter Two 
Approaches to Risk Assessment and Management 
21 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 The Role of the Mental Health Professional and Risk Assessment 
Significant empirical progress in forensic risk assessment has been witnessed 
in the last forty years. This has lead to a trend to develop clinical practice guidelines 
in an attempt to assist decision-making processes where the risk of future offending 
behaviour is possible. A central role of mental health professionals within the 
criminal justice system is the assessment, management and communication of an 
individual's propensity, or risk for future violent behaviour and recidivism. These 
judgements often have significant consequences, including the detention of 
individuals, the loss of civil liberty and the identification of treatment and 
management interventions with the aim of reducing future recidivism. The role of 
the mental health professional in accurately assessing an individual's risk of violence 
is therefore critical to ensuring the protection of the public and the individual 
detained. 
Phelan, Link, Stueve and Pescosolido (2000) report a belief in the general 
public that there exists a direct relationship between mental disorders and 
dangerousness (or risk). This perception has resulted in public apprehension in 
accepting an individual with a mental disorder as a member of their community (as a 
neighbour, colleague, or family member). In the United Kingdom, the Conservative 
government's move in the 1980s to "Care in the' Community" witnessed the 
discharge (deinstitutionalisation) of mentally ill people previously held in psychiatric 
facilities (Sines, Appleby and Frost, 2005). Public opinion has been adversely 
impacted by media attention to recidivism of patients previously detained in secure 
settings and associated failed predictions by mental health professionals (Douglas 
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and Webster, 1999). This has lead to the reform of legislation to improve accuracy 
of risk assessment to ensure the protection of society without restricting the liberty of 
individuals disproportionately (Webster and Hucker, 2007). 
The role of the mental health professional as expert witness remains 
commonplace in UK courts. Their opinion is also reflected in institutions of 
detention during annual hearings (to determine possible release decisions or transfer 
to less secure environments) and decisions concerning reintegration into society and 
the provision of care in the community. This is despite concern regarding the 
accuracy of psychiatric predictions made by clinicians (reflected in Case Law for 
example, Barefoot v. Estelle, 1982; Kansas v Hendricks, 1997; Peck v Counseling 
Service of Addison County 1985; Jones v United States, 1983; cited in Norko and 
Baranoski, 2005). 
Within a general civil setting in the U. S. A, the Tarasoff v. Regents of the 
University of California (1976) was a landmark case that was instrumental in 
identifying that the opinions of mental health professionals in relation to violent 
conduct should be utilised to inform the duty of care toward protection of the 
potential victim. The Tarasoff (1976) law reflects events concerning a disclosure by 
a student to his counsellor that he wished to kill a woman (Tatiana Tarasoff). This 
desire was actualised despite the counsellor alerting the individual's supervisor and 
police, who after interview deemed the man low risk. A malpractice suit was 
actioned against the counsellor on the basis that she had failed to warn the victim. 
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Case Laws and policies emerging from litigation associated with malpractice 
claims have therefore highlighted a core role of mental health professionals as one of 
duty to protect on the basis of knowledge related to an individual's risk, and is 
applicable to the U. K. This duty encompasses protection of identifiable victims 
(specific individuals), victim types (individuals with perceived shared group 
characteristics), and society in general (where risk to specific or victim types is 
unknown; Douglas and Webster, 1999). The necessity to predict violence is 
therefore clearly a requirement of mental health workers. This has been reflected in 
clinical and empirical attempts to improve the accuracy of risk assessment to identify 
risk-related behaviours and develop associated risk management strategies and 
interventions to minimise the risk. In this way, the ultimate goal of reduction of 
recidivism and protection of the individual and society may be facilitated. 
Wider case law has therefore had a direct impact on focusing attempts to 
predict undesirable acts. However, the predictive accuracy of mental health 
professionals has been questioned (Webster and Baffles, 2004). Monahan (1988) 
argued this reflected clinician's lack of knowledge, rather than ability, and that such 
knowledge could be acquired by attention to developments within the literature and 
best practice guidelines. 
The interaction between research evidence and clinical practice has been 
apparent within the literature produced over the past decade. Developments in 
forensic psychiatry have included a move away from a prediction-based paradigm'of 
risk assessment to a prevention-based ethos incorporating the process of risk 
management. The reformulation of risk assessment in current thinking within 
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forensic psychiatry may therefore be understood to be ` the process of identifying and 
studying hazards to reduce the probability of their occurrence' (Hart, 1998). This 
development from prediction to prevention is a clear example of the influence of 
research on the practical application of risk assessment in clinical practice (explored 
in Chapter Six). 
2.1.2 Application of the Scientist-Practitioner Model to Risk Assessment 
Douglas, Cox and Webster (1999) apply the conceptual framework of the 
scientist-practitioner model to the real world application of risk assessment. The 
authors assert the need for a flexible and clinically collaborative approach to risk 
decision making that utilises research findings (reflecting developments and 
understanding in current literature) and clinical practice (Nezu, 1996). Stricker 
(1992) states `not only are practitioners who are not informed by research offering an 
inferior brand of treatment, not only are they less than honest clinicians, but they are 
unethical in their practice' (p. 546 cited in Douglas and Webster, 1999). It is 
therefore critical that there is a reciprocal influence between research and practice. 
A flexible, but standard methodology of employing assessment guides to 
inform risk decision-making has been advocated as an appropriate way to ensure 
adherence to the ideal of the scientist-practitioner model. Borum (1996) stated that 
`(d)espite substantive advances in knowledge about the risk for violent behaviour 
among people with mental disorder, there have been virtually no systematic efforts to 
incorporate this information into a useful, empirically based framework for clinical 
assessment' (p. 947). Webster, Douglas, Eaves and Hart (1997) remarked that 
`... the greatest challenge in what remains of the 1990s is to integrate the almost 
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separate worlds of research on the prediction of violence and the clinical practice of 
assessment. At present the two domains scarcely intersect' (p. 1, cited in Douglas and 
Webster, 1999). 
Over the past decade there have been significant developments in the field of 
risk assessment, and a number of risk assessment schemes have been developed to 
contribute and provide guidance to evidence best clinical practice in an attempt to 
address the imbalance between scientist and practitioner. This has been aided by 
attempts to integrate research and clinical practice via carefully constructed 
assessment schemes such as the HCR-20 (Webster, Douglas, Eaves and Hart, 1997). 
This thesis presents the practical application and evaluation of such a scheme that 
adheres to the scientist-practitioner model. 
2.1.3 Clinical v Actuarial Debate 
A pervading debate within the risk assessment literature relates to 
methodologies applied to risk assessment. This may be seen as one component of 
the larger framework of the scientist-practitioner distinction outlined above. 
Controversies between clinical (practitioner) and actuarial (scientific) approaches to 
risk assessment, first raised by Meehl (1954) over fifty years ago, remain active 
within the literature. The `clinical versus actuarial' debate dichotomises the process 
of risk decision-making (Douglas, et al., 1999). The debate has been associated with 
the types of variables encompassed within each approach, traditionally pitching 
`dynamic'/clinical (changeable) factors against `static'/historical (unchangeable) 
factors. However, the clinical / actuarial distinction was not intended to describe the 
types of variable (static or dynamic), but throughout the literature there is a tendency 
to equate the term actuarial with static risk factors, and ' clinical with dynamic risk 
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factors. This debate may be seen to reflect the move from prediction to prevention- 
based approaches to risk assessment, as the ability to promote and evidence change 
in human behaviour is recognised. This dichotomy illustrates the first two of the 
three approaches (or `generations') of risk assessment that have been prevalent in the 
development of violence risk assessment systems. 
2.2 Generations of Risk Assessment 
2.2.1 The First Generation of Risk Assessment: The Clinical Approach 
The `first generation' of clinical risk assessment methods may be understood 
as the application of professional judgement. Two different procedures may be 
adopted; unstructured professional judgement and anamnestic risk assessment. The 
first procedure, `based solely on unaided clinical judgement' (Dolan and Doyle, 
2000, p. 304) conforms to the unstructured professional judgement model. The 
approach affords the opportunity for clinicians to make risk-related decisions specific 
to current clinical presentation on the basis of experience. The process of clinical 
judgement may be understood as the unstructured collection of information. General 
conclusions and formulations as to the appropriate future planning for the individual 
may be conducted via an interview with the individual, review of the files, and 
discussion with colleagues, however no set structure exists. The final opinion would 
be based purely on the interpretation of the clinician(s). The defensibility of these 
judgements is therefore problematic, as recall as to the decision-making process will 
not necessarily be documented according to a standardised framework. 
Another subcategory of the, clinical assessment that imposes a limited 
framework to guide decision-making is the anamnestic approach. This approach to 
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clinical judgement is not entirely unstructured. Within this approach, clinicians' 
judgements are based on detailed consideration of an individual's history to identify 
risk factors relevant to the subject's prior behaviour. Professional opinion is 
therefore guided by a restricted framework determined by the clinician. The goal of 
this approach is the identification of risk factors and targeted intervention to reduce 
the undesirable behaviour of interest. By focusing on historical variables, the 
approach neglects consideration of dynamic variables relevant to the individual 
assessed. Douglas and Webster (1999) define these dynamic variables as including 
`emotional, psychiatric, or attitudinal experiences, which are subject to fluctuation' 
(p. 195). The anamnestic approach may therefore disregard the possibility of an 
escalation, de-escalation, or even extinction of behaviours of interest, and may not 
allow consideration of progress made in response to treatment intervention(s), and 
the presence of protective factors that may limit the possibility of future recidivism. 
It has been argued that clinical approaches provide important information on 
risk behaviours, and clinical judgements have been shown to be more accurate than 
chance (Gardner, Lidz and Mulvey, 1996). The method offers flexibility in 
understanding stresses related to individuals, and informs risk management strategies 
for individuals, critical to violence prevention (Snowden, 1997; Hart, 1998). The 
approach has also shown multi-disciplinary team consensus ratings to be as robust 
with well-validated actuarial assessment methods (Fuller and Cowan, 1999). 
However, the approach has been criticised. Actuarial approaches outperform 
clinical assessments across a diverse range of offender types (Bonta, 2002). ' Grove 
and Meehl (1996) assert that `clinical experience is only a prestigious synonym for 
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anecdotal evidence when the anecdotes are told by somebody with a professional 
degree and a licence to practice a healing art'. Monahan (1984) found only one in 
three unstructured clinical predictions of violence to be accurate. Criticisms of the 
method include low inter-rater reliability, low validity and a failure to specify the 
decision-making process (Dolan et al., 2000; Webster, Douglas and Eaves, 1997) and 
`inferior predictive validity compared to actuarial predictions' (Dolan et al., 2000, 
p. 304). Overall, the unstructured or semi-structured clinical approach has therefore 
been seen to yield poor predictive efficacy and has been rejected by policy makers as 
a suitable use for risk assessment (Risk Management Authority, 2007). 
2.2.2 The Second Generation of Risk Assessment: The Actuarial Decision 
Making Approach 
Historically, actuarial scales have been used to identify individuals who are 
likely to pose a risk to society. The first actuarial scheme proposed by Lombroso in 
the early 20`h century was constructed from the observations of autopsies of 
criminals. From this an eight item checklist was developed to identify individuals 
who resembled `species from an earlier evolutionary period' (Bonta, 2002). Items 
included factors such as very long arms, large and protruding lips, flattened nose 
(indicative of a thief), or a beak (indicating a murderer). Other characteristics of 
offenders included ears "standing out like a chimpanzee" and a chin, long "as in 
apes", and eye defects. This scheme was adopted by the federal Government as a 
theory from which to ascertain deprivation of liberty and the death penalty. 
Statistical predictions to inform the accuracy of risk prediction have become 
more sophisticated. The `second generation' of actuarial risk assessment instruments 
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(ARAIs), or "mechanical" / "algorithmic" approaches (Grove & Meehl, 1996, p. 293) 
methods utilise statistical techniques to generate risk predictors, and provide a 
predetermined framework for clinicians to code items relevant to risk (Meehl, 1954). 
Formal algorithmic approaches may therefore be applied to classify the probability of 
risk of an identified future outcome. 
This approach has been successfully utilised by other agencies wishing to 
assess the risk of individuals. Actuarial analysis has provided the basis for decision- 
making processes related to the calculation of insurance premiums. Underwriters 
consider key variables based on previous factors that have correlated positively or 
negatively to the incidence (or probability) of an accident (e. g. age, gender, engine 
size, modification from manufacturer's original specification), or theft (geographical 
area, parking of vehicle at night). A numerical score may be allocated to a range of 
risk factors known to be predictive of outcome behaviours of interest (accident, 
theft), yielding an overall figure indicative of level of risk from which a premium 
may be calculated. This process is possible due to detailed information about large 
numbers of individuals for whom data related to certain risk factors may be 
correlated with the incidence of accidents or theft to identify which variables 
increase the likelihood of a claim. In the same way, forensic psychiatry and 
psychology has attempted to establish empirical relationships between risk factors 
and the criterion variable (outcome behaviour of interest, for example violence). 
Various statistical methods such as logistic regression have been used in the 
development of actuarial schemes to identify elevated risk of violence and other 
undesirable behaviours within individuals and groups (Borum, 1996). 
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Actuarial schemes for assessing risk of violence include the Hare 
Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 1991,2002); Psychopathy Checklist 
- 
Screening Version (PCL-SV; Hart, Cox, Hare, 1995) and Violence Risk Scale (VRS, 
Wong and Gordon, 2001). Risk assessment schemes to identify risk of sexual 
recidivism utilising the actuarial approach include the Sex Offender Risk Appraisal 
Guide (SORAG; Quinsey, Harris, Rice & Cromier, 2006); Rapid Risk Assessment 
for Sex Offence Recidivism (RRASOR; Hanson, 1997); Static 99 (Hanson & 
Thornton, 1999); Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool 
- 
Revised (MnSORT-R; 
Epperson, Kaul & Hesselton, 1998); Sex Offending Needs Assessment Rating 
(SONAR; Hanson & Harris, 2000) and general recidivism assessed by application of 
the Level of Service Inventory (LSI-R; Andrews & Bonta, 1995), and the Offender 
Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS ; Taylor, 1999). A summary of each of the tools 
is included in Table 2.1. 
The actuarial method has greater support than clinical approaches in 
determining reliable predictive accuracy. However, the processes involved in risk 
decision-making for forming business decisions are very distinct from the processes 
and complexities involved in risk decision-making of offending behaviours. 
Webster and Hucker (2007) assert that the complex issues within a forensic context 
reflect greater uncertainty than other applications. Uncertainty may be due to lower 
numbers of forensic individuals (hundreds) compared to civilians (millions), and so 
the attempt to produce group based norms to guide the assessment process for certain 
individuals may be less reliable within a forensic population (see Chapter Five for a 
full discussion). 
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This actuarial method has greater support than clinical approaches in 
determining reliable predictive accuracy. However, such a method has its 
limitations. The technique allows a comparison of norms generalised from a 
population for application to the individual under assessment. The risk predictor 
variables identified in actuarial risk assessment tools and behaviour rating scale are 
often based on the use of meta-analyses. As a result, Kemshall (2001) argues that the 
risk predictors result in overly simplistic outcomes that fail to capture the complexity 
of the individual processes involved. Hart, Mitchie and Cooke (2007) assert that 
professionals should avoid use of ARAIs, `as the predictive accuracy of these tests 
may be too low to support their use when making high-stakes decisions about 
individuals', and review the ` difficulties of predicting the outcomes for groups versus 
individuals' (p. 63). Despite the criticisms of the actuarial approach, group-based 
data comparing the likelihood of an `individual's failure or success rate relative to 
individuals with many of the same basic characteristics' has been utilised to inform 
decisions related to regime, level of security and subsequent release (Webster and 
Hucker, 2007). 
Dolan and Doyle (2000) state that schemes focusing entirely on a limited 
number of variables may `fail to prioritise clinically relevant variables and minimise 
the role of professional judgement' (p. 304) by limiting decision making to risk 
factors thought to be predictive of violence, at the expense of more flexible 
approaches. Reliance on a few risk factors (therefore disregarding the possibility of 
the influence of other static and dynamic factors), therefore limits identification of 
other potential variables that may be relevant. The approach also fails to allow 
consideration of the presence of mitigating (or protective) aspects of behaviour (such 
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as successful participation in offending behaviour programmes) that may reduce an 
individual's risk. 
Bonta (2002) criticises the actuarial approach suggesting that it fails to 
consider any underlying theory of behaviour changes over an individual's life span, 
including individual and environmental factors. A further assertion is made, that if 
there were such an integration of theory, there would be many more items of a 
dynamic nature in the original construction of these schemes. In addition to the 
failure of some assessment schemes to allow opportunity for consideration of the 
dynamic factors on future behaviour, the `additive nature' of risk factors may not be 
seen as prevalent in actuarial approaches. For example, the interaction between risk 
factors such as substance misuse and major mental illness may not be considered in 
making a risk-related judgement. It is for this reason that the approach has been 
criticised as being limited. Webster and Hucker (2007) cite an analogy between 
clinicians and meteorologists. The role of the meteorologist is informed by the 
output of computational models that are then amended according to locality. In this 
way the experience of the expert may add value to a judgement and subsequent 
action. This may be an appropriate strategy to adopt within mental health risk 
assessment decision-making processes. 
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2.2.3 Summary of First and Second Generation Approaches to Risk 
Assessment 
Each approach to risk assessment has its limitations. The clinical approach 
has been criticised for its unstructured, subjective interpretation and the actuarial 
approach for its narrow focus and reliance upon group-based norms and deterministic 
framework of risk factors and focus on prediction. As Reid (1992, p. 949) asserts: `It 
is clear... that we cannot, and will never be able to predict with reasonable medical 
certainty future violence'. Whichever approach is adopted, it is unlikely that 
unstructured judgements in isolation, or reliance on numerical values in isolation will 
increase the accuracy of risk related judgements. It may therefore be argued that an 
adherence to both approaches is necessary (Monahan and Steadman, 1996) and 
application of systems that considers both clinical and actuarial approaches 
encompassing both static and dynamic factors should be adopted. By considering 
both historical and current factors of an individual's behaviour, clinical experience 
may then be utilised to make inferences as to not only the possibility (prediction) of 
future behavioural manifestations, but also the probable frequency, severity and 
victim(s). Consolidation and consideration of the full range of risk factors will then 
inform the formulation of risk management plans to assist in the prevention of 
antisocial behaviours. 
The debate as to which approach is `best' appears to be unresolved, and 
despite concerns as to the accuracy of the predictive accuracy of clinicians, courts 
and mental health review tribunals rely on the opinion and risk-related judgements of 
mental health professionals. The perfect prediction approach does not exist, but, in 
its absence, clinicians should be informed by and adhere to an approach that is based 
on the ` best practice' available at the time (Webster and Hucker, 2007). 
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2.2.4 The Third Generation of Risk Assessment: Structured Professional 
Judgement Approach as Evidence-Based Clinical Practice 
The clinical versus actuarial debate has had implications for the development 
of the `third generation' of risk assessment known as structured professional 
judgement. Structured professional judgement (SPJ) is an approach that combines 
both actuarial and clinical methods. The approach has integrated the benefits of 
research with the process of violence risk assessment in clinical practice. The 
combined approach has bridged the gap between the two methods, and between the 
dichotomy of group and individual risk assessment techniques. The approach may 
be utilised by clinicians to assist the formulation of opinions related to risk 
judgements by applying the evidence base for risk factors to individual patient 
assessment (Bouch and Marshall, 2005). 
Clinical risk prediction following structured clinical judgement is therefore 
informed by empirical knowledge, and by the experience of the professionals making 
the judgement, and so encompasses the scientist-practitioner model. The system 
allows clinicians to use their professional discretion, and is less restrictive when 
compared to actuarial measures alone (Hart, 1998). Structured professional 
guidelines have been constructed to provide a framework from which clinicians may 
consider risk factors informed by theory and empirical evidence. In this way, 
guidelines should be indicative of the outcome behaviour of interest. The approach 
differs from the actuarial approach, as equal weighting is not allocated to each of the 
risk factors presented, and the overall evaluation of risk is determined by the 
assessor(s) professional judgement (Webster and Hucker, 2007). 
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Different outcomes of risk may result from the application of different risk 
assessment processes. Application of an actuarial scheme may result in identification 
of an individual as high risk of future recidivism due to his offending history. The 
same individual, assessed using a structured professional judgement tool, may be 
assessed as low risk. An example may be a violent offender who, at a young age was 
convicted of charges of grievous bodily harm, and armed robbery, but as a result of 
being shot and injured at the scene of the offence became paralysed. Assessment 
utilising an actuarial scheme would identify the individual as high risk due. to the 
presence of static risk factors. Assessment using professional judgement would 
allow flexibility of decision making to allow for consideration of factors that reduce 
the same individual's risk. 
The development of `empirically-based structured clinical decision-making 
schemes' has therefore resulted in a recent focus on the management of high-risk 
behaviour (Macpherson and Kevan, 2004, p. 63). The SPJ approach and associated 
guidelines may therefore be used to guide discussions within multidisciplinary teams, 
resulting in the formulation of individualised risk management plans allowing for 
consideration of idiosyncratic factors. 
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2.3 Empirically-Based Structured Clinical Decision-Making 
Schemes 
Table 2.1 includes a number of actuarial measures and structured professional 
guidelines used to determine different types of risk tailored to the needs of the 
population under study. Broad categories include assessment specific to the 
assessment of violent or sexual recidivism, spousal violence, general risk, and risk of 
violence within the workplace. 
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A number of structured professional assessment schemes have evolved from 
actuarial schemes (such as the PCL-R). As illustrated in the table above, SPJ 
guidelines for the assessment of violence recidivism include the HCR-20, HCR- 
20CG, START, VRAG, EARL-20B, EARL-21G, and the SARA (for the assessment 
of spousal violence recidivism). Schemes adopting the SPJ approach have also been 
developed to assess risk of sexual recidivism (SVR-20) and violence within the 
workplace (WRA-20; ERA-20). Each encompasses a framework of decision-making 
variables based on clinical and theoretical knowledge. The partnership between 
research and clinical practice has been well established in these (predominantly 
North American) systems, and their use has been reflected in best practice guidelines 
within the UK. 
The development of explicit practice guidelines has assisted in evidencing 
adherence to Tort liability principles. According to Tort principles (similar to the 
Tarasoff law above), if a mental health professional is challenged as to their 
judgement, an evaluation will be made as to `whether the decision was reasonably 
made' on the basis of the available information (Borum, 1996, p. 952), but they will 
not be held responsible for the accuracy of the decision. By incorporating structured 
guidelines in clinical practice a consistent, defendable process of risk assessment 
may be demonstrated if challenged (for example during a malpractice claim, or 
defending a judgement at Mental Health Review Tribunal). 
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Macpherson and Kevan (2004) assert that mental health professionals have a 
responsibility to demonstrate evidence-based risk assessments. In the UK, the 
Department of Health's (DOH, 2007) Best Practice in Managing Risk documentation 
states that: `Where suitable tools are available, risk management should be based on 
assessment using the structured clinical judgement approach', advice that is 
consistent with recommendations from the Scottish Risk Management Authority 
(RMA, 2007). NICE guidelines (January, 2009) also recommend the use of 
structured clinical assessments (explicitly, the HCR-20) to develop an effective risk 
management strategy within forensic services. As the SPJ approach combines both 
actuarial and clinical methods, associated guides, therefore, integrate the benefits of 
research with the process of risk assessment in clinical practice. The combined 
approach has bridged the gap between the two methods, and between the dichotomy 
of group and individual risk assessment techniques. The approach may be utilised by 
clinicians to assist opinion related risk judgements by combining the evidence base 
for risk factors with individual patient assessment. In this way the SPJ approach may 
be seen to promote the transparency of decision-making within the framework of 
clinical governance (Bouch and Marshall, 2005). 
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2.4 The HCR-20 
The HCR-20 (Webster et al., 1997) is a widely used violence risk assessment 
scheme that utilises the SPJ format. It was developed with the aim of improving the 
accuracy of risk assessment and violence prediction within clinical practice and 
contains variables whose relationship with violence is supported by research. The 
risk assessment scheme was designed for use where there are a `high proportion of 
persons with histories of violence, and a strong suggestion of mental illness or 
personality disorder' (Webster et al., 1997, p. 5), and so is relevant to community, 
hospital and prison settings. Combining the predictive power of both actuarial (static) 
and dynamic (changeable) factors, the HCR-20 comprises three sections. The 
scheme organises empirically and theoretically defined risk factors for violence into 
the past, present and future. The H (Historical) section consists of ten items 
reflecting past violent behaviour, diagnoses of mental illness/personality disorder, 
psychopathy and social maladjustment. The C (Clinical) section comprises five 
items concerning dynamic clinical factors indicative of increasing violence risk 
(current clinical presentation). The final, R (Risk Management) section of five 
dynamic items, assesses individual's adjustment to future circumstances that may 
aggravate or mitigate prospective risk of violence. 
2.4.1 Historical, Clinical and Risk Factors 
The Historical items of the HCR-20 comprise fifty per cent of the risk factors 
and include: H1, previous violence; H2, age at first violent incident; H3, relationship 
instability; H4, employment problems; H5, substance use problems; H6, major 
mental illness; H7, psychopathy (scored using the PCL-R); H8, early childhood 
maladjustment; H9, personality disorder; and H 10, prior supervision failure. 
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Five Clinical items are related to a person's current functioning, and 
contribute to twenty-five per cent of the overall scheme. Factors include: Cl, lack of 
insight; C2, negative attitudes; C3, active symptoms of major mental illness; C4, 
impulsivity; and C5 unresponsiveness to treatment. It is anticipated that the dynamic 
factors will change over time (supported by subsequent assessments), and hence can 
be the focus of intervention and management strategies. 
The remaining five Risk Management items concern assessment of factors 
associated with future likelihood of risk related behaviours. Assessors are asked to 
assess the likelihood of behaviour for the coming months. The items include: R1, 
plans lack feasibility; R2, exposure to destabilisers; R3, lack of personal support; R4, 
noncompliance with remediation attempts; R5, stress. Within this category a 
distinction between the nature of likely future `containment' is made. For example, 
risk-related judgements made within the context of further detention within an 
institution versus reintegration into the community may yield distinct outcomes. 
The items of the HCR-20 are supported from item definitions that may be 
readily accessed by assessors by use of the associated manual (see Table 3.1, Chapter 
Three for a summary of item definitions). Detailed scoring instructions guide 
judgement as to how to appropriately score an individual in relation to the item 
defined. The definitions allow for a common language of understanding between 
clinicians from whom, in the absence of structured definitions may apply the 
influence of differing theoretical perspectives or understanding. 
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2.4.2 Scoring of the HCR-20 
Each of the twenty items can be scored on a three-point scale indicative of the 
presence, possible presence or absence of each of the factors. A0 score indicates the 
absence or lack of applicability to the item; 1 represents the possibility of presence of 
the item; and 2 reflects the definite presence of the risk factor. Items may be omitted 
in the instance of unreliable or missing information. The scores on each item may 
then be added to yield a subscale scores for each cluster of risk (20 for Historical, 10 
for Clinical, and 10 for Risk Management) and a total score of 40. 
2.4.3 Final Judgements of Risk 
After consideration of risk factors, the assessor(s) must then reach a summary 
judgement relating to overall violence risk within either an institution or community 
environment using a three-point scale. Final risk judgements may be: `Low' 
reflecting belief that the individual does not present a risk of future violence (or 
presents as very low risk); `Moderate' scores may be allocated to individuals for 
whom an elevated risk for violence has been identified; and a `High' score would 
represent a very high risk for future violence. 
2.4.4 Risk Management Plans 
In response to these summary judgements, available resources may be 
allocated. For example, following a judgement of low risk, an individual may be 
deemed as not requiring additional supervision or intervention strategies outside the 
normal constraints of the institutional regime. A risk management plan may be 
developed and implemented in response to a judgement of moderate risk, including 
an identified date for review to ascertain elevated or reduced levels of risk, and the 
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further adjustment of risk management plans. A high-risk judgement should act as a 
trigger for the need to develop and implement a carefully constructed risk 
management plan to encompass arrangements for intervention and supervision as a 
priority. A shared understanding between clinical team members as to the likely 
nature, severity and frequency of anticipated violent behaviours should be promoted 
in an attempt to minimise the likelihood of the behaviour manifesting. 
The authors of the HCR-20 gave equal weighting to the number of static and 
dynamic items. Although a numerical score is allocated to each of the items yielding 
subscale and total scores, guidelines are not given in terms of categorisation of 
individuals. That is, there are no attempts to allocate a level of risk scores on the 
basis of numerical value. An individual scoring 10 from the possible 40 may be 
identified as high risk if, for example he displays active symptoms of major mental 
illness (for example psychosis adversely affecting self-control (scored 2), coupled 
with negative attitudes (scored 2), and an offending history from an early age (scored 
2) of a severe nature (scored 2) resulting in the murder of his wife (evidencing 
relationship instability, scored 2), but displaying an absence of any other factor. 
Conversely, an individual may have the presence of all the Historical items (scored 
20), impulsivity (scored 2), lack of personal support (scored 2) and stress (scored 2) 
that would yield a total score of 26. However, as in the case of a patient detained for 
18 years with no adjudications or management problems, the clinical team may judge 
the individual as low risk. Due to the flexible nature of the HCR-20 as a SPJ 
approach, the experience of the clinical team may be exercised to make an 
appropriate final risk related judgement to inform a risk management plan. 
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There is a wealth of literature demonstrating the use of the HCR-20 in 
predicting violence relevant to civil, forensic and correctional populations (McNiel, 
Gregory, Lam Binder & Sullivan, 2003; Grevatt, Thomas-Peter, & Hughes, 2004; 
Doyle & Dolan, 2006). The tool has shown good inter-rater reliability (de Vogel, de 
Ruiter, Hildebrand, Bos, van de Ven, 2004; Dahle, 2006). Validity studies have 
included research of violent recidivism in discharged psychiatric patients (Dernevik, 
Grann, and Johannson, 2002), the prediction of intra-institutional violence in 
maximum-security correctional settings (Daffern, 2007; Belfrage, Fransson and 
Strand, 2000; McNeil and Binder, 1995; Nichols, Vincent, Whitemoor and Ogloff, 
1999; Muller-Isberner, Sommer, Ozokayay and Freese, 1999) and further validated 
on various populations of disordered offenders in a variety of settings (Dernevik et 
al., 2002; Douglas and Webster, 1999; Strand, Belfrage, Franson and Lavender, 
1999). 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
It is apparent that there is a need for mental health professionals to 
S} 
S 
demonstrate effective risk assessment techniques. The first two generations of risk 
assessment (clinical and actuarial approaches) lead to a third known as structured 
professional judgement. Risk decision-making schemes such as the HCR-20 and 
other SPJ methods adhere to evidence-based clinical practice, and facilitate a 
reciprocal process between clinicians and researchers. Webster and Hucker (2007) 
recently stated that two challenges exist. The first, `... to find out how best they (SPJ 
schemes) can be introduced to settings in such a way that they will be understood, 
accepted, and developed by clinicians', and the second, to `verify and refine' the 
guidelines used in practice. Each of these challenges will be the focus of the 
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chapters that follow. The first challenge will be investigated via study of the process 
of implementation of a system of structured professional judgement to a high-secure 
forensic setting (Chapter Three), and perception of its clinical utility and practical 
application (Chapter Four). The second and third challenges will be investigated via 
studies to ascertain the predictive validity (Chapter Five) and the applicability of the 
system to the reduction and management of high-risk behaviour (Chapter Six). The 
empirical work presented in the subsequent chapters will attempt to clarify how a 
novel system of structured professional judgement may be implemented to address 
the needs of a high-secure forensic setting. 
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Chapter Three 
Process of Implementation of a System of 
Structured Professional Judgement within a 
High Secure Hospital 
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3.1 Introduction and Context for Structuring Professional 
Judgements within a High Secure Hospital 
The previous chapter established that literature, and practice guidelines 
indicate that the SPJ approach may lead to a more comprehensive review of risk 
factors, (when compared to clinical or actuarial methods). The work described below 
follows from a decision within a high secure forensic psychiatric hospital in the UK 
that a structured method of facilitating clinical team judgements of risk should be 
devised and implemented. The HCR-20, as an existing validated method of 
structuring clinical judgement, was chosen as a framework for clinical teams to rate 
specific areas of risk (Webster et al., 1997). 
Patient risk factors, and their utility for violence prediction have been 
established within the literature (see Chapter Five), yet the availability and 
application of clinically viable and efficient systems for making and documenting 
risk related decisions in response to the demands of a high-secure setting are limited. 
Webster and Hucker (2007) state that `new research on implementation processes are 
now as much in need as are more studies of basic validity issues' (p. 90). The focus 
of this chapter involves an investigation of the processes involved in the practical 
implementation of a structured risk assessment tool within a high secure forensic 
psychiatric setting to ensure that the system is used within clinical practice. 
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3.2 Setting, Admission Criteria and Patient Population 
The current investigation was conducted within Rampton Hospital, 
Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust. Rampton Hospital is one of three high- 
secure special hospitals in England and Wales. The majority of patients are accepted 
following referrals from the Criminal Justice System (prison, secure hospitals and the 
courts). A hospital restriction order to a secure hospital may be imposed by the 
Crown Court under mental health legislation for England and Wales (Jamieson and 
Taylor, 2004). This process is actioned where an individual has committed an 
imprisonable offence and is deemed to present a significant risk to the public. As a 
consequence, the offender would be contained within a hospital (healthcare) setting 
rather than a prison establishment. 
Patients detained at Rampton Hospital have the presence of a mental disorder 
s 
I 
as defined in the ICD-10 (International Classification of Mental and Behavioural 
Disorders) or DSM-IV-TR (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders). 
Patients between the ages of eighteen and sixty-five are detained under the Mental 
Health Act (1983) legal classification of Mental Disorder (according to section 1 of 
the Act). These include Mental Illness, Mental Impairment, Severe Mental 
Impairment or Psychopathic Disorder, often under more than one classification. The 
detention must be legitimised by the appropriateness of the mental disorder to the 
process of be subject to assessment and or treatment. In the presence of mental 
impairment or psychopathic disorder, detention under conditions of high security is 
only possible if the provision of treatment is anticipated to prevent a deterioration of 
their condition, or alleviate symptoms. 
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A further rationale for admission to a special hospital rests on the notion that 
the patients `represent a grave and immediate danger to the public' or self, and 
therefore should be contained in high secure hospitals as they `require treatment 
under conditions of high-security on account of their dangerous, violent or criminal 
propensities' (Mental Health Act, 1983). Due to the presence of immediate risk to 
others, regimes adhering to the highest level of security are appropriate to safeguard 
the public. The admission guidelines of Rampton Hospital state: `It is an 
unacceptable infringement of a patient's rights to detain them in a higher level of 
security than they require'. The National Service Framework for Mental Health 
(Standard 5) similarly states that patients must be detained in an environment that is 
the least restrictive to ensure protection of the service user and the public. 
The necessity to detain individuals within a high-secure hospital is therefore 
verified by the presence of a mental disorder. In addition, the presence of one or 
more types of behaviour must be present to categorise an individual as representing a 
grave and immediate risk. These behaviours include evidence of: (a) unprovoked or 
planned serious assaults on others (including other patients and staff in secure 
establishments that, if contained in a less-secure environment, may present 
management problems); (b) planned use of weapons (such as knives, firearms or 
explosives). Planning may warrant conditions of high-security, compared to 
opportunistic use which may require containment in conditions of less security; (c) 
threats, intimidation or aggression toward another. This may be apparent in a 
community or institutional setting warranting conditions of high security due to the 
risk of actual physical violence toward another that may result in injury or death; (d) 
serious sexual assault or sadistic behaviour (that could not be managed in a medium 
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secure single-sex unit); (e) arson (where supervision at medium secure units would 
not be adequate to protect risk of serious harm to others via fire setting); (fj drug or 
poison administration to others; (g) actual or attempted hostage-taking; (h) 
absconding or escape from secure institutions; (i) alcohol or drug use (if the risk of 
consumption is likely to result in the increased risk of harm to others. Admission to 
high-secure hospital is therefore reserved for patients for whom conditions of lesser 
security would not be adequate, as the risk of harm to others would be unacceptable. 
3.2.1 Directorates 
The hospital is comprised of five Directorates with a total population (at the 
time of writing) of n=345: The Peaks (or Dangerous and Severe Personality 
Disorder (DSPD), n=45); Personality Disorder (n=66); Mental Health (n=141); 
Learning Disability (n=44); and a service for Women (n=49). Each Directorate 
provides assessment, treatment, care and rehabilitation for its client group. 
Each Directorate adheres to the Mental Health Act Code of Practice in 
providing a service to assess and treat patients with mental health needs (detained 
under the MHA, 1983). The Peaks Unit has admitted patients since March 2004. The 
service is one of four developed to contain patients thought to be dangerous and 
severely personality disordered. The remaining three sites are at Broadmoor High- 
Secure Hospital, HMP Whitemoor and HMP Frankland. The service was developed 
as part of the Government's strategy to manage and contain persistent sexual and 
violent crimes committed by individuals with a personality disorder who are an 
elevated risk for future offending. The Peaks Unit consists of seven wards; six 
providing treatment and one assessment. Patients are admitted if they fulfil the 
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following three criteria: present as posing a "risk of serious harm" (where it is judged 
that the victim would be unlikely to recover physically or psychologically); "severe 
disorder of personality" (defined by a score of over 30 on Hare's Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised scale (PCL-R), or a score of between 25 and 29 on the PCL-R 
plus a personality disorder, not including anti-social personality disorder, or two or 
more personality disorders), and "a functional link between the two" (Daffern and 
Howells, 2007, p. 139). The Personality Disorder Directorate (PD) comprises seven 
wards for men diagnosed as having personality disorder with diagnoses such as 
borderline, anti-social, schizoid, narcissistic and paranoid personality disorders. The 
Mental Health (MH) Directorate consists of ten wards; two admission; two 
treatment; one intensive unit; one high dependency villa; and one providing specialist 
psycho-social interventions. Clinical diagnoses of psychosis are generally consistent 
with the legal category of mental illness (Taylor, 1998). Diagnoses include 
schizophrenia, delusional and schizoaffective disorders. The Learning Disability 
(LD) Directorate provides a service for men with the presence of a learning disability 
and / or mental disorder. The Women's Service (WS) Directorate provides a 
(national) service to females requiring care within a high-secure setting. Treatment 
provision is given to female offenders with Mental Illness, Personality Disorder and 
Learning Disability and so encompasses all mental disorders. 
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3.3 Identification of Need for Risk Assessment within High Secure 
Hospitals 
3.3.1 The Tilt Review of Security 
The need for a clear system of risk assessment and management in high 
secure hospitals was identified following the 'Tilt' review of security and a number of 
high profile incidents (Tilt, Perry, Martin, Maguire & Preston, 2000). The outcome 
and conclusion of the Tilt report recommended an increased provision of therapy and 
activity for patients and an upgrading of physical security to safeguard the public, 
staff and patients across three high-secure hospitals in the UK. 
The Tilt review of security was conducted following a recommendation from 
an earlier inquiry into serious allegations made by a former patient of the Personality 
Disorder Unit at Ashworth High Secure Hospital. Recommendation 7 of 89 made 
during the Ashworth Inquiry (Fallon, Blueglass & Edwards, 1999) suggested `... that 
an independent review of all aspects of physical security... ' should be conducted. 
Sir Richard Tilt (former director of the English Prison Service) chaired a review team 
to conduct the investigation across all three high-security hospitals in England 
(Ashworth, Broadmoor and Rampton). The review emphasised physical and 
procedural security and provided recommendations for improvements related to 
security policies and practice in each of the three high secure hospitals (Exworthy 
and Gunn, 2003). 
The Tilt review represented a challenge to balance the therapeutic and 
security needs of an offending population with complex needs. However, when the 
review was published, it was criticised by clinical professionals working within 
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forensic psychiatric hospitals. The review was seen to be ill-informed and imposing 
of a prison culture to security in a previously therapeutic environment. The report 
emphasised recommendations for increased physical security, including the 
construction of perimeter security, and access to patient areas via magnetic lock and 
key systems equivalent to that of a high-secure prison. The cost of the 
recommendations was £25 million, despite the fact that "... there have been no 
escapes (since 1994) or absconsions from 1997 onwards... " (Tilt et al., 2000). 
Despite a lack of supporting evidence, the review also recommended that 
"... the feasibility of locking rooms at night of all patients on admission and intensive 
care wards, and all `high-risk' patients should be examined" (Tilt et al., 2000). The 
potential implications of this recommendation were met with opposition as the 
review, in effect, suggested the locking of patients in their rooms overnight at a time 
when they were at their most vulnerable (when newly admitted or requiring intensive 
care). The recommendation could therefore be viewed as a potential destabiliser to 
the very behaviour that the review was attempting to minimise. 
The report was also criticised for neglecting to address the relational security 
needs of high-secure hospitals. Exworthy and Gunn (2003) note, "In contrast (to 
physical and procedural security), relational security is scarcely mentioned in the 
entire report". Recommendations to increase resources and provisions to address the 
treatment and rehabilitation needs of patients at a humanistic (rather than punitive) 
level were therefore not addressed to the same extent as physical and procedural 
security. Recommendations from the Tilt review have nevertheless been 
implemented, and have impacted on the physical and procedural security within 
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high-secure hospitals, supplemented by attempts by clinical staff to ensure the 
provision of good clinical care and promotion of relational security. 
In terms of improving procedural security, the review recommended `that a 
procedure should be set up for the hospitals to identify "high risk" patients'. 
Following the identification of such a population, provisions could be made relating 
to `special procedural security arrangements for such "high risk" patients obviating 
the need for any extra strengthening of physical security' (p. 16). 
As a consequence of the Tilt review of security, a system to document risk 
decisions with particular reference to five defined factors was required. These 
factors relate to: (i) the immediate risk of harming others; (ii) the risk of suicide or 
self-harm; (iii) vulnerability to risk from others; (iv) the risk of escape; and (v) the 
risk of organised action in collaboration with others to subvert security and safety. 
The need for a flexible, clinically viable risk assessment system to document 
risk related decisions within a high secure forensic service was therefore identified 
by the review. The importance of embedding the risk assessment and management 
processes as part of routine clinical care within the framework of clinical 
governance, multidisciplinary working and evidence-based practice was also 
highlighted. Rampton Hospital's Management Group decided that a risk assessment 
scheme to identify and manage patient risk as defined by the Tilt review should be 
developed as a priority, and that the system should be used routinely as part of 
ongoing practice by all clinical teams within the hospital. The HCR-20, as an 
existing validated risk assessment ool, was adapted (with the explicit consent of the 
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original authors) in an attempt to answer the five Tilt questions above. The scheme 
followed the SPJ approach, known as the Structured Clinical Judgement Risk 
Assessment Scheme (SCJ: Risk) and adopted an incremental development process. 
The system was first conceptualised, piloted and formally implemented, and entered 
a phase of maintenance between 2004 and 2008. The process was managed by the 
current author (described in detail below). 
3.4 Materials 
3.4.1 Structured Clinical Judgement: Risk Assessment Scheme (SCJ: Risk). 
Utilising an Existing Evidence Base of the HCR-20 to Structure Clinical 
Judgement 
The SCJ: Risk scheme follows a format consistent with the HCR-20, with Tilt 
factors integrated within the document (Figure 3.1). By basing the additional factors 
within the existing framework of the HCR-20 as a validated tool, the activity of 
clinical teams ought to be informed by evidence-based practice. The SCJ: Risk 
factors were informed by clinical evidence in an attempt to facilitate clinical 
judgement in each of the areas of concern particular to a high secure hospital. 
3.4.2 The SCJ: Risk 
The method of structuring clinical judgements has been incorporated in the 
SCJ: Risk system. The SCJ: Risk contains the existing historical (H), clinical (C) 
and risk (R) factors from the HCR-20, but also contains three additional categories of 
risk (as defined by the Tilt review). The SCJ: Risk system therefore contains six 
clusters of judgements relating to risk. The SCJ: Risk document may be found in 
Appendix 1.1. 
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3.4.3 Construction of SCJ: Risk factors 
The SCJ: Risk factors were informed by clinical evidence in an attempt to 
facilitate clinical judgement in each of the areas of concern particular to a high 
secure hospital. A panel of experienced forensic clinicians from the disciplines of 
psychiatry, psychology and security developed and agreed the additional factors of 
the SCJ: Risk. The present investigator was not involved in the construction of the 
SCJ: Risk document. Drafts of proposed risk factors were circulated among 
practitioners within the hospital to gauge their conceptual and operational utility. 
Clarification and refinement of item definitions on the basis of new clinical and 
empirical knowledge was achieved via a pilot of the use of the SCJ: Risk. The 
present investigator was not involved in the construction of the SCJ: Risk. 
The item definitions were written in a way to reflect those of the HCR-20 in 
l 
;' 
an attempt to operationalise the principles of risk assessment and management 
relevant to the needs of a high-secure hospital. In this way, it was hoped that 
professional consensus would be achieved by means of the construction of clearly 
articulated risk factors for assessing and managing patients who may be at risk of 
violence, self-harm/suicide, vulnerability, escape or subversion. 
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3.5 Additional Risk Factors of the SCJ: Risk 
In addition to the historical, clinical and risk factors, the SCJ: Risk document 
f 
incorporates three areas relating to: suicide and self-harm (S); vulnerability (V); and 
escape (E). The suicide/self-harm, vulnerability and escape/subversion items relate 
to the extent to which the identified factors have been present or absent `currently 
and in the past three months' (Richardson and Hogue, 2006). The ratings relate to 
the extent to which suicide/self harm have been demonstrated (S); the extent to 
which an individual is vulnerable to risk of harm from others (V); and the possibility 
of the individual escaping absconding or acting in a subversive manner including 
taking a hostage (E). An additional ten items relevant to the setting of a high secure 
hospital were included in the historical section of the SCJ: Risk. The risk factors of 
the SCJ: Risk were written and coded in a way to reflect the HCR-20, indicating 
clinical opinion if the item is present (yes), absent (no), or partially present (maybe). 
A list of the original HCR-20 risk factors, and the additional risk factors of the SCJ: 
Risk is presented below in Figure 3.1. A summary of the risk factors and codings is 
presented in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Content List for the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk Prediction Tools 
HCR-201(V2) 
(Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart, 1997) 
SCJ: Risk= 
(Richardson and Hogue, 2006) 
H1 Previous violence HI Previous violence 
H2 Young age at first violent H2 Young age at first violent 
incident incident 
H3 Relationship instability H3 Relationship instability 
H4 Employment problems H4 Employment problems 
115 Substance misuse problems 115 Substance misuse problems 
H6 Major mental illness H6 Major mental illness 
H7 Psychopathy (PCL-RJPCL-SV) H7 Psychopathy (PCL-R/PCL-SV) 
H8 Early maladjustment H8 Early maladjustment 
119 Personality disorder H9 Personality disorder 
1110 Prior supervision failure H10 Prior supervision failure 
H11 Child protection 
Cl Lack of insight H12 Sex Offending 
C2 Negative attitudes H13 Suicide 
C3 Active symptoms of major mental H14 Self-harm 
Illness H15 Arson 
C4 Impulsivity 1116 Hostage taking 
C5 Unresponsive to treatment H17 Weapons 
HIS Concerted Indiscipline 
H19 High public or political Interest 
H2O Escape / abscond history 
RI Plans lack feasibility 
R2 Exposure to destabilsers Cl Lack of insight 
R3 Lack of personal support C2 Negative attitudes 
R4 Non-compliance with remediation C3 Active symptoms of major 
attempts mental illness 
R5 Stress C4 Impulsivity 
C5 Unresponsive to treatment 
Si Frequency 
S2 Severity 
S3 Hopelessness 
S4 Planning 
S5 Suicidal Ideation 
VI Mental State 
V2 Physical/physiological problems 
V3 Psychological problems 
V4 Social problems 
VS Exploitation 
El Planning 
E2 Incentive 
E3 Interest in security 
E4 Mental disorder 
ES Subversive behaviour 
RI Plans lack feasibility 
R2 Exposure to destabilsers 
R3 Lack of personal support 
R4 Non-compliance with 
remediation attempts 
R5 Stress 
HI-10 relate to history, C1-5 to clinical and Rl-5 to risk. 
2 H1-20 relate to history, C1-5 to clinical, S 1-5 to suicide or self-harm, V 1-5 to vulnerability, E 1-5 to escape and subversion, 
R 1-5 to risk management 
SOURCE: Adapted from Webster, Douglas, Eaves, & Hart (1997). Used with permission from the authors. 
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3.5.1 Risk Scenario Planning 
The SCJ: Risk also incorporates a Risk Scenario Planning Section. Bjorkly 
(1995) asserts `assessment of risk situations in a patient, combined with estimates of 
the likelihood that the patient will be exposed to such situations, are crucial elements 
in the development of improved prediction instruments and violence prevention' 
(p. 479). As such, a risk scenario planning section is incorporated within the SCJ: 
Risk. This allows clinical teams to make a judgement relating to a suggested care 
plan and associated risks and the likely response of the individual. In this way 
multidisciplinary team members may discuss and document how an individual 
patient may react to future circumstances (e. g. medium secure setting, low secure or 
community setting, ground privileges, escorted visits, compliance to medication). 
This portion of the document allows for a structured judgement considering relevant 
risk factors and protective/mediating factors (aspects of an individual's behaviour 
that may inhibit the likelihood of future offending) (RMA, 2007). 
A further recommendation of the Tilt review of security, was that `hospitals 
should further develop arrangements which enable patients to progress from more 
secure to less secure environments within the hospitals, with increasing privileges, as 
part of their therapeutic plan' (Tilt et at, 2000, paragraph 7.6, p17). Rampton 
Hospital contains both secure `main building' wards, and `villa' locations, each 
characterised by different levels of security. The risk scenario planning section 
allows clinical teams to consider risk factors related to a less (or more) secure ward 
to encourage progression from the controlled environment of high security to lower 
security via discussion of clinical and security issues. 
67 
The use of risk scenario planning allows different outcome judgements to be 
made. Consideration of possible environmental variables may therefore impact on 
the final risk rating. The SCJ: Risk system recognises the dynamic nature of risk, 
and that the same presentation may result in a different judgement relating to risk 
dependent on varying conditions. It is important that the conditions and future 
circumstances are specified and understood before a risk decision is made. The 
dynamic nature of these judgements also impacts on the rate of frequency of 
discussions, and it is important that that the risk assessment process is reviewed at 
regular intervals, and if conditions or circumstances change. For example, an 
individual may be considered a low risk dependent upon adherence to a risk 
management strategy, or care plan. The same individual may pose a high risk in the 
absence of risk management strategies tailored to their individual need (e. g. failure to 
comply with medication, leading to paranoid ideation which may impact upon 
escape/abscond risk). In this way `... treatment and management planning can then be 
organised specifically to disconfirm the decision of high risk' (p. 157, Douglas and 
Webster, 1999). Adherence to the flexible method of structured clinical judgement 
therefore allows the identification of risk factors to inform a risk management 
strategy for a number of specified conditions. 
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3.5.2 Tilt High Risk Summary 
A Tilt High Risk Summary judgement is made in accordance with the five 
defined Tilt objectives as to the extent to which the individual presents a high risk. 
An evidenced judgement is then made on the basis of review of relevant risk and 
protective factors for the individual to assess if the patient presents as high risk in 
one or more of the areas of concern defined by the Tilt directive. 
3.5.3 Risk Management Plans 
A summary of risk is presented at the end of the SCJ: Risk document to 
record the overall level of risk and appropriate risk management strategies. This 
portion of the SCJ: Risk `provides information about how, conceivably, violence and 
other risks may be contained. It deals with the kinds of supervision, interventions, 
and treatments that are apparently required in the particular case in order to minimise 
violence risk', and other behaviours relevant to a high-secure hospital (Webster et 
al., 2007, p. 16). A care plan is then documented detailing how each individual area 
of high risk should be managed. This summary provides the basis of subsequent risk 
review judgements. A signature portion as part of the summary provides agreement 
that the risk assessment and management judgement was conducted in a 
multidisciplinary manner. The inclusion of risk management plans for each area of 
high risk identified is consistent with the trend in the literature to move away from 
attempts to predict behaviours, toward the management of high-risk behaviour and a 
prevention based paradigm of risk assessment (Macpherson and Kevan, 2004). 
These themes are explored further in Chapters Five and Six. 
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The Structured Clinical Judgement of Risk (SCJ: Risk) System has therefore 
been developed and implemented to assist clinical teams make risk related 
judgements and management plans for patients within a high-secure hospital 
detained under the Mental Health Act (Richardson and Hogue 2006), and to promote 
the transparency of decision making within the framework of clinical governance. 
The process of completion of the SCJ: Risk is demonstrated in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2. Diagram to Illustrate the Process of Completion of the SCJ: Risk 
System. 
*HCR-20 items used with the permission of the authors 
**Additional risk subscales of the SCJ: Risk 
Risk 
Managerre 
Plan** 
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3.6 Application of the SCJ: Risk Process to Established Patient 
Review Forums 
In addition to assessment and treatment, each Directorate within Rampton 
Hospital considers and reviews each patient at intervals. This process may be 
facilitated by the Care Programme Approach (CPA) and Mental Health Review 
Tribunal hearings (MHRTs). The SCJ: Risk was applied to each Directorate and has 
been used to inform such reviews. The SCJ: Risk is reviewed annually (as a 
minimum) and is integrated within the hospital's CPA meetings, which is a clinical 
forum to discuss, construct and monitor a patient's progress and clinical management 
strategy. Application of the SCJ: Risk is repeated for subsequent CPA meetings to 
allow for review of progress in treatment within a multidisciplinary forum (see 
method below for further clarification as to the processes of implementation). 
The SCJ: Risk process may also be used to prepare a defendable judgement 
for MHRTs (held every three years). The MHRT forum is a process by which an 
individual may be considered for transfer to conditions of lesser security to absolute 
discharge. Transfer of discharge is conditional on the permission by the Secretary of 
State (Jamieson and Taylor, 2004). This process is informed by the MHRT and 
discharge may be absolute (requiring no further legal sanction of detainment or 
supervision), or conditional (where conditions of supervision in the community are 
required to be satisfied) until a patient can be absolutely discharged. 
A more common outcome of MHRTs at Rampton Hospital is the 
consideration of transfer to conditions of lesser security (by move to a medium 
secure unit). Portions of the SCJ: Risk were designed to evidence consideration by 
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the clinical team to the appropriateness of such a move (by consideration of salient 
risk factors and the Risk Scenario Planning Section). Via discussion and review of 
relevant portions of the document, a patient's risk(s) within conditions of a medium 
secure unit may be considered to assess the viability and likelihood of significance of 
risk to others outside the regime of a high-secure setting. In this way, monitoring 
may be achieved to ensure that a patient is not contained unnecessarily in conditions 
of security that are elevated beyond the risks posed, thus allowing consideration of 
viability of a safe move to less secure settings. Facilitation of change and progress of 
patients by appropriate and efficient allocation of resources, risk management 
planning and discharge preparation was therefore dependent upon the successful 
implementation of the SCJ: Risk. 
The aim of the current chapter was an investigation of the process of 
implementation of the SCJ: Risk. The process of implementation was monitored by 
evaluation at regular intervals of levels of compliance (i. e. actual applied use) of the 
system in practice. Introduction of a risk assessment tool to address the security 
questions relevant to a high secure forensic hospital and subsequent monitoring of 
compliance of the use of the system were the primary operational/organisational 
objectives of the investigation. As a result of operational objectives, a need to 
evidence and validate the system in an academic manner was identified. Concerted 
effort to successfully implement the SCJ: Risk system within the high secure forensic 
hospital allowed an identification and understanding of the steps needed to establish 
compliance in the use of the system. Only after this was achieved was an academic 
evaluation of the system's, clinical utility and usability (Chapter Four), predictive 
validity (Chapter Five) and impact upon the management of risk (Chapter Six) 
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possible to answer the research questions defined in this thesis by conduct of 
empirical investigations. 
3.7 Process of Implementation of a System of Structured 
Professional Judgement within a High-Secure Hospital 
3.7.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of the present chapter was to understand the processes necessary to 
successfully implement a system of structured professional judgement (the SCJ: Risk 
as an adaptation of the HCR-20) within a high-secure forensic setting to fulfil the 
security objectives of the Tilt review to assist clinical teams make and document 
risk-related decisions to inform the management of patients. 
3.7.3 Research Questions 
Was a system of structured professional judgement (SPJ) successfully 
implemented (do clinical teams employ SPJ methods as part of ongoing clinical 
practice)? 
What processes are necessary to inform the successful implementation of a 
system of structured professional judgement? 
3.7.2 Hypotheses 
It was anticipated that the success of the implementation process of the SCJ: 
Risk would be reflected by compliance in use of the system, and that use of the 
system in practice would vary between clinical teams. Overall, it was expected that 
there would initially be resistance to use and implementation of the system, but that 
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due to hospital directives, all clinical teams would have implemented the system for 
the majority of their patients by December 2006 (a deadline given from the Chief 
Executive, externally audited where Responsible Medical Officers (Consultant 
Psychiatrist) would be held accountable for failure to comply). 
HAo: Compliance in use of the system of structured professional judgement 
(SCJ: Risk) will not be demonstrated. 
HAI: Compliance in use of the system of structured professional judgement 
(SCJ: Risk) will be demonstrated. 
3.7.4 Method 
3.7.4.1 Process of implementation 
The process of implementation of the SCJ: Risk began in June 2004. A pilot 
phase was conducted within nine clinical teams across three Directorates (Learning 
Disability, 5 teams, Personality Disorder, 1 team, Mental Health, 3 teams) between 
June 2004 and August 2005. The remaining Directorates within the hospital (The 
Peaks Unit and Women's Service) implemented the SCJ: Risk as part of clinical 
practice between September 2005 and December 2006. 
The process of completion of the SCJ: Risk followed the procedure described 
below. By following the procedure, clinical teams have successfully implemented 
the scheme to inform risk-related multidisciplinary discussions. The scheme has 
therefore formed a significant component of the comprehensive extended assessment 
of a patient population for all patients within Rampton high-secure hospital since 
December 2006. 
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3.7.5 Procedure 
3.7.5.1 Participants 
- 
Staff 
SCJ: Risk documentation was completed within a multidisciplinary clinical 
team forum. Relevant members comprised a Responsible Medical Officers (RMO), 
Psychologists, Social Workers, Occupational Therapists, Ward Managers, Team 
Leaders, Security Liaison and Named Nurses. The RMO fulfilled the role of Case 
Manager and had sufficient authority and responsibility for the co-ordination and 
maintenance of the SCJ: Risk including Tilt High Risk Summaries and associated 
Risk Management Plans. The Case Manager held responsibility for communicating, 
and recording and validating information regarding the risk related judgements. 
Clear definition of MDT roles and responsibilities was integral to the success of the 
implementation of the SCJ: Risk system. 
In a similar way, the recruitment of staff that could be utilised as a resource to 
clinical teams was considered essential to the large scale implementation of the SCJ: 
Risk. The absence of a support to assist clinical teams was anticipated as a barrier to 
the success of the project. Clarity and communication of roles within the SCJ: Risk 
team was also necessary. The SCJ: Risk team comprised a Project Lead (and Chair 
of the steering group), a Project Manager (the current author), two Research 
Assistants, and a Project Consultant. In addition, a Directorate Representative liaised 
between the SCJ: Risk team and Case Managers to ensure operational objectives 
relating to the implementation were achieved. This model ensured an effective 
channel of communication between the managerial decisions, SCJ: Team, and 
clinical teams using the system. 
75 
A critical component to the implementation of the SCJ: Risk was the 
provision of training. All staff members from each clinical team attended training to 
fulfil learning objectives related to understanding of the theory and approaches to 
risk assessment and management, standardised risk assessment tools, and the HCR- 
20. Clinical teams were also informed of the security requirements of a high-secure 
hospital and the SCJ: Risk and its use in clinical practice. A standardised approach 
and evaluation of training and learning objectives facilitated the understanding and 
consistency of use of the SCJ: Risk across clinical teams. 
Completion of the Historical portion of the document was identified as a time 
and resource-intensive task. During the initial phases of the implementation process 
(September 2005 to December 2006) a relevantly trained postgraduate assistant 
psychologist (in addition to the team indicated above) was therefore recruited to 
collate and code the Historical portion of the SCJ: Risk in advance of clinical team 
risk discussions. In this way, a standardised approach to coding Historical variables 
was achieved via background information searches of a range of existing hospital 
records. This information was then communicated by a research assistant and 
ratified by each clinical team at the initial SCJ: Risk discussion. Consideration by 
the clinical team of the quality and reliability of information and input of additional 
relevant information was critical to gaining a reliable and valid understanding of the 
static factors relating to an offender's history (RMA, 2007). 
The validity of risk related decisions was an anticipated problem during the 
implementation stage. Facilitation of initial SCJ: Risk discussions (by SCJ: Risk 
team members) were seen as a necessary and integral aspect of ongoing training. 
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The SCJ: Risk team's presence on the wards early in the implementation phase was 
an attempt towards harnessing the skills of the team and monitoring the process of 
making and documenting risk-related judgements. In this way, compliance and 
integrity of the use of the system were monitored. The research assistants and 
project manager within the SCJ: Risk team fulfilled the role as consultants to clinical 
teams and advised the process of how to complete the remaining dynamic variables, 
high risk summary, and risk management sections of the document. The process of 
structuring clinical judgement involved `... the use of validated, empirically 
grounded, risk assessment tools or guidelines to structure information in an evidence 
based systematic way to assess, formulate, and manage risk. 
. 
based on professional 
experience, training, decision making and knowledge' was therefore implemented 
within the service (RMA, 2007). 
The development and implementation of the SCJ: Risk benefited from 
organisational support and was governed by a steering group comprised of senior 
management, Directorate representatives and a designated SCJ: Risk Manager 
(current author) whose responsibilities included delivery of operational objectives 
and ongoing evaluation of the system of SPJ. Support from such groups and senior 
management was critical to overcoming occasional resistance to implementation of 
the SCJ: Risk as a standardised risk assessment tool. 
The timely and accurate recording of risk decisions was anticipated as a 
potential problem of the implementation of the system. The Department of Health 
Guidelines (2007) stipulated that `all risk-related decisions should be recorded, 
signed and dated in suitable documentation'. The SCJ: Risk system was therefore 
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developed to include recording of information within a computerised system. 
Following clinical team discussions, a RMO's Personal Assistant was responsible for 
entering SCJ: Risk judgements into a computerised interface (via an access database, 
see Appendix 1.2). Each clinical team member directly involved in the patient's care 
then had a responsibility to access the recorded risk-related judgements and 
contribute to the recorded risk management of each individual. The Case Manager 
(RMO) had the additional responsibility of validating the document via the 
computerised interface. Monitoring of compliance in use of the system was achieved 
by generating outputs from the computerised system, which were reported back to 
Directorate Representatives by the SCJ: Risk Manager at a monthly steering group 
meeting. The SCJ: Risk assessment system was therefore embedded in current 
practice, and so was subject to monthly audit within the framework of clinical 
governance. The use of the audit process facilitated monitoring of compliance to and 
integrity of use of the system to ensure that the risk assessment tool is used to 
document Tilt security factors in a multidisciplinary forum in accordance within the 
hospital's risk assessment policy. 
3.8 Results 
3.8.1 Compliance in Use of the System of Structured Professional Judgement 
(SCJ: Risk System) 
Compliance in use of the SCJ: Risk system, as part of ongoing clinical 
practice, rose steadily since auditing began in September 2006. Table Al (Appendix 
1.3) and Figures Al to A6 (Appendix 1.4) illustrates the increase of use between and 
within Directorates over a twenty-three month period. 
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Six months prior to deadline for implementation of the SCJ: Risk system 
(01/07/2006 to 31/12/2006), compliance rates rose across all Directorates of the 
hospital. Proportions of completions rose from forty-four per cent in September 
2006 (n=120) to eighty-seven per cent in December 2006 (n=348). At the first time 
period of investigation (01/09/06), the following Directorates had implemented the 
system: DSPD (83%, n=29); PD (16%, n=13); MH (23%, n=35); LD (84%, n=37) 
and WS (14%, n=6). At the time of the implementation deadline (31/12/07), most 
clinical teams had implemented the system for a high proportion of their population: 
DSPD (83%, n=42); PD (87%, n=71); MH (94%, n=147); LD (73%, n=48) and WS 
(98%, n=40). 
During the six months following the implementation deadline (01.01.2007 to 
30.06.2007), a further rise of the use of the system in clinical practice was observed, 
and all Directorates achieved one hundred per cent compliance levels in completion 
of SCJ: Risk documentation between the months of March and May 2008. The 
successful implementation of the system was therefore demonstrated. The 
compliance figures demonstrate that clinical teams currently employ the SCJ: Risk 
routinely within clinical practice. 
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3.9 Discussion 
3.9.1 Interpretation of Findings and Proposed Steps for Future 
Implementation in Other Forensic Settings 
The current chapter investigated the necessary processes to achieve 
successful implementation of the SCJ: Risk system within a high-secure forensic 
setting. The findings demonstrated that successful implementation was achieved, 
demonstrated by compliance of use. Rates of compliance varied between 
Directorates. Clinical teams within DSPD and Learning Disability Directorates 
implemented the system readily since the start of the implementation phase, well 
before the formal deadline (the latter Directorate perhaps due to their familiarity with 
the system due to participation in the pilot phase). Personality Disorder, Mental 
Health and Women's Services were slower to implement the system as part of 
ongoing clinical practice. Four Directorates achieved good levels of use of the 
system at the time of the implementation deadline. However Women's Service 
completed a low proportion of use, completing SCJ: Risk documentation for thirty 
per cent of its patients at this time. Upon closer examination of the figures, this was 
due to one Responsible Medical Officer failing to implement the system for any of 
their patients. 
Two explanations of compliance to the use of the SCJ: Risk in clinical 
practice may be proposed. The first explanation could be that the imposition of a 
formal deadline by senior management was a catalyst for completion of 
documentation for the majority of patients within each Directorate. Responsible 
Medical Officers were aware that compliance would be audited and communicated to 
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senior management and that they would be held accountable for failure to complete 
documentation by the end of December 2008. The second explanation may be that 
the process of implementation described above has been beneficial to assisting 
clinical teams to make and document risk-related decisions for a good proportion of 
patients detained at Rampton hospital. This assertion is developed by the 
investigation presented in Chapter Four, where clinical team members' attitudes to 
the process of implementation in relation to the clinical utility (usability) of the 
system are scrutinised. 
A number of procedures were essential to the process of successful 
implementation of the SCJ: Risk within a special hospital. The procedure adopted in 
the current investigation has direct relevance to other institutions and settings 
wishing to introduce a system of structured professional judgement to ongoing 
clinical practice within other multidisciplinary forums. As a result of the 
investigation of the process of implementation the following stages are 
recommended for practitioners wishing to implement a system of risk assessment in 
the future: (i) Initial pilot and evaluation phase (to identify initial problems and 
identify solutions); (ii) training (to equip users with an understanding of the system, 
empirical and theoretical underpinning and operational requirements); (iii) clear 
procedures (communicated to MDT members during training and via ongoing 
support and guidelines in the form of a resource pack/manual on each ward location); 
(iv) communication of MDT roles and responsibilities, and the responsibilities of 
support staff; allocation of additional resources (via recruitment of project staff and 
nomination of a liaison link from each Directorate); (v) managerial support (regular 
steering group meetings); (vi) a computerised system to assist documentation of risk 
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related decisions and (vii) audit of compliance of use to the system and ongoing 
evaluation of the system of structured professional judgement. 
Caution must be exercised and attention given to Webster and Hucker's 
(2007) assertion that: `Even when success has been achieved in the implementation 
phase, much effort is required to ensure continued fidelity to the implementation 
phase, much effort is required to ensure continued fidelity to the protocol. `Drift' 
away from the published guide will occur without constant vigilance' (p. 90). It is for 
this reason that rigorous ongoing evaluation of the system will be essential to the 
system's maintenance phase, including monitoring of the regularity of use within 
clinical practice. In terms of maintaining acceptable routine use of the system, it is 
anticipated that clinical team members will require refresher training, support from a 
knowledgeable team, and feedback as part of the ongoing evaluation. This will 
ensure consistency of use and the communication of current knowledge into clinical 
practice. In addition, it is anticipated that compliance to the system should be 
monitored by a Hospital Audit Team, external to the original SCJ: Risk team, and 
that information yielded from the system should be incorporated within annual Care 
Programme Approach (CPA) meetings to provide a meaningful outcome measure of 
risk assessment and management of risk. 
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3.10 Chapter Summary 
The current chapter demonstrates that the SCJ: Risk can be has been 
successfully implemented as part of ongoing clinical practice, and that this has been 
achieved within a forensic psychiatric setting. Adherence to best practice guidelines 
via structured professional judgement within multidisciplinary forums therefore 
forms a core component of the risk decision-making process within the institution. It 
was anticipated that successful implementation would be a necessary first step in the 
evaluation of the utility of the SCJ: Risk system in addressing the security needs of a 
high-secure hospital setting. As the proportion of patients with completed 
documentation was robust, an investigation as to the assessment and management of 
the patient population could therefore be conducted. 
The evidence-base of the SCJ: Risk (and HCR-20) assessment scheme will be 
enriched in subsequent chapters by empirical investigations as to the clinical utility 
(practical use), predictive validity (utilizing intra-institutional behaviour as an 
outcome measure), and risk management (efficacy of prevention of identified risks). 
In this way a reciprocal loop may be achieved via feedback of research-based 
evidence into ongoing clinical practice. It is hoped that this research will contribute 
positively to the overall goal of clarity of risk communication, identification and 
management of high-risk patients within a special hospital. 
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Chapter Four 
Perceived Clinical Usability and Utility of the 
SCJ: Risk 
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4.1 Introduction 
Webster and Hucker (2007) state that: `It should be clear.. 
. 
that the HCR-20 
and allied devices fit within the tradition of evidence-based clinical practice, that its 
aim is to achieve the best possible collaboration between clinicians, researchers and 
administrators 
... 
increasingly the challenge is not so much to create new schemes but 
to verify and refine the ones now on hand. Much needed are studies to find out how 
best they can be introduced to settings in such a way that they will be understood, 
accepted, and developed by clinicians' (p. 89). Previous Chapters have included 
investigation of the processes needed to ensure successful introduction and 
implementation of the SCJ: Risk within a forensic setting. It is the aim of the present 
Chapter to investigate the perceived utility and acceptance of a system of structured 
professional judgement based on the experiences of clinicians' use as part of routine 
clinical practice. 
4.1.1 The Distinction Between Usability and Utility 
Usability may be understood as the specific features, and characteristics of 
the interface that influence three factors. These are (i) effectiveness, (ii) efficiency 
and (iii) satisfaction and influence the extent to which individual users can achieve 
specified goals in a particular environment (International Standards Organisation 
(ISO), 1998). Within the context of the present study, this refers to clinical team 
member's perception of the usability of the system of structuring clinical judgement 
in terms of. (i) how well the task of risk assessment can be completed, (ii) how easy 
or quick it is to complete the task and (iii) a user's perception or opinion of the 
system. Chapter Three outlined the original intention of the SCJ: Risk system as a 
structured professional judgement approach designed to assist clinical team members 
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make and document high risk judgements in relation to the security needs of a high 
secure forensic hospital. As part of the validation of the SCJ: Risk within clinical 
practice, it is important to ascertain the usability of the system as `the perception of a 
target user of the effectiveness (fit for purpose) and efficiency (work or time required 
to use) of the Interface' (ISO, 1998). Phrased another way, in addition to user 
satisfaction, it is important to quantify the perceived usefulness (PU or effectiveness) 
and the perceived ease of use (PEoU or efficiency) by measurement and 
quantification of attributes of the system. A distinction between usability and utility 
may be made. In addition to the usability of the system, the system's utility must be 
investigated to establish the practical use of the system and its ability to help 
perform the function for which it was intended. 
In this way, the design and implementation of the system may be evaluated 
and progressively refined iteratively to incorporate riser feedback until an acceptable 
level of usability and utility may be reached. Elements of the system may be 
improved to increase compliance and consistency of use by identification of areas 
not be perceived to be usable or useful. Positive and qualitative feedback may also 
contribute to the iterative process and overall aim of evolution of documentation and 
enhanced productivity in the assessment and management of patient risk. A system 
that is easy to use, and that has an easy to understand interface would reduce the need 
for extensive training, and would decrease the time needed to complete a risk related 
judgement (and thus costs to the hospital). It is therefore important to establish 
which, if any of the areas of documentation and implementation of the SCJ: Risk 
were less useful and usable in order to ascertain ways to improve the system of 
structured professional judgement. 
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4.1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The purpose of the present Chapter was to investigate clinical team member 
use and perception of the SCJ: Risk system. Two phases were investigated (a pilot 
and a full implementation phase). The aim of the current report was to investigate 
the clinical usability and utility of the SCJ: Risk system of risk assessment and 
management. 
4.1.3 Research Questions 
A number of research questions were posed as part of the investigation as to 
the usability and clinical utility of the system of structured clinical judgement. The 
central question posed was: Is the SCJ: Risk system perceived as usable and useful 
by clinical team members? Research questions included nine areas related to (1) 
training, (2) perception of the system, (3) usability, (4) team functioning and 
multidisciplinary working, (5) piloting / implementation and support, (6) additional 
resources, policies, procedures and nominated contacts and (7) ongoing research and 
access of electronic records, (8) perceived clarity and relevance of the SCJ: Risk 
document and, (9) relevance of HCR-20/ SCJ: Risk total subscales. 
4.1.4 Respondents / Participants 
Pilot Phase 
The SCJ: Risk was piloted within three of the five directorates (Learning 
Disability, 5 clinical teams; Personality Disorder, 1 clinical team; Mental Health, 4 
clinical teams). Forty-five out of seventy respondents returned completed surveys 
(64%). 
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Implementation Phase 
The system was implemented in all five clinical directorates (Dangerous and 
Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD), Personality Disorder (PD), Mental Health 
(MH), Learning Disability (LD) and Women's Services (WS)). One hundred and 
seventy surveys were distributed, and a total of eighty-seven respondents (51%) 
participated in the completion of the questionnaire designed to investigate the 
implementation phase of the SCJ: Risk. (DSPD, 18% (n=16); PD, 16% (n=14); MH, 
46% (n=40); LD, 13% (n=11) and WS, 7% (n=6)). The following disciplines 
participated in the survey: Nursing Staff, 35% (n=31); Psychology, 17% (n=15); 
Occupational Therapy, 17% (n=14); Psychiatry, 10% (n=9); Social Work, 7% (n=6); 
Medical Staff, 6% (n=5); Security Liaison, 3% (n=3) and 5% (n=4) Other. 
4.1.5 Method 
4.1.5.1 Materials. The Likert Summated Scale 
An appropriate way of measuring the perceived usability of a system of 
structuring professional judgement was the five-point Likert-type attitude scale 
(Likert, 1932; Likert, 1967; Rossi, Wright and Anderson, 1983). The values in the 
five-point Likert scale range from strongly agree to strongly disagree to which the 
participant responds by ticking (paper) or clicking (computer) the appropriate box. In 
analysing these responses, the clinical team member's 1-5 choice becomes 
enumerated. These enumerated responses are then inverted for the negatively skewed 
statements, around the midpoint. On a scale, where 5 is good usability and 1 is bad, 
in a question whereby the participant has rated they strongly agree with a positive 
statement the score would be 5 for that particular item, but a score of 1 would be 
allocated if they strongly agreed with a negative statement. Once the respondent had 
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completed the survey, results were analysed by experimental question. The 
distribution of clinical team members responses were analysed and presented in the 
figures below. 
4.1.5.2 Pilot Phase 
The investigation of the clinical utility of the SCJ: Risk of the pilot phase 
followed a five-stage approach: (i) Throughout the pilot phase of the project, 
observations and comments from the pilot wards were compiled during clinical team 
meetings involving discussion of the SCJ: Risk system. (ii) Unstructured interviews 
were then conducted with the nominated contact from each pilot ward regarding any 
information / opinion associated with the system. (iii) The comments were then 
collated and structured into a number of relevant questions relating to the SCJ: Risk 
system. Question items were also generated in response to the original aims of the 
project. (iv) A Likert response scale questionnaire (Appendix 2.1) was constructed 
and distributed to staff that had attended training, and to nominated contacts to 
distribute to staff within their clinical team normally involved in MDT discussions. 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with 
a number of statements related to the SCJ: Risk system. The scale was as follows: 1 
= 
Strongly Agree. 2= Agree. 3= Neutral. 4= Disagree. 5= Strongly Disagree. (v) 
The questionnaires were returned to the project coordinator and the results analysed. 
Following the pilot phase, comments and recommendations were suggested in an 
attempt to improve the usability of the system in preparation of the implementation 
phase across the hospital. 
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4.1.5.3 Implementation Phase 
The Likert response scale was amended to address the needs of the user group 
(clinical teams) in line with the refined process of the implementation of the SCJ: 
Risk. A similar methodology adopted in the pilot was applied to the implementation 
phase, and the original survey used in the initial phase was updated following 
implementation. This was to ensure that the implementation survey encompassed 
questions relevant to current ongoing clinical practice, and changes following the 
pilot phase. To ensure adherence to ethical guidelines, the survey was disseminated 
to members of the SCJ: Risk steering group who advised as to the relevance of 
questions. The questionnaire was edited and an electronic version of the amended 
paper-based survey used during the pilot phase was designed (Appendix 2.2). 
Surveys were distributed to all clinical team members familiar with the use of the 
SCJ: Risk via the relevant clinical teams Responsible Medical Officer's Personal 
Assistant. This was to ensure that an up-to date distribution list was used. Following 
a poor response rate, the current author wrote personally to each Responsible 
Medical Officer and enclosed a number of paper-based surveys which were then 
distributed to members of the multidisciplinary team during SCJ: Risk discussions. 
4.1.6 Results 
4.1.6.1 Participants. Frequency of Use of the SCJ: Risk System 
All respondents had experience of the SCJ: Risk in clinical practice. 
Following the pilot phase, clinical team members had been involved in a good 
proportion of SCJ: Risk discussions (66%, n=30 had assessed between one and six 
patients, 33%, n=15 between seven and in excess of fourteen cases). Of the 
respondents from the implementation phase, just under half had been involved in 
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fifteen or more discussions (49%, n=35). Of the remaining proportion, ten per cent 
had been involved in between ten and fifteen discussions (n=9), twenty-one per cent 
had participated in between six and ten discussions (n=18), and twenty per cent 
between one and five discussions (n=17). 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the frequency of respondent's use of the SCJ: Risk 
within each Directorate (a detailed breakdown of the number and proportion of 
responses by Directorate may be found in Table CO. 1 Frequency of Use of the SCJ: 
Risk System, Appendix 2.4). Respondents from the PD Directorate had utilised the 
tool within clinical practice most frequently, with eighty-six per cent (n=12) of 
respondents having used the tool in excess of ten occasions (79%, n=11 of whom had 
engaged in fifteen or more occasions, and none of whom had participated in less than 
six discussions). Over half (56%, n=9) of respondents from the DSPD Directorate 
had participated in fifteen or more discussions, and under a third (31%, n=5) 
participated in ten or more. By comparison, participants from MH, LD and WS had 
utilised the system less. However, these Directorates still displayed regular use of 
the system. Mental Health, Learning Disability and Women's Service Directorates 
had experience of use of the system in excess of fifteen occasions: MH (42%, n=17); 
LD (36%, n=4); WS (33%, n=2). Participation in SCJ: Risk discussions of a 
frequency between six and ten occasions were evident across PD (14%, n=2), MH 
(30%, n=12), LD (28%, n=3) and WS (17%, n=1). The Learning Disability and 
Women's Service Directorates had a greater proportion of respondents experiencing 
the system within clinical practice between one and five occasions (LD (36%, n=4; 
WS (33%, n=2) indicating that these respondents utilised the SCJ: Risk on fewer 
occasions compared to other Directorates. However, these findings illustrate that 
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respondents demonstrated applied practical experience of the SCJ: Risk. This is 
indicative of knowledge of the process of implementation and documentation, which 
was important to establish when commenting on the utility of the system via the 
evaluation survey. 
Figure 4.1. Percentage of Use of the SCJ: Risk System Displayed by Directorate 
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4.1. Frequency of use of the SCJ: Risk 
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4.2 Training 
A robust training programme was central to the pilot and implementation of 
the SCJ: Risk. Training facilitators attended accredited HCR-20 and PCL-R training, 
and had experience of the application of the HCR-20 within a research and clinical 
setting. The aim of training was to ensure that the SCJ: Risk would be used in a 
consistent and professional manner. 
All clinical team members received training in the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk via 
structured sessions and participation in facilitated SCJ: Risk discussions as part of 
ongoing clinical practice. Training was attended by members of clinical teams to 
reflect the multidisciplinary team in which they worked. Content of training sessions 
(various) included; (i) theoretical underpinnings and (ii) understanding of the 
practical application. Learning objectives included; (i) understanding of the 
background of risk assessment, the structured professional judgement approach as 
evidence based practice, the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk, and (ii) practice of completion 
of the SCJ: Risk via vignettes, live case examples and feedback of ratings. In 
addition, training involved guidance and discussion of how to implement the SCJ: 
Risk effectively within each clinical team. 
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4.2.1 Research Questions 
The following questions related to identification of training needs. All 
questions were presented during the implementation phase. Questions 1.1 and 1.4 
only were posed following the pilot phase. Respondents were asked: 
1.1. If they had attended a formal training day? (Respondents were asked 
to indicate the format that they attended). 
1.2. If SCJ: Risk training should be mandatory? 
1.3. How initial training for new members of staff should be delivered? 
1.4. If refresher training should be provided? 
1.4.1. How often refresher training should be completed? 
1.4.2. How refresher training should be delivered? 
4.2.2 Results 
The number and proportion of responses in relation to training may be found 
in Table Cl, Appendix 2.4. 
1.1. The evaluation of training showed that the one hundred per cent of team 
members involved in the pilot phase survey had attended SCJ: Risk training. At the 
time of implementation eighty-nine per cent of respondents had received SCJ: Risk 
training: DSPD (81%, n=13); PD (100%, n=14); MH (83%, n=33); LD (100%, 
n=11); WS (100%, n=6). 
Training delivered via a formal training day was the most frequently attended 
mode of delivery. Seventy per cent of respondents involved in the pilot phase 
received training via this format (n=32). During the implementation phase, just over 
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half received training delivered via a formal training day (51 %, n=44). The 
remaining proportion received training given by the SCJ: Risk team on ward location 
(38%, n=33), and a small number of staff had received other forms of training 
(individual training by a member of the SCJ: Risk team, 2%, n=2). Results showed 
that some team members had not attended formal training, but used the SCJ: Risk 
(9%, n=8). Figure 4.1.1 illustrates difference in the type of training format attended 
by clinical team members responding to the survey within each Directorate. The 
majority of respondents within DSPD (62%, n=10); PD (64%, n=9) and MH (48%, 
n=19) received training via a formal session delivered over one day. Within LD and 
WS training on ward location was the most frequently attended mode of delivery 
(64%, n=7 and 66%, n=4 respectively). The DSPD and MH Directorate respondents 
had experience of use of the SCJ: Risk system in clinical practice, but indicated that 
they had not attended any formal training (13%, n=2 and 15%, n=6 respectively). 
Respondents from the remaining Directorates had all received formal training. 
Figure 4.1.1. Attendance and Formal Delivery of Training 
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4.1.1 Format of training attended 
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1.2. Following the implementation phase, the majority of respondents 
indicated agreement that SCJ: Risk training should be mandatory (83%, n=72). The 
proportion of agreement between directorates ranged between 100% (DSPD, n=16) 
and 66% (WS, n=6). 
Figure 4.1.2. SCJ: Risk as Mandatory Training 
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4.1.2 SCJ: Risk as Mandatory Training 
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1.3. When asked to indicate how initial training for new members of staff 
should be delivered, the option most frequently specified was that of formal delivery 
facilitated by a trainer (43%, n=37). Participation during ongoing SCJ discussions 
(25%, n=22), e-learning (7%, n=6) and a combination of approaches (25%, n=22) 
were also considered relevant modes of delivery. All Directorates, with the 
exception of Women's Service indicated a preference for a formal training day: 
DSPD (38%, n=6); PD (36%, n=5); MH (50%, n=20); LD (46%, n=5). Women's 
Service indicated a preference for training on a ward location (50%, n=3), and 
Personality Disorder respondents also indicated this mode as preferable (36%, n=5). 
Figure 4.1.3. Delivery of Training 
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4.1.3 Initial mode of training 
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1.4. During the pilot phase, a significant proportion of all respondents 
(71%, n=32) asserted that refresher training should be provided. Over two-thirds of 
respondents following the implementation phase indicated agreement that refresher 
training should be provided (23% (n=20) strongly agreed; 44% (n=38) agreed, with 
the remaining sample neutral (16%, n=14), disagreeing (15%, n=13) or strongly 
disagreeing (2%, n=2). All directorates agreed that refresher training should be 
provided, with the exception of Women's Services (34%, n=2 disagreed). 
Figure 4.1.4. Refresher Training 
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4.1.4 Refresher training should be provided 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
98 
1.4.1. The majority of respondents from the pilot phase suggested that 
training should be attended on an annual (80%, n=36) or six monthly basis (20%, 
n=9). Following the implementation phase, of the clinical staff agreeing that 
refresher training should be provided, just under half indicated that this should be 
attended at a frequency of every two years (48%, n=28), the remaining sample 
indicated six monthly completion (3%, n=2), annual completion (35%, n=20), or 
attendance every three years (14%, n=8) to be appropriate. DSPD and LD 
Directorates indicated a preference for refresher training to be delivered annually 
(38%, n=6; 64%, n=7 respectively). The remaining Directorates indicated a 
preference for delivery every two years: PD (43%, n=6); MH (35%, n=14) and WS 
(33%, n=2). 
Figure 4.1.4.1. Frequency of Refresher Training 
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4.1.4.1 Preferred intervals of deleivery of refresher training. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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1.4.2. The preferred mode of delivery of refresher training was via formal 
sessions facilitated by a trainer (45%, n=26), participation during ongoing SCJ 
discussions (37%, n=21), e-learning (6%, n=3) and a combination of each approach 
(2%, n=8). Three Directorates indicated preference for a formal training day: DSPD 
(31%, n=5); MH (38%, n=15), LD (36%, n=4). Consistent with opinion related to 
mode of delivery for new staff members, the remaining two Directorates indicated a 
preference for training on the ward location (PD, 51 %, n=7; WS, 16%, n= 1). 
Figure 4.1.4.2. Preferred Mode of Delivery of Refresher Training 
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LL 4.1.4.2 Initial mode of training 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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4.2.3 Summary of Results 
Pilot 
All respondents from the pilot phase had received training in the use of the 
SCJ Risk system (100%, n=45), and the majority asserted that refresher training 
should be provided (71 %, n=32). 
Implementation 
High proportions of individuals who had received training were apparent at 
the time of implementation (89%, n=77), with training delivered via a trained 
facilitator being the most widely attended (51%, n=44). Mandatory training was 
perceived to be important (83%, n=72), and delivery via a formal training day was 
identified as the best medium (43%, n=37). The provision of refresher training was 
identified as needed (71%, n=32), of a frequency of every year (80%, n=36). The 
preferred mode of training was a one day session delivered by a trained facilitator 
(45%, n=26). 
4.3 Perception of the SCJ: Risk 
- 
Was the System Seen as Useful? 
It was important to investigate the perceived usefulness of the SCJ: Risk 
system within clinical teams involved in the pilot and implementation phase. A 
critical aspect of the success of the SCJ: Risk was whether clinical teams perceived 
the system as genuinely useful. It was anticipated that there would be greater 
compliance in using a system that clinical teams perceived as useful, rather than ` just 
another paper exercise'. 
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4.3.1 Research Questions 
The following questions related to the perception of the SCJ: Risk were 
investigated: 
If the SCJ: Risk system...: 
2.1. was perceived as useful? 
2.2. assisted clinical teams make and document risk related decisions? 
2.3. was useful in documenting the Tilt security review recommendations 
of related judgements? 
2.4. was useful to construction of a risk management plan? 
2.5. was useful to informing clinical practice? 
2.6. was useful to informing patient care? 
2.7. accurately assessed a patients risk? 
2.8. helps planning for future scenarios 
Questions 2.1 to 2.5, and question 2.6 were asked at the time of pilot and 
implementation. Question 2.8 was not posed at the time of pilot, and question 2.6 
was not posed during the implementation phase. 
4.3.2 Results 
A detailed summary of the number and proportion of responses per question 
posed in relation to perception of the SCJ: Risk system may be found in Table C2, 
Appendix 2.4. 
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2.1. Ninety-six per cent of pilot respondents rated the SCJ: Risk system as 
useful (46%, n=20 strongly agreed; 50%, n=22 agreed), the remaining four per cent 
(n=3) logged a neutral opinion. Perception of the overall usefulness of the system 
fell by six per cent when canvassed at implementation phase (31%, n=27 strongly 
agreed; 59%, n=51 agreed). A smaller proportion expressed a neutral opinion (7%, 
n=6) and a minority of respondents did not perceive the system as useful (3%, n=3). 
The SCJ: Risk system was perceived the most positively by respondents in DSPD 
and LD Directorates evidenced by 44% (n=7) and 46% (n=5) respectively asserting 
strong agreement to the system's utility. The remaining Directorates asserted 
agreement that the system was useful: PD (71%, n=10); MH (68%, n=27); WS (49%. 
n=3). Respondents from two Directorates indicated that the system was not useful 
(LD, 18%, n=2; WS, 17%, n=1). 
Figure 4.2.1. Perceived Usefulness of the SCJ: Risk 
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4.2.1 The SCJ: Risk system was seen as useful. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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2.2. The majority (96%, n=42) of respondents surveyed after the pilot 
phase agreed that the SCJ: Risk assisted clinical teams make and document risk 
related decisions (46%, n=42 strongly agreed; 50%, n=22 agreed), the remaining 
proportion (4%, n= 3) logged a neutral opinion. The agreement level at the 
implementation phase was eighty-seven per cent (of whom 29% per cent strongly 
agreed (n=25) and 58% agreed (n=50). Six per cent (n=5) disagreed that the system 
was beneficial to the documentation of risk-related decisions. All Directorates 
indicated a majority agreement to this question: DSPD (69%, n=11); PD (71%, 
n=10); MH (55%, n=22); LD (46%, n=5); WS (33%, n=2). Respondents within the 
Directorates of Personality Disorder and Women's Service indicated that the system 
was not useful to the documentation of risk-related judgements (7%, n=1 and 5%, 
n=2) 
Figure 4.2.2. SCJ: Assisting Clinical Teams Make and Document Risk-Related 
Decisions 
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4.2.2 The SCJ: Risk system assisted clinical teams make and document risk 
decisions. Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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2.3. Ninety-six per cent of individuals surveyed at the pilot phase asserted 
that the SCJ: Risk system was useful in documenting the Tilt security review 
recommendations and related judgements (32%, n=20) strongly agreed; 64%, n=22) 
agreed). The remaining respondents (4%, n=3) were neutral in their opinion. The 
proportion of neutral responses was more prevalent at the time of implementation 
(17%, n=15). Eighteen per cent less attested to the use of the system to fulfil 
documentation of Tilt security objectives at the time of implementation (26%, n=23 
strongly agreed, 52%, n=45 agreed), however, the majority of respondents agreed to 
the question posed. 
Figure 4.2.3. Use of SCJ: Risk to Documentation of Tilt requirements 
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4.2.3 The system facilitated documentation of the Tilt security requirements. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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2.4. Following the pilot phase, ninety-two per cent of individuals in 
clinical teams asserted that the SCJ: Risk system was useful to the effective 
construction of risk management plans (44%, n=14 of whom strongly agreed; 48%, 
n=29 agreed and 8%, n=2 were neutral in their opinion). At the time of 
implementation seventy-eight per cent indicated agreement (15%, n=13 per cent 
strongly agreed; 63%; n=55 agreed), however a small proportion asserted that the 
system did not perceive the system to be of benefit to the construction of risk 
management plans (5%, n=4 disagreed to the statement). The majority of 
respondents from each Directorate agreed that the system was useful in this regard: 
DSPD (56%, n=9); PD (64%, n=9: MH (48%, n=19): LD (67%, n=7): WS (50%, 
n=3). A small proportion of respondents in the Personality Disorder and Mental 
Health Directorates indicated disagreement as to the utility of the system in terms of 
risk management planning (7%, n=1; 5%, n=2). 
Figure 4.2.4. Use of SCJ: Risk to the Construction of Risk Management Plans 
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4.2.4 SCJ: Risk allowed the effective construction of risk mangement plans. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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2.5. Ninety-six per cent of respondents either strongly agreed or agreed to 
the statement that the SCJ: Risk was useful to informing clinical practice following 
the pilot phase (32%, n=20 strongly agreed; 64%, n=22 agreed; and the remaining 
4%, n=3 neutral in their opinion). The perceived relevance of the system to clinical 
practice following implementation fell to seventy-two per cent (21 %, n=18 strongly 
agreed, 51%, n=44 agreed, 23%, n=20 were neutral). A minority of respondents 
disagreed to the use of the SCJ: Risk when informing clinical practice (5%, n=5). 
Differences between Directorates were not observed, and each indicated majority 
agreement as to the use of the system: DSPD (62%, n=10); PD (79%, n=11); MH 
(60%, n=24); LD (36%, n=4); WS (50%, n=50%). Neutral responses were indicated 
from two Directorates: LD (36%, n=4); WS (50%, n=3). The system was not 
perceived as useful to clinical practice by a proportion of respondents within 
Directorates of PD (7%, n=1), MH (8%, n=3) or LD (10%, n=1). 
Figure 4.2.5. Use of the SCJ: Risk to Informing Clinical Practice 
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4.2.5 The SCJ: Risk informed clinical practice. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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2.6. Clinical teams were asked following the pilot phase to indicate if they 
considered the system to be useful to informing patient care. The majority indicated 
agreement (24%, n=11 strongly agreed; 56%, n=25 agreed). Twenty per cent had 
indicated a neutral opinion (n=9). This question was not posed during the 
implementation phase following editing agreed by the risk steering group. 
2.7. Following the first survey, seventy-two per cent of respondents 
familiar with using the system either strongly agreed or agreed that the SCJ: Risk 
accurately assessed a patient's risk (24%, n=11 of whom strongly agreed; 48%, n=21 
agreed). Just under a quarter indicated a neutral opinion (24%, n=11). A similar 
trend was observed following the implementation phase (14%, n=12 strongly agreed; 
46%, n=40 agreed; 28%, n=24 neutral). At the time of implementation, a higher 
proportion of respondents indicated an opinion that the system did not accurately 
assess a patient's risk (12%, n=11 compared with 4%, n=2 after the pilot phase). The 
most frequent response within three Directorates indicated agreement to the accuracy 
of the system: DSPD (50%, n=8); PD (43%, n=6); MH (53%, n=21). The 
Directorates of Learning Disability and Women's Service indicated a mode response 
indicating neutral opinion (36%, n=4 and 66%, n=4). Respondents from DSPD 
(12%, n=2); MH (18%, n=2) and WS (17%, n=1) disagreed that the system 
accurately assessed a patient's risk. 
108 
Figure 4.2.7. Perceived Accuracy of the SCJ: Risk to Assessing Patient Risk 
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4.2.7 The system accurately assessed a patient's risk. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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2.8. An additional question to the pilot phase was posed following 
implementation, related to opinion as to whether the system helped plan future 
scenarios. Seventy per cent agreed (of whom 17%, n=15 agreed strongly; 53%, n=46 
agreed). Just under a quarter indicated a neutral opinion (23%, n=20) and a minority 
did not perceive the system as helpful to planning future scenarios (7%, n=6). Each 
Directorate indicated agreement of the use of the system to planning future scenarios: 
DSPD (37%, n=6); PD (79%, n=11); MH (60%, n=24); LD (55%, n=6) and WS 
(50%, n=3). Only Mental Health indicated disagreement to the use of this portion of 
the document (10%, n=4). 
Figure 4.2.8. Use of the SCJ: Risk for Planning Future Scenarios 
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4.2.8 The SCJ: Risk helped plan future scenarios. 
V) 
Proportion of responses by Directorate. Impementation phase only 
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4.3.3 Summary of Results 
Pilot 
SCJ: Risk system was regarded positively by clinical teams in terms of its 
usefulness. The significant majority of respondents logged the system as useful 
overall (96%, n=42); helpful to clinical teams when making and documenting risk 
related decisions (96% n=42); useful in documenting requirements from the Tilt 
security review (96%, n=42); useful to constructing a risk management plan (92%); 
useful to informing clinical practice (96%, n=42); useful to informing patient care 
(80%, n=36); and in accurately assessing a patients risk (72%, n=32). 
Implementation 
A similar trend was observed during the implementation phase, with the SCJ: 
Risk system perceived positively. Almost all clinical team members indicated strong 
agreement or agreement that the system was useful overall (90%, n=78); assisted 
clinical team members make and document risk decisions (87%, n=75); facilitated 
the documentation of the Tilt security requirements (78%, n=68); allowed the 
effective construction of risk management plans (78%, n=68), informed clinical 
practice (72%, n=62); accurately assessed a patients risk (60%, n=62) and (in 
addition) helped plan future scenarios (70%, n=61). 
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4.4 Usability of the SCJ: Risk System 
- 
Was the System Seen As 
Useable? 
User satisfaction of the SCJ: Risk system was investigated. 
4.4.1 Research Questions 
Two areas related to user satisfaction were investigated following the pilot 
and implementation phase: 
3.1. Was the SCJ: Risk more user-friendly than previous risk assessments? 
3.2. Was it feasible for the clinical team to review the SCJ: Risk for each 
patient every three months? 
Two additional questions were posed at the time of implementation: 
3.2.1. Was it feasible for the clinical team to review the SCJ: Risk for each 
patient every twelve months? 
3.2.2. Should the SCJ: Risk be reviewed every three months if a patient was 
identified as high- risk? 
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4.4.2 Results 
Table C3, Appendix 2.4 details the number and proportion of responses in 
relation to usability of the SCJ: Risk system. 
3.1. Following the pilot phase, just over three quarters (76%, n=34) of 
respondents were resolute that the SCJ: Risk was more user-friendly than previous 
risk assessment systems (44%, n=20 strongly agreed; 32%, n=14 agreed). The 
remaining clinical team members were neutral in their opinion. A similar trend was 
observed following implementation with sixty-eight per cent in agreement (of whom 
32%, n=28 strongly agreed and 36%, n=31 agreed). Twenty-four per cent were 
neutral (n=21). Eight per cent of respondents following implementation disagreed 
that the system was more user-friendly than previously used risk assessment systems 
(n=7), compared with no such opinion following the pilot phase. The majority of 
respondents within DSPD and PD indicated strong agreement to the usability of the 
system (50%, n=8; 35%, n=5). Two Directorates indicated agreement: MH (42%, 
n=17) and LD (36%, n=4). Women's Service's mode response was neutral (50%, 
n=3). A smaller number and proportion of respondents who did not find the system 
to be user-friendly were present within four Directorates: DSPD (6%, n=1); PD 
(14%, n=2); MH (8%, n=3); LD (10%, n=1). 
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Figure 4.3.1. User Friendliness of SCJ: Risk Documentation Compared to 
Other Systems Implemented Throughout the Hospital 
r+ 100 90 
E 80 
a"+ 70 öu 60 
50 
40 
30 
ci 20 10 
0 
ößäQ3öö ýa Qý Q3öö oQ ýý3° öý ä3öö CE, - 
ä ýý u a, uä uu un cuu uC-v uu tDvJvv v~ Q 
-' 
`ý°- ` 
. 
tO. vvvuv 
r 
ýv.. 
9D D bA IW QO v 
lip-. v S, 
v5- 
Fy `qRF Q<<Q 
21 TQ 
Tä äQ ¢Q Qz üZz 2'z ý 
2° 
ý0'pCýCj 
T002zZDp Ll 
>. 
1: 1 pD ý- 
.. 
ý, 
rCOv O` >, T 
bC gq 00 
00 Vi N 
OGO COL 
0% 
4.3.1 The SCJ: Risk was more user-friendly than previously used risk assessment 
systems. Proportion of responses by Directoratee 
3.2. A minority of individuals participating in the pilot phase strongly 
agreed that it was feasible for the clinical team to review the SCJ: Risk for each 
patient every three months (4%, n=2). Level of strong agreement increased at the 
time of implementation (17%, n=15). A greater proportion of respondents indicated 
agreement that this frequency of renewal was viable (24%, n=11 following the pilot; 
35%, n=30 following implementation). Similar levels of neutral opinion were 
observed at the two time periods (28%, n=13 (pilot) and 25%, n=22 
(implementation)). Following the pilot phase, a total of forty-four per cent contested 
that it was viable to renew each patient every twelve weeks during clinical team 
meetings (36%, n=16 disagreed; 8%, n=3 strongly disagreed). After full 
implementation of the system, a total of twenty-three per cent of respondents 
disagreed (17%, n=15 strongly disagreed; 6%, n= 5). Completion of documentation 
every three months was therefore seen as more feasible following the 
implementation, but was still perceived as problematic by just under a quarter of 
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clinical team members. The Directorates for whom completion of documentation 
every twelve weeks was considered the most problematic were those of DSPD (13%, 
n=2) and MH (8%, n=3), who indicated strong disagreement to an assertion 
completion at this frequency would be viable. All Directorates indicated a level of 
disagreement that this was an appropriate timescale in which to regularly renew 
documentation: DSPD (25%, n=4); PD (49%, n=7); MH (33%, n=13); LD (46%, 
n=5) and WS (33%, n=2). 
Figure 4.3.2. Viability of Renewal of SCJ: Risk Documentation Every Three 
Months 
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4.3.2 The SCJ: Risk was deemed possible to review every three months. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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3.2.1. Following the implementation phase, the majority of respondents 
asserted that it was feasible for the clinical team to review the SCJ: Risk for each 
patient every twelve months (32%, n=28 strongly agreed, 48%, n=42 agreed). 
Eleven per cent disagreed that this frequency of completion was viable (7%, n=6 
disagreed; 4%, n=3 strongly disagreed). All Directorates indicated agreement that a 
twelve month completion rate was viable: DSPD (74%, n=12); PD (43%, n=6); MH 
(42%, n=17); LD (27%, n=3); WS (66%, n=17). Proportions of respondents within 
three Directorates indicated disagreement that this timeframe would be viable: PD 
(7%, n=l ); MH (5%, n=2) and LD (27%, n=3). The Learning Disability and 
Women's Service Directorates indicated strong disagreement to a proposal that 
twelve monthly completion would be viable: LD (19%, n=2); WS (17%, n=1). 
Figure 4.3.2.1. Viability of Renewal of SCJ: Risk Documentation Every Twelve 
Months 
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4.3.2.1 The SCJ: Risk was deemed possible to review every twelve months. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate. 
Implementation phase only 
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3.2.2. Following implementation, eighty-one per cent of respondents 
asserted that the SCJ: Risk should be reviewed every three months if a patient was 
identified as high- risk (35%, n=30 strongly agreed, 46%, n=40 agreed). A small 
proportion disagreed (2%, n=2 disagreed; 2%, n=2 strongly disagreed) 
remaining proportion indicated a neutral opinion (15%, n=13). 
Figure 4.3.2.2. Importance of Renewal of Documentation if Patient Deemed 
High-Risk 
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4.3.2.2 The SCJ: Risk should be reviewed every three months if a patient was 
identified as high-risk. Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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4.4.3 Summary of Results 
Pilot 
User satisfaction of the SCJ: Risk system was investigated. The system was 
perceived to be more user-friendly than previously implemented risk assessment 
systems (76%, n=34). Responses indicated that renewal of the system for each 
patient at a frequency of every three months was not viable (28%, n=13 attested it 
was feasible). 
Implementation 
The same two questions were posed following the implementation phase. 
The majority of respondents (though proportionally less than the pilot phase) asserted 
that the system was more user-friendly than previously used tools (68%, n=59) and 
viable to complete every three months (52%, n=45). In addition, respondents 
indicated the renewal of the system every twelve months to be viable (80%, n=70), 
and necessary to review every three months if a patient was identified as high-risk 
(80%, n=70). 
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4.5 Team Functioning and Multidisciplinary Working 
Multidisciplinary decision-making was a critical component of the system of 
structured clinical judgement. It was important to understand if clinical teams 
thought it important to complete the document in a multi-disciplinary format, and to 
investigate if all components of the system were discussed within a multi- 
disciplinary team (MDT) forum. 
Questions pertaining as to whether the system has improved MDT working 
were investigated, as were perceptions of an individual's contribution, motivation of 
their clinical team, and opinion as to whether an agreed management plan resulting 
from the system was subsequently implemented. 
4.5.1 Research Questions 
The following research questions were investigated: 
If the SCJ: Risk system...: 
4.1. should be completed in a multi-disciplinary format (all components) 
4.2. was completed in a multi-disciplinary format (in the respondents 
clinical team) 
4.3. improved MDT working 
4.4. facilitated the respondent in feeling as though they made a positive 
contribution to the risk decision-making process 
4.5. encountered a resistance within the clinical team (respondents were 
invited to provide further comments) 
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4.6. and the associated risk management plan agreed during MDT 
discussions was being implemented for each patient assessed 
Questions 4.1,4.4,4.5 and 4.6 were presented following the pilot phase only, 
and were not included in the post implementation evaluation survey. Questions 4.2 
and 4.3 were presented to both pilot and implementation respondents. 
4.5.2 Results 
A detailed breakdown of the number and proportion of responses to questions 
posed in relation to team functioning and multidisciplinary working may be found in 
Table C4, Appendix 2.4. 
4.1. Eighty-eight per cent of respondents following pilot of the system 
affirmed that the SCJ: Risk system should be completed in a multidisciplinary 
format. (52%, n=24 strongly agree; 36%, n=16 agree). The remaining twelve per cent 
had a neutral opinion (n=5). 
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4.2. Seventy-two per cent of respondents involved in the piloting of the 
system confirmed that all components of the SCJ: Risk were completed in a 
multidisciplinary format (n=32). Eight per cent indicated a neutral opinion (n=4). 
Twenty per cent of respondents disagreed (n=9). Similar responses were observed 
following implementation where three quarters agreed (25%, n=22 strongly agreed, 
50%, n=44 agreed). Fewer respondents disagreed when compared to the pilot phase 
(10%, n=8). The mode response between all Directorates indicated agreement that 
MDT working was apparent during completion of SCJ: Risk documentation: DSPD 
(50%, n=8); PD (50%, n=7); MH (65%, n=26); WS (33%, n=2). Just over one third 
of respondents within the Learning Disability Directorate indicated strong agreement 
that MDT working was apparent (36%, n=4). However, respondents within the same 
Directorate also indicated disagreement that decisions were made within an MDT 
forum (27%, n=3 disagreed), perhaps indicative of different experiences from 
different clinical teams. A proportion of respondents from the three remaining 
Directorates indicated that SCJ: Risk discussions did not involve all MDT members: 
PD (7%, n=1); MH (8%, n=3); LD (27%, n=3). 
Figure 4.4.2. Completion of the SCJ: Risk by Multidisciplinary Team Members 
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4.4.2 The SCJ: Risk was completed with the majority of MDT members present. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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4.3. Forty-eight per cent of those surveyed agreed that the SCJ: Risk had 
improved MDT working during the pilot phase (8%, n=4 strongly agreed, 40%, n=18 
agreed). Following implementation, fifty per cent of respondents agreed with the 
statement (12%, n=10 strongly agreed, 38%, n=33 agreed). Twelve per cent felt that 
participation in the pilot phase of the SCJ: Risk had not improved MDT working 
(n=5), a similar level to that reported by implementation recipients (10%, n=9). 
Similar proportions of neutral opinion were observed at the two time periods of 
investigation: 40%, n=18 (pilot) and 39%, n=34 (implementation). The highest 
proportion of respondents within DSPD (43%, n=7) and MH (45%, n=18) agreed 
that the system had improved MDT working. The remaining three Directorates 
indicated a neutral response most frequently: PD (43%, n=6); LD (46%, n=5); WS 
(83%, n=5). Disagreement was observed within four Directotates: DSPD (13%, 
n=2); PD (14%, n=2); MH (10%, n=4) and LD (9%, n=1 and 1% strongly disagreed). 
Figure 4.4.3. Improvement of Multidisciplinary Working as a Consequence of 
the Use of the SCJ: Risk within Clinical Practice 
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4.4.3 The SCJ: Risk improved multidisciplinary working. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
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4.4. Eighty-five per cent of respondents felt as though they had made a 
positive contribution to the SCJ: Risk decision-making process following the pilot 
phase (27%, n=12 strongly agreed; 58%, n=26 agreed). This indicated that the 
majority of respondents felt integrated into MDT discussions. Four per cent of 
respondents were neutral (n=2), and eleven per cent felt that they did not make a 
positive contribution to the process (7%, n=3 disagreed; 4%, n=2 strongly disagreed). 
This question was not posed to respondents following implementation. 
4.5. Sixty-six per cent of those participating in the pilot disagreed that 
there was resistance to using the SCJ: Risk within their team (63%, n=28 disagreed; 
3% strongly disagreed). Thirteen per cent indicated a neutral opinion (n=6). Eight 
per cent agreed strongly to the fact that there is resistance to using the system (n=4), 
and thirteen per cent agreed to the statement (n=6). Of the respondents involved in 
the pilot of the SCJ: Risk who recorded a resistance to using the document, the 
following comments were made: (i) resistance due to low motivation (n=5 
respondents from two teams), (ii) resistance to change (n=2) and (iii) lack of support 
from other team members (n=3). Other respondents logged resistance due to the 
workload already contained within a clinical team meeting. The same question was 
not posed to participants during the implementation phase. 
4.6. Following the pilot phase, the majority of respondents recorded that 
the management plan agreed during MDT discussions was subsequently 
implemented for each patient assessed (8%, n=4 strongly agreed; 60%, n=36 agreed). 
Just under a quarter of respondents indicated a neutral opinion (24%, n=11). Eight 
per cent indicated that the agreed risk management plan was not being implemented 
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(n=4). This question was not included during investigation following the 
implementation phase. 
4.5.3 Summary of Results 
Pilot 
Multidisciplinary team (MDT) decision-making was a critical component of 
the system of structured clinical judgement. The majority of individuals involved in 
the pilot phase thought that the SCJ: Risk ought to be completed in an MDT forum 
(88%, n=30) and confirmed the SCJ: Risk was conducted involving the contribution 
of all MDT members (72%, n=32). Pilot of the SCJ: Risk was seen to improve MDT 
working (48%, n=22), and the majority of team members felt as though they made a 
positive contribution to the risk decision-making process (85%, n=38). 
The majority of respondents within clinical teams were not resistant to using 
the system during the pilot phase (66%, n=29). However, approximately a fifth 
(21%, n=10) either agreed or strongly agreed that there was resistance. Qualitative 
feedback from this group suggested this may be attributable to; general resistance to 
change, lack of support from other team members and existing workloads already 
contained within a ward round. 
Qualitative feedback suggested acceptance to the SCJ: Risk was facilitated 
by; (i) clinical teams understanding of why there was a need for a change in clinical 
practice and (ii) confidence in utilising a system that has a validated evidence-base as 
its foundation and the provision of help external to the team. 
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Implementation 
Following the implementation phase, similar trends were observed for two 
questions posed during the pilot phase. Most respondents agreed that all components 
of the SCJ: Risk were completed in a multi-disciplinary format (75%, n=57), and 
half agreed that the system had improved multidisciplinary working (50%, n=43). 
4.6 Piloting/ Implementation and Support 
It was proposed that the implementation of the project was done in a staged 
manner, initially through piloting the system within a limited number of wards within 
the hospital. The intention of the pilot was to ensure that the system worked 
effectively throughout each of the Directorates before full implementation. 
4.6.1 Research Questions 
The following research questions were investigated: 
5.1. Had completion of the SCJ put a significant strain on current clinical 
resources? 
5.2. If it was beneficial to have a regular designated time to discuss the 
SCJ: Risk where all MDT members were present? 
Question 5.1 was posed at both pilot and implementation phase. Question 5.2 
was presented following the pilot phase only, and was excluded from the 
implementation phase (as regular designated times had been established as part of the 
implementation of the SCJ: Risk). 
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4.6.2 Results 
Responses relating to the pilot, implementation and ongoing support of the 
SCJ: Risk system may be found in Table C5, Appendix 2.4, giving a breakdown of 
number and proportion of responses by Directorate for each question posed. 
5.1. During the pilot phase forty-four per cent of the total respondents 
k 
't 
F 
indicated that completion of the SCJ: Risk had put a significant strain on current 
clinical resources (8%, n=4 strongly agreed; 36%, n=16 agreed). Fewer respondents 
agreed to the statement that existing clinical resources had been strained due to the 
use of the SCJ: Risk at the time of implementation (3%, n=3 strongly agreed, 17%, 
n=15 agreed). However a fifth of all clinical team respondents still indicated a strain 
on current clinical resources, despite extra allocation of resources following the pilot 
phase. More neutral responses were observed during the implementation phase 
(43%, n=37), compared to the pilot phase (32%, n=14). Twenty-four per cent did 
not think that the system had put a significant strain on resources after the pilot phase 
(n=11 disagreed), and thirty-seven per cent did not perceive additional impact on 
current resources (32%, n=28 disagreed; 5%, n=4 strongly disagreed). Neutral 
responses were most frequently recorded within the following Directorates: DSPD 
(56%, n=9); PD (50%, n=7); LD (54%, n=6) and WS (33%, n=2). Indication was 
given from all Directorates that the system had not put a significant strain on existing 
clinical resources: DSPD (19%, n=3); PD (36%, n=5); MH (33%, n=13); LD (46%, 
n=5) and WS (33%, n=2). The strongest assertion that no additional burden was 
observed as a result of implementation of the SCJ: Risk was observed within DSPD 
(6%, n=1) and MH (8%, n=3). 
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Figure 4.5.1. Impact of Completion of SCJ: Risk Documentation on Existing 
Clinical Resources 
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4.5.1 The SCJ: Risk put a significant strain on existing clinical resource. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
Qualitative analysis of free text boxes indicated that respondents suggested 
the strain on existing clinical areas to be attributed to two areas. The first strain was 
that of time, and was summarised by one respondents comment: "In ward round 
there is little time to discuss it (the SCJ: Risk) on top of immediate clinical issues" 
(see related question 5.2 below). The second was concern over replication of effort 
due to another system of risk assessment specifically for nursing staff introduced to 
the hospital at a similar time (TRIMS). One participant logged: "Nurses will also be 
required to carry out TRIMS". 
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5.2. Eighty-seven per cent of respondents involved in the pilot phase 
indicated that it was beneficial to have a regular designated time to discuss the SCJ: 
Risk where all MDT members were present (54%, n=24 strongly agreed; 33%, n=15 
agreed). The remaining thirteen per cent were neutral in their opinion (n=6). This 
question was not presented to participants involved in the implementation phase as a 
designated time was scheduled as part of ongoing clinical practice. 
4.6.3 Summary of Results 
Pilot 
A proportion of respondents during the pilot phase agreed that the completion 
of the SCJ: Risk had put a significant strain on current clinical resources (44%, 
n=20), and the majority (87%, n=39) indicated that a regular designated time for 
SCJ: Risk discussions would be beneficial. 
Implementation 
A significantly smaller proportion of respondents reported strain on clinical 
resources following implementation of the SCJ: Risk (20%, n=18). 
128 
4.7 Additional Resources, Policies, Procedures and Nominated 
Contacts 
Following respondents' experiences of pilot of the SCJ: Risk, it was 
anticipated that clinical teams would require additional resources to successfully 
document the system. Individuals were asked to identify the resources they required, 
and responses were collated. Respondents were asked if they agreed that the system 
should be embedded in policy. Clinical team members were also asked their opinion 
as to the usefulness of a coordinator external to the team. An additional question 
thought relevant to the implementation phase related to opinion as to whether a 
patient should have a provisionally completed SCJ: Risk document before admission. 
4.7.1 Research Questions 
The areas of investigation in these areas were as follows: 
6.1. Were additional resources necessary to successfully document the 
SCJ risk system? 
6.2. Should the SCJ: Risk system be embedded in policy? 
6.3. Was it useful to have a contact person (SCJ: Risk coordinator external 
to the team) to assist clinical team implementation and assist clinical 
risk decisions. 
6.4. Was it useful for clinical teams to have a nominated contact(s) to 
liaise with the SCJ: Risk project manager? 
6.5. Should the SCJ: Risk be provisionally completed before a patient's 
admission? 
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Questions 6.1 and 6.2 were not included in the survey at the time of 
implementation (additional resources had been allocated following the pilot phase, 
and a policy document had been implemented). Questions 6.3 and 6.4 were 
presented at both phases, and question 6.5 was introduced as an additional area for 
investigation following the implementation phase. 
4.7.2 Results 
Table C6, Appendix 2.4 illustrates the proportion and number of responses 
for questions related to additional resources, policies, procedures and nominated 
contacts. 
6.1. Over half of those surveyed following the pilot phase agreed that 
additional resources were necessary to successfully document the SCJ: Risk system 
(52%, n=23). A smaller proportion disagreed (12%, n=5), with the remaining 
proportion indicating a neutral response (36%, n=17). This question was not 
included during the implementation phase. 
6.2. Over three quarters of respondents surveyed after participation in the 
pilot phase indicated that the system should be embedded in policy (29%, n=13 
strongly agreed; 45%, n=20 agreed). Twenty-two per cent gave a neutral response 
(n=10), and four per cent disagreed (n=2). In preparation for the implementation 
phase, a policy and procedure document was subsequently adopted within clinical 
practice, so this question was not presented during the second phase of the 
investigation. 
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6.3. Ninety-two per cent of respondents involved in the pilot phase of the 
system affirmed that it was useful to have a contact person (SCJ: Risk coordinator 
external to the team) to assist clinical team implementation and clinical risk decision- 
making (34%, n= 15 strongly agreed, 58%, n=26 agreed). Fewer respondents found 
an external contact to be of use during the implementation phase (15%, n=13 
strongly agreed; 33%, n=29 agreed). A greater proportion of respondents during the 
implementation phase logged a neutral response (45%, n=39), compared to the pilot 
phase (8%, n=4). A minority did not find an external contact to be a useful resource 
(6%, n=5 disagreed, 1%, n=1 strongly disagreed). Neutral responses were most 
frequently observed across four Directorates: PD (50%, n=7); MH (45%, n=18); LD 
(46%, n=5); WS (83%, n=5). Mental Health and Learning Disability Directorates 
disagreed that a nominated contact was a useful resource (8%, n=3 and 18%, n=2). 
No respondent strongly disagreed from any directorate. The Dangerous and Severe 
Personality Unit indicated that a nominated contact was useful (62%, n=10). When 
responses of agreement or strong agreement were summed, the following trends 
between Directorates were observed asserting the use of a nominated contact: DSPD 
(75%, n=12); PD (50%, n=7); MH (44%, n=18); LD (36%, n=4); WS (17%, n=1). 
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Figure 4.6.3. Usefulness of Contact Person (External to Clinical Team) 
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4.6.3 Contact person (external to the clinical team) was a useful resource. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
6.4. Eighty two per cent of respondents thought it was useful for clinical 
teams to have a nominated contact(s) to liaise with the SCJ: Risk team during the 
pilot phase (28%, n=12 strongly agreed; 56%, n=25 agreed). Twenty-seven per cent 
fewer respondents found a liaison representative to be useful during the 
implementation phase (21%, n=18 strongly agreed; 34%, n=30 agreed). A greater 
proportion indicated a neutral response at the time of implementation compared to 
the pilot phase (33%, n=29 and 8%, n=4 respectively). A slightly higher proportion 
of clinical team members surveyed indicated that a nominated contact was not a 
useful resource at the time of implementation (12%, n=10) compared to investigation 
following the pilot phase (8%, n=4). The most frequent response from three 
Directorates was indicative of neutral opinion as to the usefulness of a nominated 
contact: MH (38%, n=15); LD (54%, n=6); WS (50%, n=3). Summing the level of 
agreement from `strongly agree' and `agree' statements the following Directorates 
perceived the external contact to be of benefit at the time of implementation: DSPD 
(56%, n=9); PD (100%, n=14); MH (48%, n=19)' LD (36%, n=4) and WS (33%, 
n=2). 
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Respondents were asked to indicate the profession they thought should hold 
position of nominated contact (MDT member to liaise with the SCJ: Risk project 
manager and to take overall responsibility for SCJ completions). Consultant 
Psychiatrists (89%, n=39 pilot; 92%, n=80 implementation) and Psychologists (11%, 
n=6 pilot; 8% n=7 implementation) were the professions that were most frequently 
identified. 
Figure 4.6.4. Usefulness of Directorate Representative with the SCJ: Risk Team 
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4.6.4 Directorate representative was seen as a useful liaison link with the 
SCJ: Risk team. Proportion of responses by Directorate 
6.5. The majority of respondents surveyed following the implementation 
of the system indicated that SCJ: Risk documentation should be provisionally 
completed before a patient was admitted (25%, n=21 strongly agreed; 46%, n=40 
agreed). A small proportion of eleven per cent disagreed (8%, n=7 disagreed; 3%, 
n=3 strongly disagreed), with the remaining eighteen per cent indicating a negative 
response (n=16). The highest proportion of response within this question was that of 
agreement: DSPD (44%, n=7), PD (57%, n=8); MH (54%, n=8). The highest 
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proportion of response within Women's Service was evenly split between strong 
agreement (33%, n=2) and neutral opinion (33%. n=2). Strong agreement for the 
provisional completion of documentation before a patient's admission was asserted 
by the following proportions of respondents within Directorates: DSPD (25%, n=4); 
PD (15%, n=2); MH (28%, n=11); LD (18%, n=2) and WS (33%, n=2). 
Respondents within three Directorates indicated disagreement to this procedure: PD 
(14%, n=2); MH (8%, n=3, and 4%, n=2 strong disagreement); LD (18%, n=2) and 
WS (17%, n=1 strong disagreement). 
Figure 4.6.5. Proportion of Agreement for Completion of SCJ: Risk 
Documentation Before Patient Admission 
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4.6.5 The SCJ: Risk should have been provisionally completed before a patient 
admission. Proportion of responses by Directorate. Implemenatation phase only 
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4.7.3 Summary of Results 
Pilot 
Responses from the pilot phase indicated that additional resources were 
necessary to ensure the successful implementation of the SCJ: Risk (52%, n=23). 
Participants indicated a preference for the system to be embedded in policy (74%, 
n=33). A contact person (the current author) trained to assist clinical team 
implementation and assist clinical risk decisions was seen as a useful resource (92%, 
n=41). The majority of respondents (84%, n=37) thought that a nominated contact 
person within each clinical team (or Directorate Representative) was a useful liaison 
link with the SCJ: Risk manager. 
Implementation 
Clinical team members involved in the investigation of the implementation 
phase of the SCJ: Risk system did not indicate as compellingly that a contact person 
(recruited Research Assistants) external to the team was useful (48%, n=42), 
however nearly half did assert that this resource was valuable. Over half (55%, 
n=48) agreed that a nominated contact was a useful resource and the majority 
asserted that SCJ: Risk documentation should be provisionally completed before 
admission of a patient (71%, n=61). 
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4.8 Ongoing Evaluation of the SCJ: Risk system and Access of 
Electronic Records 
Clinical teams were asked their opinion to ascertain if clinical teams thought 
evaluation of the SCJ: Risk system was an essential component to the development 
of the system. 
4.8.1 Research Questions 
An investigation was conducted to ascertain if it was important to 
respondents that...: 
7.1. elements of the SCJ were evaluated 
7.2. the outcomes of evaluations were communicated back to clinical 
teams 
Question 7.1 was not posed at the time of implementation, however question 
7.2 was presented to both time phases. 
Clinical team members at both pilot and implementation were encouraged to 
make additional comments relating to...: 
7.3. any changes they would make to the system 
7.4. any other comments 
As part of the ongoing evaluation of use of the SCJ: Risk as part of ongoing 
clinical practice, respondents (following the implementation phase only) were also 
asked to identify their use of the computerised system of recording SCJ: Risk entries 
via the hospital's electronic recording system (RiO) by means of indicating responses 
to the following questions: 
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7.5. frequency of access of patient case notes via RiO 
7.6. frequency of access within RiO to review SCJ: Risk records 
4.8.2 Results 
Table C7, Appendix 2.4 details the distribution of responses to each question 
relevant to the ongoing evaluation and access of electronic records (displayed by 
Directorate). 
7.1. One hundred per cent of those surveyed during the pilot phase thought 
it important to evaluate elements of the SCJ: Risk. (42%, n=19 strongly agreed; 58%, 
n=26 agreed). This question was posed to pilot respondents only. 
7.2. All respondents involved in the pilot project affirmed that it would be 
important that the outcomes of evaluations are communicated back to clinical teams 
(48%, n=21 strongly agreed, 52%, n=24 agreed). Participants of the implementation 
investigation indicated agreement (23%, n=20 strongly agreed, 51%, n=44 agreed). 
A small proportion disagreed (7%, n=6; 1%, n=l strongly) with the remaining 
proportion indicating a neutral opinion (18%, n=16). The most frequent response 
was that of agreement between Directorates: DSPD (56%, n=9); PD (36%, n=5); 
MH (58%, n=23); LD (46%, n=5). Strong agreement was asserted by the following 
proportions between Directorates: DSPD (19%, n=3); PD (14%, n=2); MH (20%, 
n=8); LD (36%, n=4) and WS (50%, n=3). 
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Figure 4.7.2. Proportion of Agreement that SCJ: Risk Evaluations Should be 
Communicated Back to Clinical Teams 
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4.7.2 SCJ: Risk evaluations should be communicated back to clinical teams. 
Proportion of responses by Directorate 
7.3. When invited to note the changes an individual would make to the 
system following the pilot phase, the following useful responses were recorded; (a) 
scenario plans may be helpful, (b) add in a way to rate offence paralleling behaviours 
in current / previous presentations 
- 
may be important in making decisions about 
transfer / ground privilege etc. At the time of implementation, a number commented 
that it was unclear upon initial reading of the documentation if the Tilt High Risk 
Summary section applied to an individual's current care environment, or general risk 
(38%, n=15), but noted that this had been explained during subsequent training on 
the ward location (9%, n=8). 
7.4 There were no recurring comments noted as significant to the 
evaluation of the pilot or implementation phase. 
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7.5. The majority of respondents had accessed patient case notes via RiO 
on a number of occasions (84%, n=73 of whom had accessed notes fifteen times or 
more). Only one individual had not accessed the electronic record keeping system. 
The widespread use of the electronic system for general clinical practice was 
therefore evidenced. The following Directorates had accessed the system in excess 
of fifteen times: DSPD (88% n=14); PD (100%, n=14); MH (80%, n=32); LD (73%, 
n=8); WS (83%, n=5). The widespread use of the electronic system for general 
clinical practice was therefore evidenced. 
Figure 4.7.5. Number of Times Patient Records Accessed via Electronic Record 
Keeping System (RiO) 
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4.7.5 Frequency of access of patien t case notes via Rio 
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7.6. Frequency of access within RiO to review SCJ: Risk records 
specifically was not evidenced to the same extent. Thirty per cent of respondents had 
never accessed SCJ: Risk records electronically (n= 26), twenty-three per cent 
between one and five occasions (n=20), eight per cent between ten and fifteen 
occasions (n=7), and twenty-six per cent in excess of fifteen occasions (n=23). 
Respondents within four Directorates indicated most frequently that they had not 
accessed the electronic SCJ: Risk record-keeping system on any occasion: PD (36%, 
n=5); MH (28%, n=11); LD (46%, n=5); WS (33%, n=2). The remaining 
respondents had limited access of the system between one and five occasions 
(ranging from between 19%, n=3 DSPD and 33%, n=2 WS); between six and ten 
occasions (with a range of 0%, n=0 LD and 25%, n=4 DSPD); between ten and 
fifteen occasions (0%, n=0 PD, 12%, n=5 DSPD). However, a proportion of 
respondents had accessed the system in excess of fifteen times: DSPD (25%, n=4); 
PD (36%, n=5); MH (25%, n=10); LD (27%, n=3); WS (17%, n=1). 
Figure 4.7.6. Number of Times SCJ: Risk Accessed via Electronic Record 
Keeping System (RiO) 
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4.7.6 Frequency of access of SCJ: Risk records via MO 
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4.8.3 Summary of Results 
Pilot 
Ongoing evaluation of the SC J: Risk was considered important to 
respondents (100%, n=45) as were the communication of outcomes (100%, n=45). 
Implementation 
Communication of evaluations to clinical team members was considered 
important to the majority of respondents at the time of implementation (74%, n=64). 
Findings indicated that staff accessed patient records within RiO as part of their 
general clinical practice (99%, n= 86), but that SCJ: Risk records were not being 
accessed to the same extent (70%, n=61). Acquisition of skill to access the 
electronic system was therefore present, but awareness of the existence of the system 
and how to access records were identified as a training need. 
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4.9 Perceived Clarity and Relevance of SCJ: Risk 
Clinical team members were asked to indicate agreement to statements 
pertaining to completion of documentation for new admissions, clarity of definitions 
of the system, relevance of subscale items. Respondents were also asked to identify 
the item subscales that were most (or least) helpful and relevant to assessing and 
managing patient risk. 
4.9.1 Research Questions 
The following questions were presented to respondents following the implementation 
phase only. The SCJ: Risk: 
8.1. is unclear in certain sections 
8.2. is irrelevant in certain sections 
4.9.2 Results 
Responses related to the perceived clarity and relevance of SCJ: Risk 
document, displayed by Directorate may be found in Table C8, Appendix 2.4. 
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8.1. A proportion of respondents involved in the implementation did not 
agree that SCJ: Risk documentation was unclear in certain sections (42%, n=36). 
Two fifths recorded a neutral opinion (40%, n=35). However, eighteen per cent 
indicated that the document lacked clarity in certain sections (3%, n=3 strongly 
asserted this belief; 15%, n=13 also agreed this to be the case). Of the total 
proportion strongly agreeing that the system lacked clarity, respondents from two 
Directorates asserted this to be the case: DSPD (6%, n=1); MH (5%, n=2). All 
Directorates (with the exception of PD) agreed to varying extents that the system 
lacked clarity: DSPD (13%, n=2); MH (20%, n=8); LD (10%, n=1); WS (33%, n=2). 
Directorates of DSPD (63%, n=10), PD (64%, n=9), MH (30%, n=12) and LD (45%, 
n=5) indicated agreement that the system was clear. 
Figure 4.8.1. Perceived Clarity of SCJ: Risk Documentation 
100 
90 
80 
E 70 
60 
wo 50 
40 
30 
20 
0. 
   
1 1'® ''4 
0 11' ý A Ll x C] C] Ll xq ý1 (ý gqqn Aqq 1-31 
(- p ai v a°'i a°'i F- q a°ýi v a°ýi avi l- gm ro F- qvv a`ýi °' 
wavy 
ý"' 61 L" Q% hL F" L" ý" Vr 6J b" NNv` Ql Lý L' pQ Nýý bA ý ýý cd 3ýv 6J p4 1-" 
ý 
pq y 4.4. L' 
aq 
Q¢ Q Qý öq 
pýýq 
QQQQQRÄ 
QQTQQzzzzZ y_ 
m° 
Cl CIM ton ÄQ Cj 
öcöözq C]N ö T>>> 
CYT to " OJU = O2 (A (A )ö CO ÖÖ 
4.8.1 Agreement as to whether SCJ: Risk documentation is unclear in certain 
sections. Implementation phase 
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8.2. The SCJ: Risk was perceived as having relevance to over half the 
clinical team members responding to the evaluation survey (44%, n=38 strongly 
disagreed; 10%, n=9 disagreed that the system was irrelevant). A large proportion 
returned a neutral response (37%, n=32). The remaining proportion indicated that 
the system was irrelevant in certain sections (8%, n=7 agreed; 1%, n=1 strongly 
agreed). Differences between Directorates were found. The Learning Disability 
Directorate did not find the SCJ: Risk to be irrelevant (0%, n=0), however the 
following proportions from each Directorate did find the relevance of certain sections 
to be problematic: DSPD (6%, n=l); PD (22%, n=3); MH (8%, n=3 (of whom 3%; 
n=1 agreed strongly)); WS (17%, n=1). Neutral opinion was the most frequently 
recorded response from three Directorates: MH (40%, n=16), LD (55%, n=6) and 
WS (66%, n=4). Respondents from all Directorates indicated disagreement to the 
statement that the SCJ: Risk was irrelevant: DSPD (69%, n=11); PD (64%, n=9 
(22%, n=3 of whom disagreed strongly)); MH (52%, n=21 (14%, n=6 indicated 
strong disagreement); LD (45%, n=5) and WS (17%, n=1). 
Figure 4.8.2. Perceived Relevance of the SCJ: Risk 
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4.8.2 Agreement as to whether SCJ: Risk documentation is irrelevant in certain 
sections. Implementation phase. 
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4.9.3 Summary of Results 
Implementation 
Convincing assertions of the clarity of SCJ: Risk documentation was not 
evidenced. The system was perceived as having clarity by 42% (n=36) of 
respondents following use of the system in clinical practice. Disagreement as to the 
clarity of the system was asserted by eighteen per cent (n=16). Neutral opinion was 
a frequent response to this question (40%, n=35). Qualitative feedback suggested 
that the most frequently cited items were additional items of the SCJ: Risk relating to 
Suicide/Self Harm, and the Risk Scenario Planning portions of the document. 
The perceived relevance of the system was affirmed by a proportion of 
respondents (54%, n=47), however (similar to comments regarding clarity of the 
system), a large number of respondents indicated a neutral response (37%, n=32), 
and the system was seen not to have relevance by a proportion of respondents (9%, 
n=8). Qualitative analysis of feedback indicated that the portions of the document 
relating to the Scenario Planning section were deemed the least relevant. 
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4.10 Relevance of HCR-20 / SCJ: Risk Total Subscales 
Respondents following the implementation phase were asked to indicate 
which subscales were helpful / relevant to assessing and managing patient risk by the 
following scales: 
4.10.1 Research Questions 
Research questions related to the perception of the relevance of nine subscale 
items of the HCR-20, and SCJ: Risk: 
9.1. Historical 
9.2. Clinical 
9.3. Risk 
9.4. Suicide / Self-harm 
9.5. Vulnerability 
9.6. Escape 
9.7. Scenario Planning 
9.8. Tilt High Risk Summary 
9.9. Risk Management Planning 
9.10 HCR-20 Subscales 
9.11 Additional SCJ: Risk Subscales 
9.12 SCJ: Risk Overall 
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4.10.2 Results 
Table C9, Appendix 2.4 provides a detailed summary of the perceived 
relevance of each subscale in relation to the assessment and management of risk, 
displayed by Directorate. 
9.1. The Historical portion of the document was perceived as relevant by 
ninety-six per cent of respondents (48%, n=42 strongly agreed, and the same 
proportion agreed). All four Directorates indicated strong agreement: DSPD (31 %, 
n=5); PD (50%, n=7); MH (55%, n=22); LD (45%, n=10); WS (50%, n=3). 
Agreement was indicated by the following proportions: DSPD (56%, n=9); PD (50%, 
n=7); MH (45%, n=18); LD (45%, n=5); WS (33%, n=2). The Historical Subscale 
yielded the least frequency of neutral responses within the documentation overall 
(only two per cent of the total respondents indicated a neutral response (DPSD (13%, 
n=2)). Two per cent of the remaining total disagreed to the relevance of the 
Historical section (n=2), of whom ten per cent indicated disagreement from the LD 
Directorate (n=1), and per cent indicated strong disagreement from WS (n=1). 
Figure 4.9.1. Perceived Relevance of Historical Items 
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patient risk. Implementation phase 
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9.2. Ninety per cent of respondents (n=77) indicated agreement to the 
relevance of the Clinical items. The highest level of agreement was found within the 
PD directorate (100%, n=57). The remaining four Directorates indicated high levels 
of overall agreement: DSPD (83%, n=13); MH (95%, n=35); LD (72%, n=8) and 
WS (67%, n=4). Strong agreement was found within all Directorates: DSPD (39%, 
n=6); PD (43%, n=6); MH (50%, n=20); LD (36%, n=4) and WS (50%, n=3). 
Disagreement as to the relevance of the Clinical Subscale was found within the 
Directorates of. DSPD (6%, n=1) and LD (10%, n= l ). Nine per cent (n=8) of all 
respondents indicated a neutral response (DSPD 13%, n=2; MH 5%, n=2; LD 18%, 
n=2; WS 33%, n=2). 
Figure 4.9.2. Perceived Relevance of Clinical Items 
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4.9.2 Perception of relevance of Clinical items to assessing and managing 
patient risk. Implementation phase 
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9.3. The Risk portion of the HCR-20/SCJ: Risk documentation was 
perceived as the most relevant section overall (93%, n=81). Levels of overall 
agreement ranged between ninety-four per cent (DSPD, n=15) and eighty-two per 
cent (LD, n=9). Strong levels of agreement were frequently reported from all 
Directorates: DSPD (75%, n=12); PD (43%, n=6); MH (50%, n=20); LD (37%, n=4) 
and WS (50%, n=3). Only one per cent of total respondents indicated disagreement 
to the relevance of the Risk subscale (WS 16%, n=1). A neutral opinion was also 
reported relatively infrequently as six per cent of the total (n=5). 
Figure 4.9.3. Perceived Relevance of Risk Items 
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4.9.3 Perception of relevance of Risk items to assessing and managing patient 
risk. Implementation phase 
149 
9.4. Eighty-seven per cent of all respondents indicated a level of 
agreement that the Suicide/Self Harm portion of SCJ: Risk documentation was 
relevant. Three Directorates indicated strong agreement as the most frequent 
response: DSPD (38%, n=6); LD (45%, n=5); WS (50%, n=3). The remaining two 
Directorates indicated agreement as the mode response: PD (50%, n=7); MH (58%, 
n=23). Neutral opinion was indicated by ten per cent of the total proportion of 
respondents (n=9) whereby a quarter of all DSPD respondents indicated this response 
(25%, n=4). The same response was observed within the remaining four 
Directorates: PD (7%, n=l); MH (2%, n=1); LD (18%, n=2); WS (17%, n=l). No 
one respondent strongly disagreed to the relevance of the subscale, but disagreement 
was found in three per cent of the total number of respondents (n=3), constituting 
DSPD (n=1); MH (n=1) and WS (n=1). 
Figure 4.9.4. Perceived Relevance of Suicide/Self-Harm Items 
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4.9.4 Perception of relevance of Suicide/ Self-harm items to assessing and 
managing patient risk. Implementation phase 
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9.5. Vulnerability items were seen as having most relevance within the 
Personality Disorder Directorate (93%, n=13). The total proportion of agreement as 
to relevance was eighty-four per cent: DSPD (69%, n=11); MH (86%, n=34); LD 
(82%, n=9) and WS (50%, n=4). Within DSPD and WS, strong agreement was the 
most frequently recorded response (38%, n=6 and 50%, n=3 respectively). 
Agreement was most frequently observed within PD (50%, n=7), MH (48%, n=19) 
and LD (45%, n=5). The Vulnerability subscale had the second highest proportion of 
neutral responses of all subscales comprising the SCJ: Risk (after the Scenario 
planning Section, detailed below). Sixteen per cent of the total proportion of 
respondents indicated a neutral opinion (n=14): DSPD (31%, n=5); PD (7%, n=1); 
MH (14%, n=5); LD (18%, n=2) and WS (16%, n= 1). 
Figure 4.9.5. Perceived Relevance of Vulnerability Items 
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4.9.5 Perception of relevance of Vulnerability items to assessing and managing 
patient risk. Implementation phase 
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9.6. The Escape subscale of the SCJ: Risk was perceived as relevant to 
ninety per cent of respondents: DSPD (87%, n=14); PD (86%, n=12); MH (96%, 
n=22); LD (90%, n=10) and WS (67%, n=4). Strong levels of agreement were 
recorded as the most frequent response by DSPD (56%, n=9), LD (45%, n=5) and 
WS (50%, n=3). Agreement was indicated as the most frequent opinion by 
respondents from the Directorates of PD (50%, n=7), MH (55%, n=22) and LD 
(45%, n=5). Neutral opinion was recorded by six respondents (7% of the total 
proportion: DSPD (13%, n=2); PD (14%, n=2); LD (10%, n=1) and WS (17%, n=1). 
Levels of disagreement were indicated by three per cent of the total number of 
respondents (n=2: MH, n=2; WS, n=1). 
Figure 4.9.6. Perceived Relevance of Escape Items 
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4.9.6 Perception of relevance of Escape items to assessing and managing patient 
risk. Implementation phase 
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9.7. Almost two-thirds of those surveyed asserted that the Risk Scenario 
Planning subscale was relevant to assessing and managing patient risk (74%, n=64). 
The Learning Disability and Women's Service Directorates indicated strong 
agreement to the utility of this subscale (36%, n=4 and 33%, n=2). The remaining 
three Directorates indicated agreement as the mode response: DSPD (44%, n=7); PD 
(71%, n=10) and MH (40%, n=16). The Women's Service most frequently indicated 
a neutral response (33%, n=2). Greater variation in responses was recorded for this 
subscale, including the highest proportion of neutral opinion than any other subscale 
of the SCJ: Risk: Total (18%, n=16); DSPD (25%, n=4); PD (7%, n=1); MH (17%, 
n=7); LD (18%, n=2); WS (33%, n=2). Disagreement as to the relevance of the Risk 
Scenario Planning portion was prevalent in eight per cent of respondents (n=7): MH 
(10%, n=4); LD (18%, n=2) and WS (16%, n=1). 
Figure 4.9.7. Perceived Relevance of Risk Scenario Planning items 
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4.9.7 Perception of relevance of Scenario Planning items to assessing and 
managing patient risk. Implementation phase 
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9.8. The Tilt High Risk Summary portion of the SCJ: Risk was perceived 
as relevant by eighty-four per cent of the total respondents (n=73). The scale was 
deemed most relevant by respondents within DSPD (88%, n=14) and MH (88%, 
n=35). High levels of agreement were also reported within PD (72%, n=10); LD 
(79%, n=9) and WS (83%, n=2). Robust levels of agreement were observed within 
the DSPD Directorate (75%, n=12 agreed strongly). The remaining four directorates 
also evidenced strong agreement levels: PD (35%, n=5); MH (40%, n=16); LD 
(34%, n=4) and WS (33%, n=2). The latter four Directorates indicated agreement as 
the mode response as to the relevance of the Tilt Summary: PD (36%, n=5); MH 
(48%, n=19); LD (45%, n=5) and WS (50%, n=3). Despite the overall high levels of 
agreement, this portion of the documentation yielded the greatest proportion of 
disagreement as to its relevance to the assessment and management of patient risk 
(9%, n=8). 
Figure 4.9.8. Perceived Relevance of Tilt High Risk Summary Items 
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4.9.8 Perception of relevance of Tilt High Risk Summary section to assessing and 
managing patient risk. Implementation phase 
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9.9. Eighty-two per cent of respondents asserted that the Risk 
Management Planning Portion of the SCJ: Risk was relevant to the assessment and 
management of patient risk: DSPD (73%, n=10); PD (93%, n=13); MH (91%, n=36); 
LD (72%, n=8) and WS (66%, n=4). Within each Directorate, different levels of 
agreement were apparent. The mode response for DSPD was strong agreement 
(44%, n=7). Within the Directorates of PD and MH, agreement was most frequently 
indicated (57%, n=8 and 55%, n=36). The remaining two Directorates indicated 
equal proportions of levels of agreement LD (36%, n=4 strongly agreed and agreed) 
and WS (33%, n=2 strongly agreed and agreed). Ten per cent of the total number of 
recipients indicated a neutral response (n=9): DSPD (31%, n=5); PD (0%, n=0); MH 
(5%, n=2); LD (10%, n=1) and WS (17%, n=1). Disagreement was observed in 
seven per cent of respondents (n=6): DSPD (6%, n=l); PD (7%, n=l); MH (2%, 
n=1); LD (18%, n=2); WS (16%, n=1). 
Figure 4.9.9. Perceived Relevance of Risk Management Planning Items 
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4.9.9 Perception of relevance of Risk Management Planning section to assessing 
and managing patient risk. Implementation phase 
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Analysis of Responses of Questionnaire Items 9.1 to 9.9 
Table C9, Appendix 2.4 provides a summary of an analysis of responses 
pertaining to the relevance of subscales from the HCR-20, additional subscales of the 
SCJ: Risk, and the document in its entirety to the assessment and management of 
patient risk. Figure 9.10 displays totals of the mean responses of the perceived 
relevance of Historical, Clinical and Risk subscales displayed by Directorate. Figure 
4.9.11 displays the mean scores for the additional Suicide, Vulnerability and Escape 
subscales. Figure 4.9.12 represents mean total responses per Directorate for the 
perceived relevance of all portions of SCJ: Risk Documentation. 
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9.10. Ninety-three per cent of respondents indicated agreement that the 
subscales comprising the HCR-20 were relevant to the assessment and management 
of patients: DSPD (87%, n=14); PD (98%, n=46); MH (98%, n=39), LD (81%, n=9), 
WS (78%, n=5). Strong levels of agreement were the most frequently indicated 
opinions from the Directorates of DSPD (48%, n=8); PD (46%, n=6); MH (52%, 
n=21) and WS (50%, n=3). The Learning Disability Directorate indicated agreement 
to the utility of the HCR-20 subscales as the most frequent response (42%, n=5). Six 
per cent of all respondents indicated a neutral response (n=5: DSPD (11%, n=1); PD 
(3%, n=1); MH (2%, n=1); LD (12%, n=1) and WS (12%, n=1). 
Figure 4.9.10. Perceived Relevance of HCR-20 Total Subscales 
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4.9.10 Perception of Relevance of HCR-20 Total Subscales (Historical, Clinical, 
Risk) to the Assessment and Management of Patients. Implementation Phase. 
157 
9.11. The additional subscales of the SCJ: Risk (Suicide, Vulnerability and 
Escape) were perceived to be of relevance to eighty-six per cent of the total number 
of respondents. Similar to the findings of 9.10 (above) PD and MH found the 
additional subscales to be the most relevant (91%, n=12 and 93%, n=38). The 
remaining three Directorates also indicated high proportions of agreement as to the 
relevance of the additional subscales: DSPD (75%, n=12); LD (84%, n=10) and WS 
(67%, n=4). Neutral responses were indicated more frequently than for items 
comprising the HCR-20, as eleven per cent recorded this response (n=10): DSPD 
(23%, n=4); PD (9%, n=1); MH (5%, n=2); LD (16%, n=2) and WS (17%, n=1). 
Three per cent of respondents disagreed that the additional subscales were relevant: 
(2%, n=3): DSPD (2%, n=1); MH (1%, n=l ); WS (16%, n=1) and one per cent 
strongly disagreed (MH (I%, n= 1)). 
Figure 4.9.11. Perceived Relevance of Additional SCJ: Risk Subscales 
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4.9.11 Perception of relevance of additional SCJ: Risk subscales (Nuicide, 
Vulnerability, Escape) to the assessment and management of Patients. 
Implementation Phase 
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9.12. SCJ: Risk documentation overall was perceived as relevant to the 
assessment and management of patient risk by eighty-six per cent all respondents: 
DSPD (79%, n=11); PD (91%, n=12); MH (92%, n=17); LD (79%, n=8) and WS 
(70%, n=4). The most frequent response from two Directorates was strong 
agreement as to the relevance of the document: DSPD (47%, n=8) and WS (44%, 
n=3). The mode response of the remaining three Directorates asserted agreement: 
PD (52%, n=7); MH (49%, n=19) and WS (44%, n=3). The inclusion of the 
additional portions relating to Scenario Planning and the Tilt High Risk Summary 
indicated a marginally higher level of disagreement as the relevance of the SCJ: 
Risk, as four per cent of respondents indicated this to be the case (3%, n=3 disagreed: 
DSPD, 2%, n=2; PD 2%, n=1) and one per cent (MH, n=1) strongly disagreed. The 
remaining nine per cent of respondents indicated a neutral response (n=8). 
Figure 4.9.12. Perceived Relevance of SCJ: Risk Documentation Overall 
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4.9.12 Perception of relevance of all SCJ: Risk documentation sections to the 
assessment and management of patient risk. Implementation Phase 
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4.10.3 Summary of Results 
Implementation 
The HCR-20 (Historical, Clinical Risk) total subscales were perceived to be 
of greater relevance than the additional subscales of the SCJ: Risk (Suicide, 
Vulnerability, Escape). Ninety-three per cent of respondents agreed (49%, n=42 
strongly; 44%, n=38 agreeing) that the HCR-20 subscales were relevant. By 
comparison, eighty-six per cent agreed to the total relevance of Suicide, 
Vulnerability and Suicide/Self-harm subscales (41%, n=35 strongly agreed; 45%, 
n=39 agreed). 
The Historical (H) subscale was perceived as having the most relevance of 
any subscale, evidenced by ninety-six per cent of respondents agreeing (either 
strongly agreeing (48%, n=42), or agreeing (48%, n=42)). Clinical (C) and Risk (R) 
subscale totals were also perceived as of relevance. Ninety per cent of the total 
number of respondents indicated agreement (46%, n=39 agreed strongly; 44%, n=38 
agreed) as to the relevance of C items. Risk items were perceived to be of relevance 
to ninety-three per cent of the total surveyed (52%, n=45 agreed strongly; 41%, n=36 
agreed). 
The Escape (E) subscale of the SCJ: Risk was perceived to have the greatest 
relevance of any additional subscale to the assessment and management of patient 
risk, with ninety per cent indicating agreement (44%, n=38 strong agreement; 46%, 
n=39 agreement). Eighty-seven per cent agreed that the Suicide/Self-harm (S) 
subscale was relevant (40%, n=35 agreed strongly; 47%, n=40 agreed), and eighty- 
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four per cent indicated the relevance of the Vulnerability (V) subscale (39%, n=34 
agreed strongly; 45%, n=37 agreed). 
Other additional sections of the SCJ: Risk were also perceived as relevant. 
The Tilt High Risk Summary portion of the document was seen as relevant to the 
assessment and management of patients by eighty-four per cent (45%, n=39 agreed 
strongly; 39%, n=34 agreed). The Risk Management Planning portion was perceived 
as relevant by eighty-two per cent of respondents (37%, n=32 agreed strongly; 45%, 
n=39 agreed). The section that was perceived as having the least relevance was the 
Scenario Planning portion of the document, however, seventy-four per cent of 
respondents indicated its relevance (31%, n=27 agreed strongly; 43%, n=37 agreed). 
Participants asserted a more confident judgement when indicating the 
perceived relevance of HCR-20 items than SCJ: Risk items. On average six per cent 
(n=5) indicated a neutral response to the relevance of total HCR-20 subscales, 
compared to eleven per cent (n=10) when responding to the SCJ: Risk subscale 
totals. Historical, Clinical and Risk subscales yielded a small proportion of 
respondents indicating a neutral opinion: H (2%, n=2); C (9%, n=8); and R (6%, 
n=5). An elevated level of neutral opinion was observed for Suicide, Vulnerability 
and Risk subscales: S (10%, n=9); V (16%, n=14) and E (7%, n=6). In addition, 
ambiguity in response was shown to the Scenario Planning (18%, n=16) and Risk 
Management Planning portions (10%, n=9) of the SCJ: Risk. 
Respondents indicated disagreement as to the relevance of Scenario Planning 
(8%, n=7), Risk Management Planning (8%, n=7) and Tilt High Risk Summary (9%, 
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n=8) portions of the SCJ: Risk system. This finding represents a small proportion of 
respondents who did not perceive these items to be relevant to the assessment and 
management of patient risk. However, disagreement as to the relevance of HCR-20 
subscale (H, C, R) totals, or SCJ: Risk (S, V, E) totals were not demonstrated to the 
same extent. 
4.11 Discussion 
Maden (2007) observed, `the task of getting people to do things they do not 
want to do is difficult, demanding and draining' (p. 163). Previous attempts to 
`create' and implement ways of identifying patient risk factors to fit the requirements 
of the hospital have met resistance. It was anticipated that an attempt to integrate the 
SCJ: Risk into ongoing clinical practice may be met with opposition. However, 
findings of the present investigation showed the system to be held in positive regard 
by the majority of clinical team members in the nine areas investigated. SCJ: Risk 
documentation was perceived to be useful and usable overall, and compliance of use 
of the system within routine clinical practice was evidenced. The system may 
therefore be said to be usable in that the system was said to be effective, efficient and 
promoted user satisfaction, and to have utility in that the system was perceived to be 
of practical use in performing the task of risk assessment and management of high- 
risk patients. 
The findings of the evaluation survey have a number of implications for 
r 
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future use of the SCJ: Risk system in clinical practice. Staff responses allowed 
analysis of training needs to ensure consistency of use of the system, including 
identification of a need to audit training attendance, introduction of SCJ: Risk 
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training as mandatory, the provision of training for new members of staff via formal 
delivery by an `expert' facilitator, and provision of refresher training an annual basis 
delivered by the same medium. Investigation of the perception of the SCJ: Risk 
system helped identify necessary content of future training sessions including 
communication of the benefits of the system to the documentation of risk-related 
decisions, Tilt requirements, risk management planning and application of the SCJ: 
Risk to informing clinical practice and patient care during training. Additional 
training needs related to the use of the electronic record keeping system were also 
identified to achieve greater compliance of use of this interface to inform clinical 
practice. Future research may be conducted following refresher training to ascertain 
the frequency of access of SCJ: Risk notes to inform patient care. 
The survey provided guidance as to the viability of the frequency of renewal 
of documentation. It was the opinion of clinical teams that the SCJ: Risk should be 
reviewed every three months if a patient was identified as Tilt high-risk (or following 
a notable incident), or every twelve months in preparation for a patient's annual 
review if no Tilt high-risk had been identified. The provisional completion of 
documentation before a patient's admission was also perceived to be of importance. 
These assertions have been reflected in hospital policy documentation to provide a 
framework of best practice. Ongoing audit will ensure monitoring of consistency of 
use in the ongoing maintenance of the system. 
The majority of respondents involved in the evaluation surveys confirmed 
that the SCJ: Risk was completed in a multidisciplinary forum. Multidisciplinary 
team (MDT) decision-making was therefore a critical component of the system of 
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structured clinical judgement. The dynamic nature of the assessment format allowed 
a structure to aid communication between professional disciplines in the 
identification of relevant risk factors, specifying those that are changeable and 
allowed `flexibility to change violence risk communications should conditions 
change' (p. 176, cited in Douglas and Webster, 1999). In this way, the construction 
of `structured interdisciplinary plans of care' (or integrated care pathways, ICPs) 
may be facilitated. It follows that the presence of all multidisciplinary members 
theoretically allowed shared understanding of present and protective risk factors and 
the steps required to address an individual patient's problem (Webster and Hucker, 
2007). Testing of this assertion will necessitate future investigation. Findings of the 
present study indicated a that use of the Risk Management and Scenario Planning 
portions of the system were perceived to be less robust than other sections of the 
document. The effective construction and implementation of risk management plans 
is investigated further in Chapter Six. 
The present Chapter investigated the perceived attendance of disciplines at 
clinical team meetings. Future investigation may warrant investigation of actual 
representation of various professional grades. A comparison between perceived 
(qualitative) and actual (quantitative) attendance may be of interest to ascertain 
reliable rates of engagement and subsequent sharing of understanding of risk 
assessment and associated management plans (achieved by audit of attendance via 
the electronic record keeping system). 
Problems with wide scale implementation of the system which may have 
resulted in resistance of use and non-compliance to the system were anticipated, and 
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controlled for following the pilot phase. Unanticipated problems during the initial 
months of the implementation phase were managed by a steering group and 
designated team that acted as a resource to provide assistance to clinical teams on a 
ward location (e. g. clarification of documentation, supplementation of training 
needs). Despite this initial investment of additional resources, a proportion of 
respondents indicated that implementation of the system had significantly impacted 
upon existing clinical resources, and opinion was divided as to the perceived 
usefulness of a contact person external to the clinical team (Research Assistant), and 
nominated contact (representative from each Directorate). Qualitative feedback 
indicated that some clinical staff did not perceive the function of Research Assistants 
as `consultants' to clinical teams to have sufficient expertise to adequately advise 
teams as to the assessment and management of patient risk, and so impacted upon the 
perceived usefulness of the team as an additional resource. 
An impact upon current clinical practice in terms of time to complete SCJ: 
Risk documentation was anticipated. SCJ: Risk discussions within a 
multidisciplinary meeting took in the region of one and a half hours per patient. 
However, this timeframe accounted for discussion and documentation of dynamic 
risk factors, and the final risk judgement only. The Historical items were completed 
in advance of this meeting by the dedicated SCJ: Risk team (see Chapter Three), and 
completion of this section necessitated a minimum of four hours to obtain the 
relevant information. In addition, the documentation of Risk Scenario Planning 
sections could increase the time to complete the document ranging from between half 
an hour to one hour. The total time required to complete an SCJ: Risk was therefore 
in the region of six hours. In contrast, HCR-20 discussions may be completed in the 
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region of forty-five minutes. Preparation of Historical items of the HCR-20 
conversely equates to a minimum of two hours. The difference in time to complete 
the additional items of the SCJ: Risk (of approximately an additional three hours and 
fifteen minutes) therefore has clinical service implications, and demands the 
additional resources of the clinical team. The collective effort of eight 
multidisciplinary team members typically involved in SCJ: Risk discussions (see 
Chapter Three), equates to an additional six hours per patient, compared to 
completion of the parent version. 
Qualitative feedback indicated that although the system involved the 
scheduling of additional discussions (involving the time and attendance of all 
multidisciplinary members), the use of the system had provided a framework for 
ongoing clinical team meetings, and was perceived to be beneficial to 
communication of relevant patient factors on a regular basis. Survey of the views of 
clinical team members as to the perceived clarity and relevance of SCJ: Risk 
documentation allowed for the identification of ways in which the system may be 
developed in the future. It was apparent from user feedback that to increase the 
perceived clarity portions items relating to Suicide/Self-harm and Risk Scenario 
Planning, documentation would necessitate revision. A greater clarity of expression 
would also aid user understanding as to the context of the risk related judgement 
when documenting the Tilt High Risk Summary section. 
When responses of clinical team members were summed to ascertain the 
relevance of HCR-20 total subscales and SCJ: Risk total subscales, the original 
document was perceived to have greater relevance., Similarly, the individual 
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subscales of the HCR-20 were perceived to have greater relevance than SCJ: Risk 
additional subscales. This finding is important to the introduction of the system 
within clinical practice. By nature of the HCR-20 comprising fewer items, 
completion of documentation would demand less time on the part of a clinical team. 
The additional Historical (10 items), Suicide/Self-harm (S, 5 items), Vulnerability 
(V, 5 items), Escape (E, 5 items), Risk Scenario (RM2,5 items), Tilt High Risk 
Summary sheet and associated Risk Management Plans necessitate extra time for 
discussion, recording and review of items. If the additional items are perceived to 
have less relevance, than their inclusion in the system of structured clinical 
judgement may be problematic. It is for this reason that as part of the validation of 
the SCJ: Risk, it will be important to establish in an empirical fashion the relevance 
of these items, and the results disseminated to clinical teams. A comparison between 
the perceived and actual relevance of HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk items may therefore be 
established. This will be the focus of subsequent Chapters (Chapters Five and Six). 
4.11.1 Limitations of the Present Study 
To ensure adherence to ethical guidelines, the evaluation survey at the time of 
pilot and implementation was presented to the SCJ: Risk steering group (see Chapter 
Three) who advised as to the relevance of questions. The present investigation of the 
evaluation of the system of structured professional judgement may be critiqued in 
terms of the design. The restrictions of the steering group and ethical requirements 
influenced the methodology of the study. The original survey distributed at the pilot 
phase differed from that at the time of implementation. A direct comparison of the 
overall perceived usability and utility of the system at two points in time was not 
possible. However, of the items that were directly comparable, it was apparent that 
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the system was perceived more positively following the pilot phase than the 
implementation phase. Clinical teams involved in the earlier phase comprised 
individuals who were involved in the conceptualisation of the SCJ: Risk, and who 
were original members of the SCJ: Risk steering group. Adherence to the system 
was not mandatory as it was at the time of implementation. The respondents from 
the pilot phase may therefore be labelled `enthusiasts' of the project by their nature 
in volunteering to pilot the system before large-scale implementation. The overall 
perceived utility of the system was less at the time of implementation. This may be 
as a result of use as a result of a hospital directive rather than a desire of clinicians to 
implement the system in clinical practice. 
On the recommendation of the steering group, the questionnaire design 
included a series of statements to which respondents logged their level of agreement. 
The majority of questions were posed in a positive way, for example `the SCJ is 
useful overall'. A more methodologically robust design involving positive and 
negative statements was presented to the group, but rejected. A balance between 
positive and negative statements in Likert-style questionnaires would have been 
beneficial so as to avoid a response acquiescence set, (or bias effect) where the user 
may have a tendency to consistently tick an agree box rather than disagree. The 
design of the questionnaire may therefore have been enhanced by inclusion of an 
equal number of positive and negative statements, presented in a randomised order 
(Gross, 2003). 
In addition to the design of the evaluation of the system of professional 
judgement, the present investigation may be critiqued in terms of the low return rate 
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of surveys. Interpretation of results must bear the low response rate of Women's 
Service in mind. Only six individuals within this Directorate responded to the 
survey, so the proportion of responses were based on very low numbers. The extent 
to which findings may be generalised to represent the view of all members within 
this Directorate may therefore be seen as problematic. 
Responses between professional grades were not analysed. Adherence to 
ethical guidelines meant that the discipline of the respondent was not analysed due to 
a requirement to preserve anonymity. The perception of use of the system by 
discipline and professional grade would have been of interest to the present 
investigation. Comparisons of the perceived utility of the system between nursing 
staff, psychology, occupational therapy, psychiatry, social work, medical staff, 
security liaison and other members comprising the multidisciplinary team would 
have been of relevance, and may have had implications for the identification of 
training needs and development of the system. 
4.12 Chapter Summary 
The focus of the present chapter was to investigate the perceived clinical 
usability and utility of the SCJ: Risk that was piloted and subsequently implemented 
within a special hospital. The investigation enabled nine core issues related to 
clinical team experiences to be evaluated. This has enabled a contribution to the 
understanding of the risk assessment and management of the user interface of the 
system of structured clinical judgement. Overall, in answer to the central question 
posed, the SCJ: Risk system was perceived as usable and useful by clinical team 
members. Staff feedback indicative of disagreement to this assertion in any core area 
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related to the use of the system has allowed the formulation and identification of 
ways to improve documentation. As part of the validation process, on the basis of 
these findings, the system may continue to be developed in an attempt to ensure 
future usability. The investigation has contributed to an understanding of the utility 
of the system which may be used to inform continued fidelity and consistency of use 
of the system in clinical practice. 
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Chapter Five 
Predictive Validity 
A Prediction-Based Paradigm of Risk 
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5.1 Introduction 
The aim of the present investigation was to evaluate the use of a system of 
structured professional judgement within a high-secure hospital. It has been 
established that there is a need for robust, reliable and clinically viable methods for 
assisting mental health professionals assess and manage violence risk (Chapter Two). 
The Tilt review of security was a prominent development that identified the need for 
the assessment and management of behaviours relevant to the needs of high-secure 
forensic psychiatric hospitals (Chapter Three). 
The structured professional judgement (SPJ) approach has been advocated as 
the most clinically useful method of structuring and documenting risk-related 
decisions, and is purported to improve clinicians' ability to identify `high-risk' 
patients for whom interventions may be targeted to minimise risk (Daffern, 2007). 
Many professional guidelines adhere to the SPJ approach, including the HCR-20 
violence risk assessment scheme (Webster, Douglas, Eaves and Hart, 1997). The 
SCJ: Risk, as an adaptation of the HCR-20, was developed and implemented within 
clinical practice to assist multidisciplinary teams assess and manage intra- 
institutional behaviours relevant to the needs of a high-secure forensic psychiatric 
hospital. The scheme was designed to assist in the evaluation of the presence or 
absence of operationally defined risk factors to achieve a final summary judgement 
to identify patients deemed as `high risk'. 
As part of the evaluation of the SCJ: Risk, it was important to investigate the 
relevance of, and relationship between risk related decisions (by evaluation of risk 
factors and subscales) and subsequent intra-institutional behaviour relevant to the 
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needs of a high-secure forensic setting. This relationship was the focus of the present 
research Chapter. 
The predictive utility of the HCR-20 has been established, as illustrated by 
the large number of studies presented below. The focus of the present chapter was to 
establish the predictive validity of the SCJ: Risk as an adaptation of the HCR-20 
within a forensic psychiatric population in conditions of high security. Before 
description of the investigation, it is important to understand important concepts 
relating to risk prediction, including success and failure, and statistical and 
methodological issues within the context of behaviours of relevance to the security 
requirements of a high-secure hospital. 
5.1.1 Concepts of Risk 
The prediction of risk within an offending population is critical to the 
prevention of harm to the public and the individual offender. Risk prediction is 
possible by the application of a risk assessment process. The process of risk 
assessment impacts upon the validity of the prediction, and, as such, it is necessary to 
subject it to close scrutiny. The validity of the prediction of risk is necessary to 
inform the process of risk management. The correct identification of risk is required 
to minimise and contain the identified behaviour by application of treatment, 
supervision and intervention strategies according to individual need. (The process 
of risk management is explored in more detail in Chapter Six). 
A process of risk assessment examines the context and detail of past 
behaviours considered to present as risks, in the light of current circumstances. 
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Predictions may then be made as to the likelihood of future risk behaviours. An 
effective assessment provides a formulation on which judgements and plans are 
based. Risk management is a response to the risk judgement, and incorporates a 
statement of plans and allocation of responsibilities to contain minimise or 
ameliorate behaviour. 
A process of risk decision-making bridges the gap between assessment and 
management. Risk factors, or circumstances affecting the likelihood of risk 
behaviours are considered to form the basis of an overall judgement. Risk 
judgements, or predictions, therefore form a foundation of the subsequent risk 
management plan for an individual judged as demonstrating behaviour deemed to be 
a risk. 
5.2 Understanding the Prediction of Risk. Success and Failure in 
the Prediction of Risk 
A number of methodological factors must be considered and understood 
when establishing risk within a high-secure hospital utilising a system of SPJ. These 
include margins or error, base rates, and, statistical techniques used to investigate 
validity. 
5.2.1 Margins of Error 
Monahan (1981) outlines a method of looking at success and failure in the 
prediction of risk. This is illustrated in Figure 5.1 and is referred to as a 2x2 
contingency table. A method of risk prediction can be said to be successful if a 
judgement that an individual will act dangerously (D) is proven correct, giving a 
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"true positive" (TP, or sensitivity). A prediction of "not dangerous" (ND) may be 
confirmed as a "true negative" (TN, or specificity) if no risky behaviour is 
demonstrated. In this way these judgements, or risk predictions are correct. 
Figure 5.1. Possible Outcomes According to Type of Prediction 
(adapted from Webster, Harris, Rice, Corimer and Quinsey, 1994) 
Outcome 
Prediction ND 
Low risk 
D 
High risk 
ND D 
(non-reoffenders) (reoffenders) 
TN FN 
(specificity) (Type 2 error) 
FP TP 
(Type 1 error) (sensitivity) 
A risk measure may be complicated by error. A false negative (FN) may 
result when an individual has been judged to be non-dangerous, but commits a 
violent act. It is this judgement that poses the greatest concern to the prediction of 
risk within an offending population. A false prediction resulting in injury or death is 
a concern for mental health (and other) professionals within the criminal justice 
system. A false negative may have implications on a decision makers' conscience, 
and may have a legal and professional sanction as a result. 
Webster and Hucker (2007) recognise that Monahan's contingency table is 
useful to illustrate the problematic nature of violence prediction. They cite 
Mossman's (2000) critique that invites a reader to assume 1 in 100 will offend, and 
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that application of a scheme that has 95% accuracy to a population of 100 offenders 
would therefore result in the correct identification of 95 of these offenders. Ninety- 
five per cent accuracy although impressive would mean that 5% of those assessed 
would be a false positive error. Application of these odds to the current prison 
population of approximately 80,000 would mean that 4,000 of those detained would 
be incorrectly identified as potential reoffenders, when no such risk would be 
displayed. Within the context of the present study, for a population of 400 patients, 
20 would be falsely identified as violent. No scheme yielding this level of accuracy 
exists, and it is therefore likely that mental health professionals will inevitably 
continue to make prediction errors, with varying consequences. The probability of 
error is impacted by further the type of scheme used, and the risk assessment process 
that is adopted. It is for this reason that the effective application of a risk assessment 
process following evidence-based practice is essential to minimise the chance of 
prediction error. 
Instances of false negatives have been reported in the media. The recent case 
of Peter Bryan, labelled "the cannibal" by police officers illustrates a `trial by 
media'. Mr Bryan had previously been convicted for killing in 1993 and was sent to 
Rampton Hospital in 1994. Following a mental health review tribunal he was 
released in 2002 to the care of a local East London hospital. He later lived as a care 
in the community out-patient, and attended a locked ward on a voluntary basis. Mr 
Bryan discharged himself days before he attacked, killed and attempted to eat his 
friend. He was sent on remand to Broadmoor secure special hospital where, two 
months later, he attacked and killed a fellow patient. 
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The media reported the public's lack of confidence in the mental health 
system, blaming the system for the last two deaths. The Times reported the response 
of a relative of Mr Bryan as stating: "The mental health workers were responsible for 
monitoring Peter but they failed. They are to blame. " Other media criticised the 
decision to release Mr Bryan from Rampton Hospital. When passing sentence, Judge 
Forrester said: "In a case such as this, the protection of the public must come before 
any other consideration. " A false negative prediction is therefore a possible 
outcome. An effective method of risk assessment must therefore be employed in 
making a judgement as to risks associated to an individual. 
A false positive is an error in prediction in the other direction (FP), where an 
overcautious judgement may be made. A decision may be reached that an individual 
presents a risk of committing a violent act, however, the reality would be that if the 
individual was released to conditions of lower security, or released, no violence 
would occur. Such an error in decision-making may result in the detention of an 
individual within a setting of a nature that is not commensurate with their actual risk. 
The Baxtrom v. Herald (1966) case is an ecologically valid illustration of 
false positive prediction error. The case was a landmark in USA risk assessment 
history and provided a rare opportunity for scientific study. Johnnie Baxtrom was 
convicted for assault and was transferred to New York's Dannemora State Hospital 
for the Criminally Insane. He therefore served his sentence in a hospital prison as a 
mentally ill inmate. On appeal, nearly one thousand inmates detained at the 
institution were transferred to civil hospitals following a ruling by the Supreme Court 
that the procedure was unconstitutional (Webster et al, 1994, p. 2). As a result of 
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the ruling, nine hundred and sixty-six patients were released from a maximum- 
security setting to the community or lower security setting, ninety-eight of whom 
were released into the community. 
Steadman and Cocozza, (1974) conducted a four-year follow up and found 
only a 20% reconviction rate. Reconvictions were mainly for minor offences. As a 
result of the ruling, it was possible to test the positive predictions of dangerousness 
(the reason for their detention) for this released population. Fifty-nine of the ninety- 
eight cases resulted in TNs (as predicted, violent behaviour was not observed) and 
eleven cases displayed TPs (predicted violent behaviour subsequently manifest). 
Twenty-five cases did not display violent behaviour as was predicted (FPs), and three 
individuals displayed violent behaviour that was not anticipated (FNs). However, the 
study was reliant upon reporting using official records, and so instances of violence 
may be under-reported. 
The predicted level of violent conduct upon release was therefore 
overcautious. Steadman and Cocozza (1974) described the results: "... we have used 
a meat axe to kill a spider" (p. 14). The Baxtrom case is a further illustration of the 
need for an effective system of risk assessment to inform decisions from the courts, 
to care plans and mental health tribunals. Clinical opinion may therefore be seen as a 
critical element in advising judgement for future violence, including impacting upon 
a decision of the conditions of confinement within the criminal justice system. 
Monahan's 2x2 contingency table may be applied to risk decision-making 
judgements within high-secure hospitals. The implications of error within this 
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setting may be understood in the following ways: A FP (where an over prediction of 
high-risk behaviour occurs) may result in lower-risk offenders not only being 
allocated conditions of security inconsistent with their need, but also allocation of 
treatment intervention of a duration and cost that is not necessary. Over-caution 
may therefore result in unnecessary detainment and allocation of resources to the 
detriment of the individual and the institution. Conversely, a FN error (e. g. at 
MHRT leading to absolute discharge or conditions of lesser security) may afford 
opportunities for high-risk offenders to reoffend in the absence of treatment and 
intervention provisions. 
When evaluating the validity of a risk assessment scheme, the predictive 
accuracy must be established. The evaluation of the validity of the SCJ: Risk as an 
assessment scheme must compare prediction with actual outcome. Positive 
Predictive Accuracy (PPA, or positive predictive power; PPP) should be established 
and negative predictive accuracy (NPA, or negative predictive power; NPP) of the 
system in terms of intra-institutional behaviour (criterion variables of interest) will be 
subject to scrutiny. Criterion variables within the present study (as defined by the 
Tilt review of security) include an assessment of SCJ: Risk factors and subscales 
related to; (i) violence, (ii) risk of suicide/self-harm, (iii) vulnerability of risk from 
others, (iv) risk of escape, (v) risk of action in collaboration with others to subvert 
security and safety. 
When establishing PPA, the additive value of true positives and false 
positives are divided by the number of true positives (PPA=TP/ (TPs + FPs)). This 
will yield the percentage of offenders identified as high-risk who subsequently 
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display the criterion variables of interest (Craig, Beech & Browne, 2007). Negative 
predictive accuracy (NPA) may be established by identifying the percentage of the 
non-high-risk group who did not subsequently display intra-institutional behaviour of 
interest (NPA = TN/ (FN/TN). In this way, correct predictions of risk behaviour 
(PPA) or non-violence (NPA) may be established. 
5.2.2 Base Rates 
When evaluating the predictive accuracy of a risk assessment scheme, it is 
important to understand the base rates of the criterion variables of interest (listed 
above). The base rate (BR) is simply the proportion of the sample that actually 
present evidence of the criterion variable of interest (or the proportion that actually 
reoffend). The base rate can be established by taking the sum of the true positives 
and false negatives divided by the total sample (BR=(TP+FN) / T)). After 
establishing and taking into account the baserate, it is possible to evaluate the 
accuracy of both positive and negative predictions (or relative improvement over 
chance (RIOC)). The base rate therefore yields a representation of `prior 
probabilities that these predictions would be correct if left to chance alone' (Douglas 
& Webster, 1999). Establishing base rates of the intra-institutional behaviour of 
interest is critical to the present study. Craig, Beech and Browne (2007) and Duggan 
(2007) assert that if base rates (or prevalence) of the criterion variable (violence and 
other behaviours) are low it is almost impossible to predict the outcome behaviour of 
interest. 
In addition to base rates, it is important to establish selection ratios (SRs). 
SRs may be understood as the `proportion of the sample that was predicted to 
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reoffend' (Craig et al., 2007). When the BR is smaller than the SR, the number of 
false positive prediction errors (FPs) will exceed the number of false negative errors 
(FNs). Overcautious judgements and the incorrect identification of high-risk 
offenders will therefore result. Conversely, if the SR is smaller than the BR, FN 
judgements will exceed FP judgements. Under cautious judgements may therefore 
result in negative consequences as high-risk offenders will be incorrectly identified 
as presenting as low-risk. The SR has an impact upon the accuracy of judgements in 
predicting risk. If the sample that was predicted to reoffend (SR) is low, the number 
of recidivists correctly identified will be high, raising the chance of a FP error. 
However, if a large number of the sample are predicted to reoffend (high SR), a FN 
error is more likely, resulting in a greater chance of TP error. 
Understanding of the predictive accuracy of risk assessment schemes is 
therefore dependent on a sound understanding of base rates of the criterion variables 
of interest. A further methodological issue is consideration of the `criterion or 
threshold of defining "high risk"' (Douglas and Webster, 1999). The cut off point 
between behaviours deemed to be high or low risk are therefore base rate dependent. 
Issues relating to sensitivity and specificity result as the selection of too low a 
threshold may yield more TPs, where too high a threshold may yield more TNs. 
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5.3 Statistical Methods Investigating the Predictive Validity of 
Measures 
5.3.1 Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) 
The methodological issues above are important to incorporate when 
evaluating the predictive validity of a system of risk assessment and management. 
The predictive accuracy and effect size of risk assessment schemes may be 
ascertained via the application of sophisticated statistical techniques such as Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis. The analysis allows for the comparison of 
the percentage of true positive rate (sensitivity) against the percentage of false 
positive rate (1-specificity). By graphical representation, the ROC curve allows 
interpretation of the overall accuracy of the predictive judgement. 
Accuracy of judgment may be understood by interpretation of the area under 
the curve (AUC). An AUC of 
. 
80 would mean that there is an 80% chance of an 
individual actually displaying the criterion variable of interest (e. g. violence) and 
would score above the set threshold for that behaviour (or that a "randomly selected 
`recidivist' would have a higher rating of risk than a randomly selected non- 
recidivist" (Craig et al, 2007). Conversely, there is an 80% chance that an individual 
not actually displaying the violent behaviour would score below this threshold. 
ROC analyses have often been used in the last decade to assess the predictive 
accuracy of the HCR-20 (Macpherson and Kevan, 2004). Several HCR-20 studies 
investigating the predictive utility of the tool have used this analysis, and results are 
reported in terms of the statistical indexes that ROC produces (as shown by studies 
described below). 
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ROC analyses therefore allow for the comparison of various thresholds on the 
predictor measure for offering predictions of violence or other intra-institutional 
behaviours of interest. The application of the technique is appropriate in the analysis 
of data comprised of a continuous predictor variable (e. g. HCR-20 scale scores) and 
a dichotomous dependent measure (or criterion variable in the sample, that is the 
presence or absence of behaviour). An overall index of accuracy is yielded, which 
accounts for all possible thresholds, simple identification of the optimal (best) 
threshold, and comparison of two or more predictors (Douglas and Kropp, 2002). 
When evaluating the predictive accuracy of a system of risk assessment, it is 
therefore important to understand the effect size of the prediction judgement made. 
The following AUCs would yield the following interpretation of predictive accuracy: 
0, perfect negative; 
. 
50, chance; 1, perfect positive. Any AUC above 
. 
50 is 
indicative of an increase in predictive accuracy. In terms of statistical significance 
and effect size, no consensus as to a standardised interpretation of AUC estimates 
exists (Grann and Langstrom, 2007). However, it has been proposed that the 
following interpretations of AUC values are appropriate: `Below 0.60 = low 
accuracy; 0.60 to 0.70 = marginal accuracy; 0.70 to 0.80 = modest accuracy; 0.80- 
0.90 = moderate accuracy; and greater than 0.90 = high accuracy' (Sjostedt and 
Grann, 2002, cited in Grann and Langstrom, 2007). Douglas and Kropp (2002) 
define AUC values of 
. 
70 to 
. 
75 and above to be considered moderate to large. For 
the purposes of the present investigation of the predictive validity of a system of 
structured professional judgement, it will therefore be important to establish 
predictive accuracy in the region of 0.65 or above. 
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5.4 Recidivism in the Community and within Institutions 
5.4.1 Post-Discharge Violence Recidivism 
Public interest has tended to focus on the reoffending of psychiatric patients, 
and there is a heightened apprehension that individuals released from secure units 
will reoffend (compared to individuals without the presence of a mental disorder). 
Maden, Scott, Burnett, Lewis and Skapinakis (2004), investigated the prevalence of 
patient recidivism after discharge. Of the 959 patients discharged from medium 
secure units in England and Wales over a two year period, 15% (n=145) were 
subsequently convicted of an offence, of whom, 6% (n=60) committed a violent 
offence. The study demonstrated that, in reality, the rate of violent offending upon 
release within this population was uncommon. The study found that within the 
recidivist group, the strongest predictor of offending was previous offending. 
Psychiatric diagnosis did not yield a significant association with reoffending. The 
findings therefore illustrate that the perceived association between high probabilities 
of reoffending by discharged psychiatric patients is distorted. 
Formal risk management strategies and treatment interventions prevalent 
within forensic psychiatric services are designed and implemented with the 
expectation that the risk of reoffending will be reduced. Coid, Hickey, Kahtan, 
Zhang and Yang (2007) conducted a large-scale (n=1344) longitudinal study to 
investigate the prevalence and incidence of reoffending by patients who had 
previously been admitted to medium secure forensic services. Over an average 
period of 6.2 years, over a third of men, and one in seven women were subsequently 
convicted of a criminal offence (including "... offences of violence against the 
person; sexual offences; arson; acquisitive offences or burglary, theft, fraud and 
4' 
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deception and robbery" (Coid et al., 2007). One in eight men and one in sixteen 
females were convicted of `grave' offences (including "... homicide, serious 
wounding, rape, buggery, arson, robbery and aggrevated burglary" (Coid et al., 
2007). These findings indicate that patients discharged from medium secure units 
continued to present risks. However, in relation to violence risk, fourteen percent of 
convictions were relevant to violent offences. This prevalence is therefore relatively 
low, considering this population was originally detained under the Mental Health 
Act, due to their violent and criminal behaviour. 
The study by Coid et al., (2007) also identified the risk factors that are 
predictive of offending. Effective predictors included static risk factors, such as 
"... gender, younger age, early onset offending, previous convictions and a comorbid 
or primary diagnosis of personality disorders". Clinical risk factors did not yield 
statistically robust relationships with the prevalence of reoffending after discharge. 
However, the authors recognised that the identification of dynamic risk factors may 
assist in the allocation of appropriate interventions after discharge, thus leading to a 
reduction in reoffending. Studies investigating the prevalence of reconviction for 
patients previously detained within medium secure forensic services therefore 
illustrate a low incidence of reoffending, particularly with relevance to violent 
offences. 
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5.4.2 Intra-Institutional Violence 
Research investigating the assessment and management of intra-institutional 
violence within psychiatric hospital settings has been problematic (Drinkwater, 
1982). Early research was conducted with the aim of assessing the impact of risk to 
the community if locked wards were opened. One of the earliest studies by Stierlin 
(1956) concluded that aggression and violence in psychiatric hospitals was of a 
minor nature. An early systematic study of aggression in English psychiatric 
hospitals found a high number of incidents involving female patients (Folkhard, 
1957). Larkin, Murtagh and Jones' (1988) review of studies reported that no further 
research was conducted in British special hospitals until 1980. Fottrell (1980, cited 
in Larkin et al., p. 226) conducted research investigating the extent and severity of 
violence in British special hospitals and found; (a) "that the vast majority of patients 
in psychiatric hospitals are non-violent, and; (b) that despite many incidents of petty 
violence, serious violence is rare". However, the investigation concluded that: "This 
study concerns only a portion of psychiatric illness and violence, as the more 
seriously violent patients will be found in special hospitals". Dietz and Rada (1982, 
cited in Larkin et al., p. 227) commented at that time that: "There have been too few 
good quantitative studies of intra-institutional violence". Most studies investigating 
the efficacy of measures designed to facilitate professionals' assessment of risk do so 
for single-point predictions (e. g. consideration at MHRT for discharge to the 
community). 
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5.5 The Predictive Utility of the HCR-20 
Guy and Wilson (2007) conducted an extensive search of published literature 
lending empirical support of relevance of HCR-20 risk factors in predicting violence. 
They found in the region of 2500 articles published in peer-reviewed journals 
between 1997 and 2005 to be of relevance. There is a wealth of literature examining 
the use of the HCR-20 in predicting violence (Belfrage, Franson and Strand, 2000; 
Douglas and Kropp, 2002; Dolan and Doyle, 2000) and the tool has shown good 
inter-rater reliability. Studies have shown the HCR-20 risk assessment tool to have 
good concurrent validity with other well-validated measures when applied to a 
correctional sample (e. g. The Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) (Harris, Rice 
and Quinsey, 1993); Psychopathy Checklist (Revised), (PCL-R) (Hare, 1991). 
However, Doyle, Dolan and McGovern (2002), suggest that empirical support for the 
predictive validity of North American risk assessment measures in Britain has been 
absent until relatively recently. 
Violent behaviour is often an admission criterion for mental health facilities, 
such as a secure hospital. Johnson and Taylor (2001) reported 34% of new 
admissions to psychiatric hospitals in the year 2000 resulted from convictions or 
charges of violence against the person. Validity studies have included research on 
violent recidivism in discharged psychiatric patients (Dernevik, Grann, and 
Johannson, 2002). Studies have also focused on the prediction of intra-institutional 
violence in maximum-security correctional settings (Belfrage et al., 2000, McNeil 
and Binder, 1995; Nichols, Vincent, Whitemoor and Ogloff, 1999; Muller-Isberner, 
Sommer, Ozokayay and Freese, 1999). Investigation has also included validation of 
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populations of disordered offenders in a variety of settings (Demevik et al. 2002; 
Douglas and Webster, 1999; Strand, Belfrage, Franson and Lavender, 1999). 
5.5.1 Predictability of Intra-Institutional Violence 
Investigation of the predictive validity of the HCR-20 for intra-institutional 
violence has produced inconsistent findings. Belfrage et al., (2000) found high 
predictive validity for Clinical and Risk management items, but almost none for 
Historical items when predicting inpatient violence. Dolan and Doyle (2000) 
reported a number of studies reporting an area under the curve AUC of between 0.63 
and 0.80. Doyle et al., (2002) conducted a retrospective investigation of the validity 
of North American risk assessment tools in predicting intra-institutional violence in 
England. The Historical scale scores of the HCR-20 yielded a positive relationship 
to in-patient violence, reporting statistically significant AUC's of (i) 0.70 for `Any 
Violence'; and (ii) 0.66 for `Level 1 Violence' (physical violence resulting in injury). 
The H-10 item subscale yielded statistically significant AUCs between ` violent' and 
`non-violent' group mean scores (Macpherson and Kevan, 2004). 
Dernevik, et al., (2002) found the tool to be moderately predictive, with 
Historical Total factors having the greatest accuracy (AUC of 0.68 for HCR-20 in 
predicting any incident of violence; and AUC of 0.70 for subscale item H-10). 
Grevatt, Thomas-Peter and Hughes (2004) found the Clinical subscale to be 
predictive (AUC range 0.65 and 0.72), and found a number of items within subscales 
to be particularly predictive of inpatient violence. Macpherson and Kevan (2004) 
found Historical, Clinical and HCR-20 Total indices to be differentially predictive of 
different types of inpatient violence (AUC ranging between 0.65 and 0.72), and 
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found only the Clinical scale of the tool to be predictive of physical violence (AUC 
of 0.65) within a maximum-security hospital. Strand, et al., (1999) reported overall 
predictive validity (AUC of 0.80), and high validity for Clinical and Risk 
management factors, but low or no validity for Historical items. Grevatt et al., 
(2004) has suggested that the variability of these results may be explained by the 
differences between settings and designs of these studies, or by inherent differences 
within the samples. 
Table 5.1 presents an overview of other studies conducted within forensic 
psychiatric settings investigating the predictive validity of the HCR-20. The 
predictive validity and reliability of the HCR-20 has been demonstrated in a variety 
of settings. Evidence therefore suggests that the scheme has efficiency in its 
application to assessing risk for violence in offenders with mental illness and 
personality disorders within forensic institutional settings. The table displays the 
means, standard deviations and validity indices of studies investigating the predictive 
accuracy of the HCR-20 in predicting violent intra-institutional behaviour within 
forensic psychiatric settings (adapted from Douglas, Guy and Weir, 2007). 
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5.6 Prediction of Risk in Response to the Needs of a High-Secure 
Forensic Setting 
The studies presented above illustrate the predictive utility of the HCR-20 
within forensic institutional settings. With relevance to the present study, the Tilt 
review of security identified that a system for assessing violence (immediate harm to 
others) should be present within high-secure hospitals. In this way, it was anticipated 
by the current investigator that the use of the HCR-20 as part of the SCJ: Risk would 
assist clinical teams at Rampton Hospital make and document risk-related decisions 
of the likelihood of future violent behaviour within the forensic institution. In 
addition to the assessment of risk for violence within this population, the Tilt review 
of security identified the need to assess additional behaviours relating to risk relevant 
to a high-secure setting. 
When constructing the additional factors of the SCJ: Risk, it was anticipated 
by the authors of the instrument that the suicide (S), vulnerability (V) and escape (E) 
items would assist in the evaluation and documentation of behaviours related to risk 
as identified by the Tilt review. It was therefore necessary to subject the SCJ: Risk 
to an investigation to ascertain the predictive validity of subscales and individuals 
risk factors as part of the evaluation as to the usefulness of the system. 
It was important to establish the relevance of the subscales and individual risk 
factors to the outcome behaviours of interest. This initial identification and accurate 
assessment of risk factors relevant to the needs of a high-secure hospital was an 
imperative first step in the process of minimising or ameliorating the risk. It was 
therefore important to establish the predictive accuracy of the SCJ: Risk via 
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investigation of intra-institutional violence and other behaviours relevant to the 
setting for which it had been designed. 
5.7 The Need for a System of Structuring Clinical Judgement 
5.7.1 Aims and Objectives 
The reported study examined the validity of the Structured Clinical 
Judgement: Risk (SCJ: Risk) assessment scheme in predicting intra-institutional 
behaviour relevant to a high-secure forensic psychiatric hospital. The study also had 
the objective of investigating any differences in the predictive validity of the SCJ: 
Risk during two distinct six month time periods. These two time periods reflected 
documented clinical judgements and recorded intra-institutional behaviour for the six 
months preceding, and six months subsequent to the formal implementation date of 
31 S` December 2006. 
5.7.2 Research Questions 
Are SCJ: Risk subscales and individual risk factors that comprise subscales 
predictive of future intra-institutional behaviour? (In the context of the present 
study, intra-institutional behaviour relates to the five Tilt categories of risk related to; 
(i) the immediate risk of harming others (i. e. violence), (ii) the risk of suicide or self- 
harm, (iii) the risk of escape, (iv) vulnerability of risk from others, (v) risk of 
organised action in collaboration with others to subvert security and safety. A 
further research question was posed. Are any differences in the predictive validity of 
the SCJ: Risk observed between the two defined six month time periods? 
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5.7.3 Hypotheses 
It was expected that there would be variability between subscales and 
individual risk items dependent upon the outcome behaviour of interest. It was 
anticipated that the judgements made by multidisciplinary teams utilising the SCJ: 
Risk assessment scheme would predict intra-institutional behaviours of interest with 
moderate to large statistical effects. It was also expected that larger statistical effect 
sizes would be observed during the first period of investigation. The rationale for 
this assertion was that, due to the proximity to the documentation of risk decisions 
during the first six month period, associated risk management plans may not have 
had sufficient time to be implemented (compared to the second time period), and so 
intra-institutional behaviours may be more prevalent during the first period 
investigated. The hypotheses were: 
Hypothesis One 
HAo: There will be no significant differences between the predictive utility of 
subscales of the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk and the presence of intra-institutional 
behaviour. 
HAI: There will be significant differences between the predictive utility of subscales 
of the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk and the presence of intra-institutional behaviour. 
Hypothesis Two 
HBo: There will be no significant differences between the predictive utility of 
the individual risk factors of the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk and the presence of intra- 
institutional behaviour. 
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HB I: There will be significant differences between the predictive utility of the 
individual risk factors of the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk and the presence of intra- 
institutional behaviour. 
Hypothesis Three 
HCo: Differences between the predictive validity of the HCR-20 and SCJ: 
Risk systems will not be observed between the two time periods under investigation. 
HC1: Differences between the predictive validity of the HCR-20 and SCJ: 
Risk systems will be observed between the two time periods under investigation. 
5.7.4 Method 
5.7.4.1 Setting 
Rampton Hospital, Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust (for a full 
description see Chapter Three). 
5.7.4.2 Participants 
Two-hundred and seventeen patients detained as inpatients at Rampton 
Hospital were included in the present study: DSPD n=28 (12.9%); PD n=51 (23.5%); 
MH n=92 (42.4%); LD n=21 (9.7%); WS n=25 (11.5%). Each subject's risk had 
been assessed on at least one occasion by use of the SCJ: Risk system over a twelve 
month period (01.07.2006 and 30.06.2007). Hospital records of intra-institutional 
behaviour were also collated during this time as part of routine clinical practice. 
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The above specified twelve month period was divided into two equal six- 
month segments to distinguish any differences in intra-institutional behaviour in the 
six months prior to full-scale implementation (01.07.2006 to 31.12.2006), compared 
with six months post implementation (01.01.2007 to 30.06.2007). 
5.7.4.3 Procedure 
The study was approved by the local research and development manager as 
constituting ongoing service development, and therefore not constituting a separate 
research study that would require referral to the Trust's Ethics Committee. Existing 
hospital records were used to collate information related to age, source of admission, 
ethnicity, marital status, and diagnosis. 
Multidisciplinary (MDT) clinical teams completed SCJ: Risk documentation 
as part of ongoing clinical practice. (For a comprehensive description of the 
procedure for completion of the SCJ: Risk, please refer to Chapter Three). 
Consensus judgements related to the relevance of individual SCJ: Risk factors and 
overall summary of risk were made and documented by clinical teams. Evidenced 
judgements were then entered into a specifically designed computerised (Access) 
database to store patient information related to risk. The current investigator 
attended over one hundred SCJ: Risk MDT discussions to ensure compliance and 
consistency of use of the system. A random selection of thirty discussions attended 
indicated that the recording of judgements were accurate and were of a quality to 
allow the extraction of reliable information. 
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5.7.4.4 Monitoring 
Outcome data related to intra-institutional behaviours of interest were 
collated using official incident record forms (IRls). To avoid bias, the present 
investigator coded data involving clinical incidents as an outcome measure. Patients 
were identified by hospital number and neither victim nor perpetrator of incidents 
was identifiable by name. In this way, clinical knowledge of the patient did not 
impact upon the coding. 
Following appointment to the hospital, staff members attend mandatory 
training in the completion of IRI forms. Training was designed and delivered with 
the learning objectives considered to ensure that staff; `... are aware of how to 
correctly record any incident using the appropriate local template' (NICE guidelines, 
2005, p. 24). The local template within Rampton Hospital is the IR1 form, routinely 
completed by hospital staff following notable incidents, including violence, personal 
accidents, clinical and security incidents, self-harm and missing persons. 
The majority of clinical teams commenced use of the SCJ: Risk system 
between July and December 2006. An organisational directive stipulated that a SCJ: 
Risk must be completed and documented by MDTs for each patient by 318t 
December 2006. To ascertain the impact of SCJ: Risk identification and subsequent 
risk management plans, two six month periods were therefore investigated. The 
frequency, characteristics and nature of patients' intra-institutional behaviour during 
a twelve-month period was collated via IR1 data that was subsequently compared 
with SCJ: Risk data. 
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5.7.4.5 Measures 
5.7.4.5.1 Risk Measure 
The SCJ: Risk (Richardson and Hogue, 2006) was used to structure clinical 
judgements relating to risk. The 20 individual risk factors included in the Historical 
(10), Clinical (5) and Risk (5) subscales of the HCR-20, and additional 25 individual 
risk factors of the SCJ: Risk (relating to Historical (10), Suicide/ Self-harm (5), 
Vulnerability (5), and Escape (5) were used as predictor variables. Clinical teams 
coded each item by determining the presence or absence of each of the individual 
risk factors. Items were coded for research purposes accordingly on a0-2 scale. 
Scores of 0,1 or 2 were allocated indicating the absence, possibility or presence of 
relevance of individual risk factors within each subscale. 
Scores on the subscales of the SCJ: Risk therefore ranged between 0-40 for 
Historical items, and 0-10 for all dynamic items. Tilt high-risk summary judgements 
indicating an overall judgement of immediacy of high risk were also coded (reported 
in Chapter Six). Subscale scores and cumulative total scores were therefore deemed 
to be indicative of specific and overall risk of future intra-institutional behaviour 
relevant to a high-secure hospital setting. 
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5.7.4.5.2 Behavioural Outcome Measure 
Official incident report (IR1) forms were used as the measure of intra- 
institutional behaviour. Incidents were coded in a comparable way employed by 
other research (Steadman et al., 1998; Heilbrun, Hart, Hare, Gustafson, Nunez and 
White, 1998; Doyle et al., 2002). Incidents were coded in relation to the five Tilt 
categories; ((i) violence, (ii) suicide/self-harm, (iii) escape, (iv) vulnerability and (v) 
subversion of security). 
Violence 
For the purpose of the present study, a violent act (or the immediate risk of 
harming others) was operationalised as; `... actual, attempted or threatened harm to 
person or persons' (Webster et al., 1997, p. 4). Verbal aggression and violent 
behaviour toward objects were included when defining inpatient violence (Doyle et 
al., 2002). Intra-institutional violence was coded dichotomously as Level 1 and 
Level 2, similar to the method first used by the MacArthur Foundation study of 
community violence (Steadman et al., 1998) and subsequently by Doyle et al., 
(2002). Violence involving `physical assault against a person or any violence 
resulting in injury to a person' was coded Level 1. Violence including `other 
aggressive acts, such as threats of violence and property damage' was coded Level 2 
(Doyle et al., 2002, p. 114). Patients were categorised as `violent' or `non-violent' 
within each of the two levels of violence (Macpherson et al., 2004). This coding 
system is consistent with the definitions of violence defined within Hospital Trust 
policy related to violence, abuse and harassment. Policy defines Level 1 violence as 
physical assault and `... the intentional application of force to another without lawful 
justification resulting in physical injury or personal discomfort'. Level 2 violence 
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including verbal non/physical assault is defined as the `... use of inappropriate words 
or behaviours causing distress to an individual and/or constituting harassment'. 
Within the two levels of violence, the status of the victim was coded. Within 
Level 1 violence, physical assault toward staff or another inpatient was ascertained. 
Within Level 2 incidents violence not resulting in physical injury to another was 
coded including categories relating to; aggression / hostility, attempted assault, 
damage to organisational property, harassment (including intimidation toward staff 
e. g. confrontation questioning competency to do their job) or other attempts of 
intimidation, restraint of a patient (to prevent anticipated harm following behaviour 
display warranting a response by application of approved hospital techniques to 
manage violence and aggression) and threat of physical violence and verbal abuse. 
Suicide I Self-Harm 
A suicide attempt or episode of self-harm was operationalised as actual, 
attempted or intended attempt to harm self. The difference in the nature of severity 
between a suicide attempt / self-harm episode was reflected by the coding criteria 
adopted. IR1 forms were coded according to four levels. Levels were coded in the 
following way: Level 1 reflecting significant injury sustained during an attempt to 
self-harm (with a requirement of intervention reported of a severity to require 
medical attention (e. g. hospitalisation, attendance at an Accident and Emergency 
Unit, seen as a `near miss')); Level 2 indicating a minor injury (e. g. superficial 
injury, scratches, lacerations, burns, grazes, substances inserted into the eyes, head 
banging); Level 3 if no injury was sustained (e. g. secreted ligature (towel/clothing), 
staff observation leading to intervention following attempt to self-ligate; threat of 
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self-harm, self disclosures of recent attempts (e. g. swallowing a battery), but no signs 
of injury) and Level 4 indicative of thoughts of self-harm (verbalised by the patient). 
The levels were operationally defined from existing codings used when 
reporting self-harming behaviour as part of the official hospital recording system 
(IRi s). In this way, intra-institutional behaviour related to the severity of self-harm 
was gathered in a systematic way. Any evidence of self-harming behaviour during 
the follow-up was therefore chosen as the criterion variable. 
Escape 
Escape within the context of the present study may be operationalised as an 
actual or attempted unauthorised leave from detention. Within the IRI official 
hospital recording system, relevant behaviours are coded under the categories of 
escape from detention, abscond, missing person, and attempt to abscond. Due to the 
low frequency of such behaviours, intra-institutional behaviours related to escape 
were not coded according to specific levels (due to the related to problems of base 
rates described above), but were coded to indicate the presence or absence of such 
behaviours. 
Vulnerability 
The vulnerability to risk from others was operationalised as behaviours that 
related to an individual being victimised, taken advantage of, or exploited by others 
(Richardson and Hogue, 2006). Such behaviours were routinely categorised within 
the IRl recording system as `harassment toward a patient' (including general, racist 
and sexual harassment). By utilising the existing hospital recording categorisation 
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system, intra-institutional behaviour related to vulnerability was coded in a 
systematic way. Again, due to the low frequency a distinction between severity of 
such behaviours, specific levels of vulnerability were not ascribed, but the presence 
or absence was coded. 
Subversion of Security 
The risk of organised action in collaboration with others to subvert security 
and safety was operationalised as an attempt or actual compromise of physical or 
relational security within a high-secure hospital. Behaviours were coded to include 
evidence of actual or attempted hostage-taking, misuse of drugs or alcohol while 
detained, knowledge or attempt to obtain security information and a security breach 
(e. g. key compromise, rooftop demonstration). Similar to the other categories of 
intra-institutional behaviours of violence, suicide/self-harm, vulnerability and escape, 
the subversion of security was reported via IRIS. As with incidents relating to 
vulnerability and escape, to distinguish between levels of behaviours was considered 
arbitrary given the infrequency of the presence of reported behaviour and associated 
problems base rates. Behaviour was operationalised and coded independently to 
ascertain the presence or absence of relevant behaviours. In this way, codings and 
identification of frequencies and subsequent analysis may be seen as free from 
experimenter bias. 
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5.8 Results 
5.8.1 Sample Characteristics 
The mean age of the total sample of two-hundred and seventeen patients was 
40 years (SD 11), with at range of between 20 and 71 years of age (DSPD 37 years 
(SD 9): PD 40 years (SD 10); MH 41 years (SD 11); LD 42 years (SD 14); WS 36 
years (SD 8)). The majority of the subjects were detained under Section 37/41 
Hospital Orders with restrictions (120,47.9%). The remaining patients were 
detained under Section 47/49 (Home Office transfer) (46,21.2%); Section 41 (5) (23, 
10.6%); Section 3 (Admission for Treatment) (11,5.1%); Criminal Insanity Act (7, 
3.2%); Section 37 Hospital Order (6,2.8%); Section 37/41 Hospital Order with 
restrictions (Domestic Violence Crime and Victims Act) (3,1.4%) and Section 45A 
(Hospital and Limitation Directions (1,0.5%). 
Most of the sample were White: White British (171,78%); White Irish (2, 
1%); White Other (6,3%) and Welsh (2,1%). The remaining proportions of 
ethnicity included: Caribbean (13,6%); Pakistani (6,3%); African (6,3%); 
Bangladeshi (1,0.5%); Indian (1,0.5%); White and Black Caribbean (5,2%); White 
and Black African (2,1%); White and Asian (1,0.5%); and Mixed Other (1,0.5%). 
Similarly, the most prominent nationality descriptor was British (205,94.5%), and 
the remainder Bangladeshi (1,0.5%); Dutch (1,0.5%); Ghanian (3,1%); Nigerian (2, 
1%); North African (1,0.5%) and Pakistani (4,2%). 
A minority of the sample were married (2,1%), with the remainder 
categorised as single (183,85%), divorced, (23,11%); separated (3,1%); widowed 
(3,1%) or unspecified (3,1%). All subjects had the presence of a mental disorder 
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(as defined by the ICD-10 or DSM-IV) and had been judged to represent a grave and 
immediate risk to others. Thirty per cent (39) of the sample posed a risk to children, 
and seventeen per cent (37) had a history of sex offending. 
5.8.2 Establishing Baserates. Outcome Measures: Intra-institutional 
Behaviour Relevant to the Security Needs of a High-Secure Hospital 
The results of the frequency of intra-institutional behaviour relating to the 
five Tilt security factors are presented below. 
5.8.2.1 Any Intra-institutional Behaviour 
Time One 
One-hundred and nineteen (55%) of the total sample of two-hundred and 
seventeen were involved in at least one incident, as recorded by IRI s in the first six 
month period (TI). The mean number of any intra-institutional behaviour was 4.37 
and ranged between 0 and 62 occasions. The Directorates with the highest 
proportion of reported IRIS were DSPD, where 93% (n=26) of the population 
displayed adverse behaviours, and 91% of LD (n=19). The remaining Directorates 
displayed the following trends: PD, n=24 (47%); MH, n=30 (33%); WS n=20, 
(80%). WS accounted for the highest range of demonstrated behaviours in any one 
individual (n=62), compared with the following: DSPD (n=0-22); PD (n=0-48); MH 
(n=0-11); LD (n=0-17). Differences between Directorates may be found in Table D1 
(Appendix Three). 
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Time Two 
Similar trends were demonstrated in the second time period of interest. One- 
hundred and twenty-nine (59%) of the total sample were involved in an incident. The 
mean number of incidents rose to 5.99 (SD=11.96), range 0-82)). WS had the 
highest proportion of individuals involved in at least one incident (n=24,96%), 
followed by LD (n=19,91%), DSPD (n=25,89%), PD (n=29,57%) and MH (n=32, 
35%). The range of behaviours was greater during this time period, and WS again 
demonstrated the highest proportion of recorded incidents (n=82). The remaining 
Directorates showed the following range of behaviours: DSPD (n=0-46), PD (n=O- 
69), MH (0-10), LD (0-21). 
5.8.2.2 Immediate Risk of Harming Others (Violence) 
Any Violence 
A total of one-hundred and six (49%) of the sample were involved in at least 
one violent incident during the first six months investigated: DSPD, n=23 (82%); 
PD, n=21 (41%); MH, n=24 (26%); LD, n=18 (86%); WS, n=20 (80%). A slightly 
higher proportion showed behaviour relating to violence during the second period of 
investigation (n=121,56%): DSPD, n=22 (78%); PD, n=29 (57%); MH, n=29 (32%); 
LD, n=18 (86%); WS, n=23 (92%). Table D2 (Appendix Three) provides an 
explanation of categories of violence within each level, and frequencies (baserates) 
of IRIS related to each defined incident of violent intra-institutional behaviour. 
Level One Violence 
During the first time period, nineteen per-cent (n=42) of the total population 
displayed Level One violence: DSPD, n=7 (25%); PD, n=8 (16%); MH, n=10 (11%); 
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LD, n=8 (38%); WS, n=9 (36%). Behaviours relevant to Level One Violence at T2 
were greater than those observed at Ti, as twenty-five per-cent (n=55) engaged in 
physical assault: DSPD, n=8 (29%); PD, n=11 (22%); MH, n=11 (12%); LD, n=10 
(48%); WS, n=15 (60%). Within Level One Violence, fifteen of the total population 
(7%) physically assaulted staff at Ti and twenty (9%) at T2. Thirty-two patients 
(15%) physically assaulted another patient over the first six-month period, and forty- 
one (19%) over the second six-months. The highest number of assaults toward staff 
were demonstrated at Ti within LD at (n=4,19%), and the lowest was at T2 within 
MH (n=1,1%). The highest proportion of assaults toward patients were observed 
within WS, where at T2 fifty-six (n=14) engaged in this behaviour. Variations 
between directorates may be found in Table D2 of Appendix Three. 
Level Two Violence 
A total of one-hundred and one (47%) of the sample were involved in at least 
one Level Two Violent incident during the first period of study: DSPD, n=22 (79%); 
PD, n=19 (37%); MH, n=23 (25%); LD, n=17 (81%); WS, n=20 (80%). A slightly 
higher proportion had engaged in the same category of behaviour during the second 
period of investigation (n=114,53%): DSPD, n=23 (82%); PD, n=27 (53%); MH, 
n=24 (26%); LD, n=17 (81%); WS, n=23 (92%). The following numbers and 
proportions of the sample were involved in at least one of the following types of 
Level Two Violent behaviour: Aggressive/ hostile toward staff at Ti, n=17 (8%), T2 
n=22 (10%); aggressive/hostile toward a patient, Ti, n=9 (4%), T2, n=2 (1%); 
aggressive/hostile generally (no direct victim), Ti, n=34 (16%), T2, n= 31 (14%); 
attempted assault towards staff, Ti, n=20 (95%), T2, n= 25 (12%); attempted assault 
toward a patient Ti, n=5 (2%), T2, n=6 (3%); damage to organisational property Ti, 
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Ti, n=4 (2%), T2, n=8 (4%); harassment towards staff, Ti, n=9 (4%), T2, n=16 
(7%); restraint of a patient, Ti, n=20 (9%), T2, n=26 (12%); threat of physical 
violence toward staff, Ti, n=33 (15%), T2, n=59 (27%); threat of physical violence 
toward a patient, Ti, n=25, (12%), T2, n=38 (18%); thereat of physical violence in 
general, Ti, n=16 (7%), T2, n=23 (11%); verbal abuse in general, Ti, n=62 (29%), 
T2, n=60 (28%); and other behaviour including violence Ti, n=14 (7%), T2, n=19 
(9%). Differences between Directorates may be found in Table D2, Appendix Three. 
5.8.2.3 Risk of Suicide or Self-harm (Suicide) 
Ninety-seven incidents of behaviour related to self-harm/suicide were 
reported using official hospital recording forms during the twelve months of 
investigation. The distribution of behaviours was comparable between the two time 
periods. At Ti a total of forty-eight (22%) of individuals displayed relevant 
behaviours: DSPD, n=10 (36%); PD, n=10 (20%); MH, n=5 (5%); LD, n=8 (38%); 
WS, n=15 (60%). During T2 a total of forty-nine individuals (23%) showed such 
behaviours: DSPD, n=10 (36%); PD, n=8 (16%); MH, n=4 (4%); LD, n=7 (33%); 
WS, n=20 (80%). Frequencies of self-harming behaviour were therefore most 
prolific in the Directorate of WS, and most infrequent within MH. Table D3 
(Appendix Three) provides a descriptor of examples of behaviour within each level 
and illustrates the frequency of self-harming behaviour. The table also displays 
descriptors for behaviours relevant to Escape, Vulnerability, and the Subversion of 
Security. Of the four Levels defined, the following number and proportions of 
behaviours were displayed: 
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Level One 
Two patients (1%) at Ti and five patients (2%) at T2 sustained significant 
injuries during an attempted self-harm attempt (constituting Level One behaviours), 
so the baserate for this behaviour was low. Both individuals at Ti, and four 
individuals at T2 were patients within the Directorate of Women's Service (8% and 
16% of the total within that service). The remaining individual was a patient within 
the PD Directorate. 
Level Two 
Of the total population under study, forty-three (20%) received minor injuries 
at Ti and forty-eight (22%) at T2. Within the Directorate of WS, sixty per-cent 
(n=15) at Ti and eighty-four per cent (n=21) at T2 displayed self-harming 
behaviours of the severity defined by Level Two. The following numbers and 
proportions were observed within the remaining directorates: Ti DSPD, n=8 (29%); 
PD, n=9 (18%); MH, n=5 (5%); LD, n=6 (29%): T2 DSPD, n=9 (32%); PD, n=7 
(14%); MH, n=4 (4%); LD, n=7 (33%). 
Level Three 
Twenty-one (10%) individuals at Ti, and twenty-two individuals (10%) at T2 
attempted to self-harm and did not sustain injury, as defined by Level Three 
behaviour (n=22,10%). Women's Service demonstrated the highest proportion of 
this level of behaviour at both time periods investigated (Ti WS, n=7 (28%); T2 WS, 
n=13 (52%)). The following number and proportion of this behaviour was observed 
for the remaining Directorates: Ti: DSPD, n=4 (14%); PD, n=5 (10%); MH, n=5 
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(5%); LD, n=4 (19%); T2: DSPD, n=5 (18%); PD, n=2 (4%); MH, n=0 (0%); LD, 
n=2 (10%). 
Level Four 
Thoughts of self-harm as categorised by Level Four behaviour were not 
shown by intra-institutional official hospital recordings over the twelve-month period 
under investigation. 
5.8.2.4 Risk of Escape (Escape) 
The base rate of behaviour relating to actual, attempted or unauthorised leave 
from the institution was low (see Table D4, Appendix 3). A total of two incidents 
(1%) relating to attempts to abscond were observed over the twelve-month period of 
investigation. Both incidents were observed during Ti, whereby one individual 
within DSPD (4%) and one individual within WS (4%) attempted to exit a secure 
area (locked door) without a member of hospital staff acting as escort. No attempts 
or actual behaviour relevant to escape, abscond or missing persons were observed 
within the high-secure setting. 
5.8.2.5 Vulnerability to Risk from Others (Vulnerability) 
Incidents relating to the victimisation of an individual were demonstrated 
during the twelve-month investigation. Eight per-cent (n=17) of the total population 
during Ti, and nine per-cent (n=20) during T2 experienced a form of victimisation 
(see Table D4, Appendix 3). The following numbers and proportions within each 
Directorate were observed: Ti (DSPD, n=3 (11%); PD, n=2 (4%); MH, n=3 (3%); 
LD, n=4 (19%); WS, n=0 (0%); T2 DSPD, n=2 (7%); PD, n=4 (8%); MH, n=4 (4%); 
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LD, n=3 (14%); WS, n=7 (28%)). The most frequently observed descriptor of 
vulnerability was whereby a patient was challenged or intimidated by another 
patient. This descriptor constituted 14 (6%) of the 17 incidents at Ti, and 13 (6%) of 
the 20 at T2. The Directorate with the highest number of related incidents was WS 
(Ti n=5 (20%); T2 n=6 (24%)). Incidents related to a patient being harassed 
sexually by another patient were most frequently observed within WS, where during 
Ti, 5 (20%) instances were recorded. Incidents related to a patient being racially 
harassed by another patient were observed infrequently (TI n=2, (1%), and T2 n=5 
(2%) of the total population). 
5.8.2.6 Risk of Organised Action in Collaboration with Others to Subvert 
Security (Subvert Security) 
There were no recorded incidents during the twelve-month study relating to a 
hostage situation or drugs and alcohol misuse within the institution. Behaviours 
constituting the inappropriate acquisition of security information were observed (see 
Table D4, Appendix 3). During the first six months of investigation, a total of thirty- 
six individuals (17%) displayed behaviours related to subversion of security. The 
Directorate of WS, n=12 (48%) and DSPD, n=11 (36%) showed the highest 
incidence of this behaviour at Ti. The remaining three Directorates showed a lower 
frequency of subversive behaviour: PD, n=2 (4%); MH, n=8 (9%); LD, n=3 (14%). 
A lower proportion was demonstrated during T2 where a total of twenty-nine (13%) 
incidents were reported. A similar trend to Ti was observed with individuals from 
DSPD (n=5 (18%)), WS (n=6 (24%)) and LD (n=5 (24%)) demonstrating behaviour 
considered to be subversive. A lower proportion of behaviour was documented for 
individuals within the Directorates of PD (n=5 (10%)) and MH (n=8 (9%)). 
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5.8.3 Descriptive Characteristics. SCJ: Risk Mean Scores 
Descriptive characteristics of SCJ: Risk scores in the sample are displayed in Table 
5.2. The sample size for all statistical analyses was 153 at Ti and 217 at T2 (at Ti 
DSPD, n=11; PD, n=38; MH, n=70; LD, n=13; WS, 21 and at T2 DSPD, n=28; PD, 
n=5 1; MH, n=92; LD, n=21; WS, 25). Each statistical analysis considered HCR-20 
factors and the additional variables of the SCJ: Risk system separately to allow for 
comparisons with previous studies. Mean scores are displayed by Directorate for 
each of the two time periods. 
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Table 5.2. Descriptive Characteristics of the SCJ: Risk Assessment Scheme 
Subtotal and Total Scores within a High-Secure Hospital (Displayed by 
Directorate) 
Measure Scores Mean 
Ti 
SD Range Mean 
T2 
SD Range 
Total Hospital 
HCR-20 Total 0-40 23.99 4.81 13-36 23.17 5.02 13-36 
H scale (111-10) 0-20 15.28 2.94 7-20 15.45 2.83 7-20 
C scale 0-10 5.32 2.42 0-10 5.21 2.43 0-10 
R scale 0-10 3.59 2.29 0-9 3.56 2.29 0-10 
SCJ: Risk total 0-90 26.94 6.95 13-44 30.94 7.99 11-61 
H scale (H11-20) 0-20 9.84 3.39 2-20 9.81 3.42 2-20 
S scale 0-10 1.37 2.50 0-10 1.30 2.42 0-10 
V scale 0-10 3.24 2.93 0-10 2.89 3.40 0-10 
E scale 0-10 
. 
93 1.73 0-10 
. 
97 1.68 0-10 
H scale (H1-20) 0-40 25.12 5.30 10-37 25.26 5.29 10-37 
DSPD 
HCR-20 Total 0-40 25.27 4.05 18-33 24.36 3.31 16-29 
H scale (111-10) 0-20 17.18 1.60 14-20 17.00 1.81 12-20 
C scale 0-10 5.50 1.43 3-8 4.64 1.73 2-9 
R scale 0-10 3.40 1.96 1-7 3.04 1.81 0-7 
SCJ: Risk total 0-90 34.64 5.66 23-44 34.64 6.11 23-47 
H scale (H11-20) 0-20 11.27 2.76 6-14 11.50 3.11 6-17 
S scale 0-10 2.09 2.84 0-8 1.64 2.64 0-9 
V scale 0-10 2.55 2.30 0-7 3.50 2.53 0-9 
E scale 0-10 1.55 1.70 0-4 1.00 1.28 0-4 
H scale (H1-20) 0-40 28.45 3.86 22-34 28.50 4.27 21-35 
PD 
HCR-20 Total 0-40 23.45 5.01 15-36 22.67 5.32 14-35 
H scale (H1-10) 0-20 16.63 1.78 12-19 16.39 1.97 12-19 
C scale 0-10 3.74 2.54 0-9 3.61 2.47 0-9 
R scale 0-10 3.08 2.08 0-9 3.09 2.02 0-8 
SCJ: Risk total 0-90 30.50 5.95 20-49 29.86 5.95 18-49 
H scale (H11-20) 0-40 10.68 2.70 5-17 10.45 2.98 2-17 
S scale 0-10 
. 
82 1.96 0-10 
. 
67 1.73 0-10 
V scale 0-10 2.00 2.21 0-8 1.88 2.09 0-8 
E scale 0-10 
. 
37 
. 
85 0-3 
. 
47 
. 
99 0-4 
H scale (111-20) 0-40 27.32 2.29 20-35 26.84 3.86 18-35 
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MH 
HCR-20 Total 0-40 23.23 5.03 13-36 23.47 5.02 13-36 
H scale (H1-10) 0-20 14.09 3.23 7-19 14.34 3.10 7-19 
C scale 0-10 5.74 2.44 0-10 5.72 2.46 0-10 
R scale 0-10 3.40 2.46 0-8 3.45 2.37 0-9 
SCJ: Risk total 0-90 26.94 7.39 11-57 27.45 7.28 11-52 
H scale (H11-20) 0-40 8.36 3.33 2-16 8.34 3.29 2-16 
S scale 0-10 
. 
69 1.51 0-7 
. 
54 1.19 0-6 
V scale 0-10 3.29 2.98 0-10 3.60 2.99 0-10 
E scale 0-10 
. 
53 1.28 0-7 
. 
64 1.27 0-8 
H scale (H1-20) 0-40 22.44 5.30 10-34 22.67 5.27 10-34 
LD 
HCR-20 Total 0-40 27.62 4.13 20-33 26.33 4.34 19-33 
H scale (111-10) 0-20 16.38 2.81 10-20 16.00 3.13 9-20 
C scale 0-10 6.31 1.60 3-9 6.19 1.63 3-9 
R scale 0-10 5.33 1.87 3-9 4.58 2.52 0-9 
SCJ: Risk total 0-90 36.69 9.65 26-61 35.14 8.95 20-61 
H scale (H11-20) 0-40 10.85 3.39 6-17 9.95 3.20 5-17 
S scale 0-10 1.31 2.87 0-10 1.71 2.85 0-10 
V scale 0-10 6.23 2.87 1-10 5.62 2.82 0-10 
E scale 0-10 1.92 2.63 0-8 1.86 2.52 0-8 
H scale (H1-20) 0-40 27.23 5.39 16-34 25.95 5.42 14-34 
WS 
HCR-20 Total 0-40 24.62 4.02 20-34 23.36 4.41 20-34 
H scale (H1-10) 0-20 15.14 2.61 9-19 15.44 2.52 9-19 
C scale 0-10 6.10 1.61 2-9 6.40 1.71 2-10 
R scale 0-10 4.44 1.83 0-8 4.89 2.22 0-10 
SCJ: Risk total 0-90 37.57 7.29 25-54 38.28 7.38 25-54 
H scale (H11-20) 0-40 11.90 3.13 7-20 11.92 3.07 7-20 
S scale 0-10 4.33 3.47 0-10 4.68 3.38 0-10 
V scale 0-10 3.86 2.92 0-9 3.80 2.87 0-9 
E scale 0-10 2.33 2.49 0-10 2.44 2.47 0-10 
H scale (H1-20) 0-40 27.05 5.03 17-37 27.36 4.76 17-37 
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5.8.3.1 Mean Values of HCR-20 Subscales 
HCR-20 total mean scores were comparable between Directorates, ranging 
between 27.62 (LD TI) and 22.67 (PD T2) from a possible total score of 40. The 
HCR-20 mean score for the total population ranged between 23.99 and 23.17 for the 
two time periods. Minimum scores and ranged between 13 and 36 (T1 and T2 MH). 
Historical subscale totals mean scores across the hospital ranged between a minimum 
of 14.09 (Ti MH) and 17.18 (Ti DSPD). The lowest minimum score was 7 (Ti 
MH) and the maximum score was 20 (Ti and T2 LD and DSPD). All other 
Directorates demonstrated maximum scores of 19. This perhaps is a reflection of the 
nature and severity of the offences for which the individuals are detained within the 
high-secure setting. The mean Clinical subscale totals for the hospital ranged 
between 5.32 (Ti) and 5.21 (T2) from a possible total of 10. The highest mean score 
was observed during the second time period under investigation, within the 
Directorate of Women's Service (6.40) and the lowest was within the Personality 
Disorder Directorate (3.61). The range of scores ascribed to the population within 
each service ranged between a minimum of 0 (PD Ti and T2; MH, Ti and T2) and a 
maximum of 10 (MH Ti and T2 and WS T2). Mean Risk subscale totals ranged 
between 3.59 and 3.56 for the two time periods investigated, and the lowest mean 
score was evident within DSPD (T13.40) and the highest within LD (Ti 5.33). Each 
Directorate assessed some individuals as warranting the minimum score of 0, 
indicative of the absence of any risk factors. A range of maximum scores was 
apparent between Directorates; a maximum of 7 was documented within DSPD (T1 
and T2), 9 within PD (T2), 9 within MH (T2), 9 within LD (Ti and T2) and 10 
within WS. 
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5.8.3.2 Mean Values of SCJ: Risk Subscales 
Total mean scores for the additional items of the SCJ: Risk showed greater 
variations between minimum and maximum scores obtained. Mean SCJ: Risk total 
subscales ranged between a minimum of 26.94 (Ti MH) and a maximum of 37.57 
(T1 WS) from a possible 90. The minimum score ascribed was 11 (T1 and T2 MH) 
and the maximum was 61 (T2 LD). Hospital mean SCJ: Risk total scores ranged 
between 26.94 and 30.94 for each of the two periods. The additional ten Historical 
items of the SCJ: Risk (Hi 1-20) yielded lower mean scores than the original ten 
items of the HCR-20, with hospital totals ranging between 9.84 and 9.81 (compared 
to 15.28 and 15.45 for H1-10). The minimum score of 2 (MH, T2), and maximum 
scores of 14 (Ti DSPD); 17 (Ti and T2 PD); 16 (Ti and T2 MH); 17 (Ti and T2 
LD); and 20 (WS T2) also showed greater variance of scores when compared to the 
original Historical items of the HCR-20. When the items of H1-10 and H11-20 were 
considered together, mean subscale Historical totals ranged between 25.12 and 25.26 
throughout the hospital (from a possible total of 40). Total mean scores for this 
subscale yielded high maximum values within each Directorate: 35 (T2 DSPD), 35 
(PD Ti and T2); 34 (MH Ti and T2); 34 (LD Ti and T2) and 37 (WS Ti and T2). 
Mean subscale total scores related to the five Suicide/Self-harm individual risk 
factors ranged between 1.37 and 1.30 within the twelve months under study. This 
subscale showed the greatest variation on the judgement of the presence or absence 
of risk factors between Directorates. The Directorate of Mental Health demonstrated 
the lowest mean score of 0.54 (T2,0.69 at Ti) and Women's Service documented the 
highest mean scores in the range of 4.33 (Ti) and 4.68 (T2) from a possible 
maximum of 10. Total mean scores for Vulnerability subscale items within the 
hospital ranged between 3.24 (T1) and 2.89 (T2), with the lowest prevalence of risk 
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being documented within PD (T2 1.88) and the highest within LD (Ti 6.23). The 
most significant absence of behaviour was documented for the additional SCJ: Risk 
subscale relating to Escape. Mean total subscale scores for the hospital ranged 
between 0.93 at Ti, and 0.97 at T2. The lowest mean score was evident within PD 
(Ti 0.37) and maximum scores within WS at T2 (2.44). Maximum scores of 3 and 4 
were obtained at TI PD, and Ti and T2 DSPD respectively (from a possible score of 
10), and other Directorates displayed maximum scores of 8 (MH T2 and LD at Ti 
T2), and 10 (WS Ti and T2). 
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5.8.4 The Accuracy of SCJ: Risk in 'Predicting' Intra-Institutional 
Behaviour. Part One. The Predictive Utility of SCJ: Risk Subscales 
ROC analyses were conducted to investigate the predictive accuracy of HCR- 
20 total, SCJ: Risk total and individual subscale scores with respect to inpatient 
violence. Table 5.3 compares the three categories of violence (Any, Level One and 
Level Two) for the total sample under investigation. 
5.8.4.1 Violence 
Any Violence 
Of the original items of the HCR-20, the Total Score had the most significant 
predictive accuracy in terms of `Any Violence', yielding AUCs that were 
significantly greater than chance (. 743, p<0.001 at Ti and 
. 
660, p<0.001 at T2). All 
other subscale totals were predictive of any violence, with the exception of the Risk 
scale at T2. Subscale totals were significant for Historical (. 693, p<0.001 at Ti and 
. 
628, p<0.01 at T2); Clinical (. 649, p<0.01 at Ti, and 
. 
633, p<0.01 at T2) and Risk 
factors (. 628, p<0.01 at Ti). 
The additional items of the SCJ: Risk also had predictive value when `Any 
Violence' was considered as an outcome measure during the first period of study. 
Table 5.3 shows that during this period, patients that displayed violence had 
significantly higher scores on all subscale totals apart from Suicide (nor was this 
scale a significant predictor at T2). Historical 11-20 subscales yielded AUCs of 
. 
593 
(p<0.05) and when the original ten Historical factors of the HCR-20 were 
considered, the predictive accuracy rose to 
. 
662 (p<0.001) at Ti. Neither Historical 
subscale was predictive at T2. The Vulnerability subscale was predictive of `Any 
Violence' (. 654, p<0.001) during Ti (but not T2), as were subscales related to 
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Escape (. 658, p<0.001 at Ti and 
. 
598, p<0.05 at T2). SCJ: Risk Totals were the 
most robust predictor of `Any Violence' with AUCs of 
. 
766 at Ti (p<0.001) and 
. 
672 
at T2 (p<0.001). Differences between the predictive validity of subscales 
comprising the SCJ: Risk were therefore observed, with AUCs yielding larger 
statistical effect sizes during the first period of investigation. In addition, during the 
pre-implementation phase, a greater number of subscales indicative of any violence 
were apparent. 
Differences between the predictive accuracy of subscales between 
Directorates were observed. H1-10 Total (. 703, p=0.05); HCR-20 Total (. 734, 
p=0.05) and SCJ: Risk (including H1-10 Totals, 
. 
689, p=0.05) were robust predictors 
of `Any Violence' within the Directorate of PD at Ti. The same three subscales 
were predictive of the same behaviour within the Directorate of Mental Health at Ti: 
H1-10 Total (. 711, p=0.01); HCR-20 Total (. 703, p=0.01) and SCJ: Risk (including 
H1-10 Totals, 
. 
685, p=0.05). In addition Clinical and Vulnerability subscales yielded 
AUCs that were statistically significant (. 664, p=0.05 and 
. 
668, p=0.05 respectively). 
The Clinical subscale was also observed to be predictive at T2 within the Directorate 
of MH (. 697, p=0.001). 
Level One Violence 
The ROC analysis for Level One Violence yielded AUC's that were 
significantly greater than chance for the HCR-20 Total scale (. 685, p<0.001) and 
Historical (H1-10) scores (. 677, p<0.01). Clinical and Risk factors yielded predictive 
validity no better than chance during this period. During the second time period 
investigated, Clinical, Risk and HCR-20 Total subscales yielded values indicative of 
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predictive accuracy (. 657, p<0.01; 
. 
634, p<0.05; 
. 
687, p<0.001 respectively). 
Differences between the predictive utility of subscales during the two periods under 
study were therefore observed. 
Subscales related to the additional Historical, Suicide or Escape items were 
not predictive of Level One Violence during the twelve-month investigation. 
However, Vulnerability (. 659, p<0.01 at Ti and 
. 
621, p<0.05 at T2) and SCJ: Risk 
Totals (excluding H1-10; 
. 
637, p<. 0.5 at Ti and 
. 
632, p<0.05 at T2, and including 
HI-10;. 686, p<0.001 at Ti and. 649, p<0.01 at T2) were robust predictors. 
Subscale scores were differentially predictive between Directorates. Within 
DSPD Level One Violence was most strongly associated with subscale scores related 
to H1-10 (. 920, p=0.05) at Ti. During the same time period, subscales related to 
Vulnerability (. 855, p=0.01) and HCR-20 Total scores (. 742, p=0.05) were 
significant within PD, and within MH, H1-10 subscales were also predictive (. 753, 
p=0.05). Clinical subscales were predictive of Level One Violence during the 
second six-month period under investigation within the Directorates of PD (. 739, 
p=0.05) and MH (. 736, p=0.05). HCR-20 Total scores were also found to be robust 
predictors within PD at T2 (. 732, p=. 0.05). 
Level Two Violence 
All subscale totals were robust predictors of Level Two Violence, with the 
exception of the Risk subscale at T2, and the Suicide subscale at both time periods. 
Analyses produces AUCs significantly better than chance ranging from 
. 
778 
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(p<0.001 at Ti) for SCJ: Risk Total subscale scores (including H1-10) and the 
additional ten items of the SCJ: Risk's Historical subscale total 
. 
608 (p<0.05 at T2). 
The most robust predictors of Level Two Violence were found within MH, 
where the following subscales yielded significant AUC values: H1-10 Total (. 685, 
p=0.05 at Ti); Vulnerability (. 729, p=729, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
730, p=0.05 at T2); 
HCR-20 Total (. 670, p=0.05 at Ti), and SCJ: Risk Total (inclusive of H1-10, 
. 
714, 
p=0.01 at T1 and 
. 
609, p=0.05 at T2). Statistically significant subscale items were 
also observed within PD during T1 including: H1-20 (. 699, p=0.05); Clinical (. 714, 
p=0.05); HCR-20 Total (. 763, p=0.05); SCJ: Risk Total (including HI-10, 
. 
738, 
p=0.05). 
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Table 5.3. Area Under Curve (AUCs), Standard Error (SE) and Confidence 
Intervals (CI) from Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis for Intra- 
Institutional Behaviour Related to Violence 
Scale Measure Any Violence 
AUC SE 95% CI 
T1 T2 T1 T2 Ti T2 
H scale (H1-10) 
. 
693*** 
. 
628** 
. 
043 
. 
046 
. 
608-. 778 
. 
537-. 718 
C scale 
. 
649** 
. 
633** 
. 
045 
. 
046 
. 
560-. 738 
. 
543-. 724 
R scale 
. 
628** 
. 
564 
. 
046 
. 
048 
. 
537-. 718 
. 
470-. 657 
HCR-20 Total 
. 
743*** 
. 
660*** 
. 
041 
. 
045 
. 
663-. 822 
. 
572-. 749 
H scale (H11-20) 
. 
593* 
. 
582 
. 
047 
. 
048 
. 
501-. 686 
. 
488-. 675 
H scale (H1-20) 
. 
662*** 
. 
620 
. 
045 
. 
046 
. 
574-. 749 
. 
529-. 710 
S scale 
. 
558 
. 
575 
. 
049 
. 
047 
. 
463-. 653 
. 
482-. 667 
V scale 
. 
654*** 
. 
591 
. 
045 
. 
047 
. 
565-. 743 
. 
499-. 683 
E scale 
. 
658*** 
. 
598* 
. 
046 
. 
047 
. 
568-. 747 
. 
507-. 690 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(excluding H1-10) 
. 
720*** 
. 
656*** 
. 
042 
. 
045 
. 
637-. 803 
. 
567-. 744 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(including H1-10) . 
766*** 
. 
672*** 
. 
039 
. 
045 
. 
689-. 842 
. 
585-. 760 
Scale Measure Level 1 Violence 
AUC SE 95% CI 
T1 T2 T1 T2 Ti T2 
H scale (H1-10) 
. 
677** 
. 
579 
. 
055 
. 
056 
. 
570-. 784 
. 
487-. 707 
C scale 
. 
600 
. 
657** 
. 
083 
. 
049 
. 
493-. 708 
. 
561-. 754 
R scale 
. 
592 
. 
634* 
. 
061 
. 
054 
. 
473-. 711 
. 
527-. 741 
HCR-20 Total 
. 
685*** 
. 
687*** 
. 
050 
. 
050 
. 
588-. 783 
. 
534-. 730 
H scale (H11-20) 
. 
523 
. 
527 
. 
060 
. 
053 
. 
407-. 640 
. 
424-. 631 
H scale (111-20) 
. 
597 
. 
568 
. 
057 
. 
055 
. 
485-. 709 
. 
459-. 676 
S scale 
. 
524 
. 
579 
. 
062 
. 
056 
. 
403-. 645 
. 
469-. 689 
V scale 
. 
659** 
. 
621* 
. 
051 
. 
054 
. 
560-. 758 
. 
516-. 727 
E scale 
. 
585 
. 
547 
. 
059 
. 
056 
. 
470-. 701 
. 
438-. 657 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(excluding H1-10) . 
637* 
. 
632* 
. 
056 
. 
050 
. 
528-. 746 
. 
534-. 730 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(including H1-10) . 
686*** 
. 
649** 
. 
049 
. 
050 
. 
590-. 782 
. 
551-. 747- 
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Scale Measure Level 2 Violence 
AUC SE 95% CI 
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
H scale (H1-10) 
. 
663*** 
. 
628** 
. 
045 
. 
046 
. 
575-. 751 
. 
537-. 718 
C scale 
. 
665*** 
. 
609* 
. 
045 
. 
047 
. 
577-. 753 
. 
517-. 700 
R scale 
. 
650** 
. 
564 
. 
046 
. 
048 
. 
560-. 739 
. 
470-. 657 
HCR-20 Total 
. 
743*** 
. 
658*** 
. 
041 
. 
045 
. 
663-. 822 
. 
569-. 747 
H scale (H11-20) 
. 
616* 
. 
608* 
. 
047 
. 
047 
. 
524-. 708 
. 
517-. 699 
H scale (H1-20) 
. 
663*** 
. 
643** 
. 
045 
. 
046 
. 
574-. 751 
. 
554-. 732 
S scale 
. 
557 
. 
590 
. 
049 
. 
047 
. 
461-. 652 
. 
497-. 683 
V scale 
. 
682*** 
. 
610* 
. 
045 
. 
047 
. 
594-. 769 
. 
519-. 701 
E scale 
. 
659*** 
. 
635** 
. 
046 
. 
046 
. 
569-. 749 
. 
545-. 726 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(excluding H1-10) 
. 
748*** 
. 
709*** 
. 
041 
. 
043 
. 
668-. 828 
. 
625-. 792 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(including H1-10) . 
778*** 
. 
718*** 
. 
039 
. 
042 
. 
703-. 854 
. 
636-. 800 
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5.8.4.2 Suicide/Self-Harming Behaviour 
The additional subscales of the SCJ: Risk yielded significantly more robust 
AUC values than the original items of the HCR-20 when predicting intra-institutional 
behaviour relevant to self-harm and suicide. Significant predictive accuracy was 
observed within all subscales, with AUC in the range of 
. 
839 (p <0.001 T2 for SCJ: 
Risk Totals) and 
. 
645 (p <0.05 for the H1-20 subscales). The predictive merit of 
the Suicide/Self-harm subscale was established (. 759, p <0.001 at Ti and 
. 
775, p 
<0.001). The most robust predictor was the SCJ: Risk Total excluding the original 
H1-10 items of the HCR-20 (. 808, p <0.001 at Ti and 
. 
839, p <0.001 at T2). The 
Clinical subscale of the HCR-20 was not predictive of self-harming/suicidal 
behaviour at either time period, nor was the H1-10 subscale during Ti. Table 5.4 
compares behaviour related to Suicide / Self-harm for the total sample under 
investigation. 
The predictive utility of individual subscales varied between Directorates. 
Within the Directorate of MH perfect predictive accuracy of the Suicide /Self-harm 
scale was demonstrated at Ti (1.00, p=0.01), and excellent predictive accuracy of the 
same subscale was observed within the same Directorate at T2 (. 938, p=0.01), and 
within WS at Ti (. 808, p=0.05). The Clinical Risk subscale was predictive within 
MH (. 836, p=0.05 at Ti and 
. 
886, p=0.05 at T2); PD (. 765, p=0.05 at T2). Risk 
subscales were predictive of Suicide/Self-harming behaviour within PD (. 811, 
p=0.05), and HCR-20 total scores were robust within PD (. 827, p=0.01 at T2) and 
MH (. 915, p=0.05 at T2). Vulnerability of risk from others was a predictive subscale 
for the subsequent manifestation of self-harming behaviour within the Directorate of 
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PD at T2 (. 924, p=0.001). SCJ: Risk total scores (inclusive of H1-10) were also 
predictive within PD (. 869, p=0.05 at T2) and MH (. 876, p=0.05 at Ti). 
Table 5.4. Area Under Curve (AUCs), Standard Error (SE) and Confidence 
Intervals (CI) from Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis for-Institutional 
Behaviour Related to Suicide/Self-harming Behaviour 
Scale Measure Suicide / Self-Harming Behaviour 
AUC SE 95% CI 
T1 T2 T1 T2 Ti T2 
H scale (H1-10) 
. 
569 
. 
626* 
. 
055 
. 
056 
. 
462-. 676 
. 
516-. 735 
C scale 
. 
561 
. 
643 
. 
063 
. 
059 
. 
439-. 684 
. 
528-. 759 
R scale 
. 
640* 
. 
704*** 
. 
057 
. 
048 
. 
528-. 752 
. 
609-. 799 
HCR-20 Total 
. 
635* 
. 
733*** 
. 
062 
. 
051 
. 
514-. 756 
. 
633-. 834 
H scale (H11-20) 
. 
658** 
. 
690** 
. 
051 
. 
048 
. 
557-. 759 
. 
595-. 784 
H scale (H1-20) 
. 
645* 
. 
696** 
. 
053 
. 
052 
. 
540-. 749 
. 
593-. 799 
S scale 
. 
759*** 
. 
775*** 
. 
059 
. 
057 
. 
644-. 874 
. 
663-. 887 
V scale 
. 
656** 
. 
658* 
. 
058 
. 
060 
. 
542-. 771 
. 
541-. 775 
E scale 
. 
673** 
. 
687** 
. 
061 
. 
063 
. 
554-. 792 
. 
563-. 811 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(excluding H1-10) 
. 
808*** 
. 
839*** 
. 
048 
. 
041 
. 
715-. 901 
. 
760-. 919 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(including H1-10) . 
796*** 
. 
839*** 
. 
050 
. 
042 
. 
697-. 894 
. 
755-. 922 
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5.8.4.3 Escape / Abscond 
The predictive validity of any subscale item related to intra-institutional 
behaviour relevant to escape or absconding was not established, due to the problem 
of low baserates of this behaviour (above). There were no variations between 
Directorates as to the predictive validity of individual subscales for either time period 
investigated. 
Table 5.5. Area Under Curve (AUCs), Standard Error (SE) and Confidence 
Intervals (CI) from Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis for Intra- 
Institutional Behaviour Related to Escape / Abscond 
Scale Measure Escape / Abscond 
AUC 
- 
SE 95% CI 
T1 7r T2 Ti 2 T2 Ti T2 
H scale (H1-10) 
. 
168 
- 
. 
108 
- 
. 
016-. 353 
- 
C scale 
. 
648 
- 
. 
474 
- 
. 
336-. 959 
- 
R scale 
. 
575 
- 
. 
113 
- 
. 
354-. 796 
- 
HCR-20 Total 
. 
354 
- 
. 
044 
- 
. 
268-. 440 
- 
H scale (H11-20) 
. 
292 
- 
. 
039 
- 
. 
215-. 368 
- 
H scale (H1-20) 
. 
167 
- 
. 
070 
- 
. 
030-. 304 
- 
S scale 
. 
319 
- 
. 
134 
- 
. 
056-. 583 
- 
V scale 
. 
470 
- 
. 
240 
- 
. 
001-. 940 
- 
E scale 
. 
866 
- 
. 
099 
- 
. 
672-1.06 
- 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(excluding H1-10) 
. 
540 
- 
. 
275 
- 
. 
001-1.07 
- 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(including H1-10) . 
413 
- 
. 
194 
- 
. 
033-. 794 
- 
1,2,3 There were no valid observations for positive actual state groups. Due to the absence of intra- institutional behaviour, the estimation of predictive accuracy could not be modelled within SPSS 
version 16. 
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5.8.4.4 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability of risk from others was not predicted by the Vulnerability 
subscale, but was predicted by the Escape subscale at T2 (. 699, p=0.05), and SCJ: 
Risk total subscales (excluding H1-10:. 737, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
730, p=0.01 at T2 and 
including H1-10:. 754, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
749, p=0.01 at T2). The Vulnerability 
subscale was significantly predictive within the Directorates of PD at T2 (. 857, 
p=0.05), however no further observations were made for either time period 
investigated. 
Table 5.6. Area Under Curve (AUCs), Standard Error (SE) and Confidence 
Intervals (CI) from Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis for Intra- 
Institutional Behaviour Related to Vulnerability 
Scale Measure Vulnerability 
AUC SE 95% Cl 
T1 T2 Ti T2 Ti T2 
H scale (111-10) 
. 
624 
. 
648 
. 
099 
. 
068 
. 
430-. 817 
. 
514-. 782 
C scale 
. 
568 
. 
650 
. 
066 
. 
057 
. 
439-. 697 
. 
538-. 762 
R scale 
. 
625 
. 
566 
. 
088 
. 
062 
. 
168-. 453 
. 
445-. 687 
HCR-20 Total 
. 
656 
. 
645 
. 
078 
. 
075 
. 
504-. 808 
. 
501-. 765 
H scale (H11-20) 
. 
646 
. 
622 
. 
109 
. 
073 
. 
433-. 859 
. 
478-. 766 
H scale (H1-20) 
. 
661 
. 
669 
. 
110 
. 
072 
. 
445-. 876 
. 
528-. 811 
S scale 
. 
603 
. 
582 
. 
104 
. 
084 
. 
400-. 807 
. 
417-. 747 
V scale 
. 
651 
. 
644 
. 
067 
. 
067 
. 
519-. 782 
. 
513-. 775 
E scale 
. 
618 
. 
699* 
. 
094 
. 
077 
. 
434-. 802 
. 
513-. 775 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(excluding H1-10) 
. 
737** 
. 
730** 
. 
098 
. 
062 
. 
545-930 
. 
609-. 851 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(including 111-10) . 
754** 
. 
749** 
. 
090 
. 
066 
. 
577-. 930 
. 
619-. 878 
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5.8.4.5 Subversion of Security 
The Clinical subscale (. 638, p=0.05 at TI, and 
. 
667, p=0.01 at T2) and HCR- 
20 Total (. 633, p=0.05 at Ti, and 
. 
691, p=0.05 at T2) were significant predictors of 
subversive behaviour. The Escape items yielded the most robust AUC values for TI 
in particular (. 789, p=0.001 and 
. 
719, p=0.01 at T2). SCJ: Risk Total subscales 
excluding and including H1-10 items were also predictive of subversion (7.22, 
p=0.001 at Ti and 
. 
655, p=0.05 at T2: 
. 
710, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
684, p=0.05 
respectively). Subscales related to H1-10, Risk, HI1-20, H1-20, Suicide or 
Vulnerability were not statistically significantly. 
Table 5.7. Area Under Curve (AUCs), Standard Error (SE) and Confidence 
Intervals (CI) from Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis for Intra- 
Institutional Behaviour Related to Subversion of Security 
Scale Measure Subvert Security and Safety 
AUC SE 95% CI 
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
H scale (H1-10) 
. 
518 
. 
624 
. 
067 
. 
069 
. 
387-. 649 
. 
488-. 760 
C scale 
. 
638* 
. 
667** 
. 
047 
. 
073 
. 
546-. 730 
. 
525-. 810 
R scale 
. 
573 
. 
550 
. 
053 
. 
084 
. 
470-. 676 
. 
286-. 715 
HCR-20 Total 
. 
633* 
. 
691* 
. 
054 
. 
063 
. 
527-. 738 
. 
568-. 814 
H scale (H11-20) 
. 
602 
. 
558 
. 
062 
. 
073 
. 
481-. 724 
. 
415-. 701 
H scale (H1-20) 
. 
573 
. 
618 
. 
065 
. 
074 
. 
446-. 700 
. 
472-. 764 
S scale 
. 
618 
. 
568 
. 
071 
. 
082 
. 
480-. 757 
. 
408-. 728 
V scale 
. 
492 
. 
541 
. 
058 
. 
074 
. 
378-. 606 
. 
396-. 687 
E scale 
. 
789*** 
. 
719** 
. 
054 
. 
81 
. 
527-. 738 
. 
560-. 878 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(excluding H1-10) 
. 
722*** 
. 
655* 
. 
054 
. 
080 
. 
616-. 828 
. 
499-. 811 
SCJ: Risk Total 
(including H1-10) . 
710** 
. 
684* 
. 
054 
. 
072 
. 
605-. 816 
. 
543-. 825 
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5.8.4.6 Summary of the Predictive Accuracy of Subscale Items 
The results are indicative of the variation in the predictive accuracy of the 
subscales included within the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk, between Directorates and for 
the two time periods investigated. The predictive ability of subscales within the 
SCJ: Risk measure was particularly robust when considering intra-institutional 
behaviour relevant to Violence (Any and Level Two in particular) and Self- 
harm/Suicide. Behaviours for which low baserates of intra-institutional were 
observed yielded predictive validity that was no greater than chance, particularly 
when considering Escape/Abscond risk factors. The original items of the HCR-20 
were not predictive of behaviour relevant to Vulnerability (nor was the expected 
subscale of Vulnerability within the SCJ: Risk), however, SCJ: Risk Totals did yield 
statistically significant AUCs. Individual subscales of the HCR-20 (Clinical and 
Total), Escape and SCJ: Risk Totals of the SCJ: Risk were predictive of behaviour 
related to Subversion. The most robust predictor each type of intra-institutional 
behaviour was the SCJ: Risk Total (including H1-10), indicative of the value of the 
instrument to the purpose for which it was designed. 
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5.8.5 The Predictive Accuracy of SCJ: Risk in `Predicting' Intra- 
Institutional Behaviour. Part Two. The Predictive Utility of SCJ: 
Risk Items within Subscales (Individual Risk Factors) 
The predictive utility of individual items within subscales was investigated 
with varying levels of statistical significance between the behavioural outcome 
criterion variables of interest. Table 5.8 displays AUC values for individual risk 
factors comprising the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk. 
5.8.5.1 Violence 
Any Violence 
Analyses found five of the original ten Historical risk factors of the HCR-20 
to be predictive of `Any Violence'. Relationship Instability (H3), Psychopathy (H7), 
Early Maladjustment (H8), and Personality Disorder (H9) yielded statistically 
significant AUCs in the range of 
. 
641 (p=0.01) and 
. 
693 (p=0.001) for the whole 
population during the twelve-month study. Two of the additional Historical items 
comprising the SCJ: Risk were predictive. Arson (H15) was predictive at T1 (. 611, 
p=0.05) and Concerted Discipline (H 18) at both time periods (. 637, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
672, p=0.001 at T2). Two of the Clinical Subscales: C2 Negative Attitudes (. 740, 
p=0.01 at T1 and 
. 
690, p=0.001), and C4 Impulsivity were predictive of the 
manifestation of future intra-institutional violence. (R4) Non-compliance with 
remediation attempts (. 625, p=0.05 at Ti) and (R5) Stress (. 640, p=0.05 at T1 and 
. 
608, p=0.05 at T2) were found to be predictive. Of the additional subscales, (Si) 
Frequency of Self-harming attempts (. 591, p=0.05 at Ti); (V3) Psychological 
Problems (. 641, p=0.05), (V4) Social Problems (. 608, p=0.05) and (E5) Subversive 
Behaviour (. 680, p=0.001 at T1 and 
. 
624, p=0.01 at T2) were predictive of `Any 
Violence'. Differences between the predictive utility of individual risk factors in 
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relation to `any violence' were therefore observed, with a greater number of factors 
yielding statistical significance during the first period of investigation, than the 
second. 
Level One Violence 
The presence of a Personality Disorder (H9) was the only significant 
Historical predictor from the original HCR-20 (. 659, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
630, p=0.01 
at T2). The additional Historical factors of (H14) Self-harm was predictive at T2 
(. 659, p=0.01) as was (H15) Arson (. 608, p=0.05) and (H18) Concerted Indiscipline 
(. 617, p=0.05). The same two Clinical subscales that were predictive of `Any 
Violence' were predictive of Level One Violence, namely C2 (. 689, p=0.01 at Ti 
and 
. 
680 at T2, p=0.001) and C4 (. 72 1, p=0.001 at Ti and 
. 
788, p=0.001 at T2). In 
addition to R4 (. 641, p=0.05 at Ti and 
. 
644, p=0.01 at T2) and R5 (. 663, p= 0.0 1, p= 
0.01 at Ti (also predictive of Any Violence, and Level Two Violence), R3 (Lack of 
Personal Support) was predictive of Level One Violence at T1 (. 656, p=0.01). 
Frequency of Self-harm (Si) and Planning (S3) were also significant predictors at T2 
(. 629, p=0.05 at Ti and 
. 
616, p=0.05 at T2). The same Vulnerability factors that 
were predictive of `Any Violence' were also predictive of Level One Violence: V2 at 
T1 (. 642, p=0.05), V3 at Ti and T2 (. 646, p=0.05 and 
. 
628, p=0.05), and V4 at T2 
(. 640, p=0.05). No differences in the predictive utility of individual risk factors with 
relevance to Level One Violence were prevalent during the two time periods under 
investigation. 
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Level Two Violence 
The same individual risk factors predictive of Level One and Any Violence 
were found to be predictive of Level Two Violence, and no differences between the 
two time periods investigated were observed. The original static HCR-20 factors of: 
H3 (. 663, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
593, p=0.05 at T2); H7 (. 645, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
636, 
p=0.01 at T2); H8 (. 639, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
622, p=0.01 at T2) and H9 (. 670, p=0.01 
at Ti and 
. 
661, p=0.001 at T2) had predictive merit. The original dynamic factors 
relevant to C2 (. 733 at Ti and. 671 at T2 both significant atp=0.001), C4 (. 800 at T1 
and. 737 at T2 both p=0.01), R4 (. 640, p=0.01 at TI and 
. 
594, p=0.05), and R5 (. 615, 
p=0.05) also showed predictive value of Level Two Violence. Additional individual 
risk factors related to H14 (. 593, p=0.05 at T2), H15 (. 611, p=0.05), H18 (. 657, 
p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
680, p=0.01), Si (. 593, p=0.05 at Ti), V2 (. 636, p=0.05), V3 
(. 661, p=0.01 at Ti), V4 (. 631, p=0.01) and E5 (. 673, p=0.01 at TI and. 649, p=0.01 
at T2) were also predictive of violence not resulting in physical injury. 
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5.8.5.2 Suicide/Self-Harming Behaviour 
The predictive validity of individual risk factors comprising the SCJ: Risk for 
behaviour relevant to suicide/self-harm was less obvious when considering static risk 
factors. The presence of Personality Disorder (H9), Negative Attitudes (C2), 
Impulsivity (C4), Non-compliance with remediation attempts (R4), Stress (R5) were 
factors of the original risk assessment system that yielded significant AUCs. 
Additional static factors of the SCJ: Risk that were predictive were (H13) Suicide 
(. 625, p=0.05 at T2), (H14) Self-harm (. 680, p=0.01 at T1 and 
. 
699, p=0.01 at T2), 
and (H20) Escape/Abscond History (. 693, p=0.001 at T2). Dynamic factors of the 
HCR-20 that were predictive of any evidence of self-harming behaviour included 
(C2) Negative Attitudes (. 628, p=0.05 at T2), (C4) Impulsivity (. 682, p=0.01 at Ti 
and 
. 
790, p=0.001 at T2), (R4) Non-compliance with remediation attempts (. 686, 
p=0.01 at T2) and (R5) Stress (. 722, p=0.001 at T2). The additional individual risk 
factors within the subscale of Suicide were all predictive of the manifestation of 
subsequent behaviour, with particular strength during T2 yielding the following 
AUCs: (Si) Frequency (. 683, p=0.01 at Ti and 
. 
714, p=0.001 at T2), (S2) Severity 
(. 636, p=0.05 at T2), (S3) Hopelessness (. 673, p=0.05 at T1 and 
. 
701, p=0.001 at 
T2), (S4) Planning (. 674, p=0.05 at TI and 
. 
657, p=0.05 at T2), and (S5) Suicidal 
Ideation (. 633, p=0.05 at T2). Other dynamic factors that were predictive included 
(V3) Psychological Problems (. 649, p=0.05 at Ti and 
. 
707, p=0.001 at T2), (V5) 
Exploitation (. 631, p=0.05 at T2) and (E5) Subversive Behaviour (. 658, p=0.05 at 
Ti). Differences between the predictive validity of individual risk factors between 
the two time periods of investigation were therefore observed in relation to 
behaviours relevant to suicide/self-harm, with a greater degree of validity apparent 
within the six months following the formal date of implementation. 
233 
5.8.5.3 Escape/Abscond 
No individual item within any subscale of the original HCR-20 or the 
additional items of the SCJ: Risk system was predictive of intra-institutional 
behaviour relevant to attempts to abscond or escape from the physical security of a 
high-secure special hospital. Differences between the two time periods under 
investigation were not observed. 
5.8.5.4 Vulnerability 
Two individual risk dynamic factors of the HCR-20 were predictive of 
behaviours related to patient vulnerability at Ti, namely (C2) Negative Attitudes 
(. 724, p=0.05) and (C4) Impulsivity (. 762, p=0.01). Three static risk factors were 
predictive of subsequent vulnerability of risk from others. These were related to the 
(H15) Arson (. 676, p=0.05 at T2); (H12) Sex Offending (0.724, p=0.05); and (H7) 
Psychopathy (. 760, p=0.05 at T1; 
. 
687, p=0.05 at T2). Only one of the five 
individual risk factors within the Vulnerability subscale yielded AUCs of statistical 
significance, and related to (V3) Psychological Problems (. 725, p=0.05 at T2). The 
presence of (E5) Subversive Behaviour was also a significant predictor of patient 
vulnerability during the first phase of investigation (. 750, p=0.05). Differences 
between the two time periods investigated in relation to the predictive validity of 
individual risk factors in relation to vulnerability were therefore observed. 
5.8.5.5 Subversion of Security 
The Clinical subscale contained individual risk factors that were predictive of 
behaviour relevant to the subversion of security, namely; (C2) Negative Attitudes 
(. 697, p=0.01 at T2) and (C4) Impulsivity (. 761, p=0.05 at Ti and 
.7 10, p=0.01 at 
234 
T2). The Risk subscale contained one relevant factor evident at the second period of 
investigation, namely (R4) Non-compliance with Remediation Attempts (. 675, 
p=0.05). Two individual factors within two subscales of the SCJ: Risk had 
predictive merit; (V2) Physical /Physiological Problems (. 540, p=0.05) and (E5) 
Subversive Behaviour (. 740, p=0.05 at Ti and 
. 
690, p=0.01 at T2). 
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5.8.5.6 Summary of the Predictive Accuracy of Individual Items within 
Subscales 
Individual Items of the HCR-20 and the Prediction of Violent Behaviour 
As reported in the analysis of the predictive accuracy of subscale items, the 
individual risk factors comprising the subscales of the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk 
yielded AUCs with varying levels of statistical significance. The predictive ability of 
individual items comprising the original HCR-20 was observed, and replicated 
empirical support provided by previous studies. 
Historical Items 
Relationship Instability (H3) was a predictive factor at Ti for Violence (Any, 
Level One or Level Two). The inability to form and maintain long-term, stable 
intimate relationships, or presence of an unstable conflictual pattern of relationship 
was a predictive factor of aggression within a community sample of adults within the 
community with the presence of psychosis (Milton, Amin, Singh, Harrison, Jones, 
Croudace, Medley & Brewin (2001)). 
Employment problems (H4) were predictive of Any Violence at Ti, and 
problems related to seeking and maintaining employment were found in community 
samples within violent schizophrenic patients (Fresan, Apiquan, de la Fuente- 
Sandoval, Garcia-Anaya, Loyzaga & Nicolini (2004, cited in Guy & Wilson, 2007)) 
and in recidivist groups of mentally disordered offenders (Bonta, Law & Hanson, 
1998). 
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The presence of psychopathic traits (H7) as defined by the PCL-R or PCL: SV (see 
Chapter Three) was predictive of Any Violence and Level Two Violence during the 
twelve month investigation. A wealth of literature exists in support of the construct 
of psychopathy as a predictor of violence risk. A recent publication conducted by the 
present investigator and colleagues investigated the predictive utility of the PCL-R in 
a sample of sixty individuals within the Learning Disability Directorate of the special 
hospital (Morrisey, Hogue, Mooney, Richardson, Johnston, Hollin, Lindsay and 
Taylor (2007). IRI data was again used to ascertain intra-institutional behaviour over 
a twelve-month period. Within this sample, the predictive utility of the PCL-R 20- 
item total, PCL-R 13-item total was not demonstrated (nor were PCL-R Factor 1 and 
Factor 2 scores), and did not significantly predict any type of aggressive or violent 
behaviour. The same study investigated the predictive utility of two more clinically 
based measures, one of which was the HCR-20, which was found to be significantly 
predictive of both violence manifesting physical aggression directed toward another 
(Level One) and violence comprising aggression toward property/threats (Level 
Two). The results from the investigation also yielded AUCs within the Learning 
Disability Directorate that were not statistically significant for the individual item of 
psychopathy. The evidence base of the PCL-R is significant, and Guy and Wilson 
(2007) cite empirical support form thirty-one studies conducted in a range of forensic 
settings over the past decade. The evidence for the PCL-R's association with 
violence recidivism (including intra-institutional violence) was therefore supported 
by the present investigation. 
Early Maladjustment (H8) at home school or community before the age of 17 
was predictive of Any Violence at TI and Level Two Violence over the twelve- 
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month investigation. This finding replicates empirical studies conducted within 
forensic populations with the presence of recidivism of (physical) violence within 
institutional settings (Krakowski & Czobor, 2004). 
The presence of a Personality Disorder (H9) was one of the most robust 
single factor predictors of intra-institutional violence, and was predictive across all 
levels of violence over the two time periods under investigation. Individuals who 
met the criteria for at least one DSM-IV diagnosis were more likely to act violently 
than those without the presence of a personality disorder, and provide support to 
previous studies with similar findings in community forensic settings (Hiscoke, 
Langstrom, Ottoson and Grann, 2003; Ulrich & Marneros, 2004). 
Clinical Items 
Negative Attitudes (C2) and Impulsivity (C4) were robust predictors of Any, 
Level One and Level Two Violence for each of the two time periods investigated. 
Entrenched pro-criminal attitudes (C2) has had limited support in the literature for 
individuals contained within institutions, however support has been demonstrated 
within international community forensic samples (Williams, Van Dorn, Hawkins, 
Abbott and Catalano, 2001). 
The presence of behavioural and affective instability (Webster et al, 1997) 
(Impulsivity, C4) was a highly robust predictor or future violent intra-institutional 
behaviour, and constitutes an important finding of the present study. The absence of 
the moderating effect 
. 
of self-regulatory, cognitions, and the ability to remain 
composed were therefore demonstrated to contribute to the manifestation of violent 
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behaviour. This individual subscale has been supported by contributions to the 
literature from Cornell, Peterson and Richards (1999) in juvenile offending samples 
within institutions, in terms of the predictability of physical violence. Studies from 
community samples have demonstrated the presence of impulsivity and an increased 
likelihood of subsequent violent (and sexual) recidivism (Firestone, Nunes, Moulden, 
Broom & Bradford, (2005), cited in Guy & Wilson, 2007). 
Risk Items 
Lack of Personal Support (R3), Noncompliance with Remediation Attempts 
(R4) and Stress (R5) were predictive of violence with varying levels of accuracy over 
the twelve-month investigation. The absence of a pro-social support network (R3) 
was predictive of Level One violence at T2 and Level Two violence at Ti. 
Individuals (in forensic community samples) with the absence of social modelling or 
quality relationships with significant others, have been found to experience feelings 
of threat and hostility from others (Estroff, Swanson, Lachiotte, Swartz & Bolduc, 
1998) that may also be relevant to a high-secure forensic sample. 
Noncompliance with Remediation attempts is defined in the HCR-20 manual 
as linked to the item of Impulsivity, a finding that has been replicated by the present 
study (as shown by the findings related to C4 described above). Item R4 was a 
significant predictor of intra-institutional violence including Any Violence at Ti, and 
Level One and Level Two Violence at both time periods. Individuals assessed as at 
risk of failure to comply with therapeutic, medication, supervision or management 
plans therefore demonstrated greater prevalence of subsequent aggressive behaviour, 
compared with individuals who did comply with appropriate interventions. The 
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motivation to succeed in reducing recidivistic behaviour may therefore be absent 
within this population, exacerbating the presence of risk. This assertion has been 
supported by community violence studies (Swansonm, Swartz, Borum, Hiday, 
Wagner and Bums, 2000), but no such evidence has been apparent for individuals 
within forensic institutional settings. 
The presence of stressors that may have a destabilising influence on the 
vulnerabilities of individuals to the subsequent manifestation of Any, Level One and 
Level Two Violence was apparent during the present investigation. The relationship 
between stress and violence has been supported within community samples (Eitle & 
Turner, (2002), cited in Guy and Wilson, 2007). The proximal (dynamic) exposure 
to stressful events (experiencing assault, accidents, refusal for parole), coupled with a 
history of exposure to traumatic events (also evidence for Early Maladjustment) has 
been shown to increase the likelihood of subsequent episodes of aggression. 
Additional Individual Items of the SCJ: Risk and the Prediction of Intra- 
Institutional Behaviour 
Similar trends as observed during the predictive ability of the individual 
subscales of the SCJ: Risk were observed for the utility of individual risk factors. 
The present investigation provided empirical support for the predictability of 
violence risk for individual items contained within the HCR-20. 
As observed during the investigation of subscale scores, behaviours for which 
IRI s were infrequent, yielded AUCs with low or no predictive utility (relating to 
Escape (E1-5) and Vulnerability (VI-5) in particular). The predictive ability of 
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individual risk factors in terms of the predictability of violence were most robust for 
items contained within the HCR-20. The study also established the predictive utility 
of specific risk factors within the SCJ: Risk. Additional items relating to a history of 
fire-setting (H15, Arson) and previous evidence of acting with others to cause 
disorder (H18, Concerted Indiscipline) were found to be predictors of violent 
behaviour. An item with similar content to H18 that was predictive of `Any 
Violence' and Level Two Violence was (E5) the presence of Subversive Behaviour. 
Dynamic items related to the frequency of self-harm / suicide attempts were also 
predictive during the second phase of investigation (SI, Frequency), as was 
Hopelessness (S2). Dynamic factors relevant to Vulnerability of risk from other 
patients in terms of the presence of Physical/Physiological Problems (V2), 
Psychological Problems (V3), and Social Problems (V4) were also predictors of 
subsequent behaviour. 
The investigation of the predictive utility of subscales showed the additional 
subscale of Suicide/Self-harm to be predictive of corresponding behaviour. When 
investigating the individual risk factors related to Suicide/Self-harm, all five (S 1-5) 
showed validity, indicative of the value of the inclusion of these items within the 
SCJ: Risk. Prior history of suicide attempts or concerns (H13) and a history of self- 
harm (1114) were also indicative of subsequent self-harming behaviour within the 
institution. The predictive validity of individual risk factors within the subsection of 
Vulnerability (V3, Psychological Problems; V4 Social Problems and V5 
Exploitation) were predictive of behaviours relevant to Suicide/Self-harm. 
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The inclusion of factors related to the prediction of behaviours relevant to 
Escape/Abscond risk were problematic to assess due to the low baserates of 
behaviour (due to the physical security of the institution), and as such, no one 
individual risk factor within this subscale was shown to have predictive utility. As 
reported in the summary of the predictive accuracy of subscale items, vulnerability of 
risk from other patients were not predicted by the presence (or absence) of individual 
factors within the Vulnerability subscale (with the exception of the Presence of 
Psychological Problems, (V3) at T2). A reason for this observation (similar to the 
explanation of Escape/Abscond) may be due to the low frequency of behaviour 
recorded within the hospital (8% at Ti and 9% at T2). 
The risk of organised action in collaboration with others to subvert security 
and safety was not predicted by any individual Historical risk factor. Such 
behaviours were related to the presence of risk related to recent clinical presentation 
related to entrenched pro-criminal attitudes or beliefs (C2); Impulsivity (C4) and 
Noncompliance With Remediation Attempts (R4). The presence of Physical / 
Physiological Problems (V2) and Subversive Behaviours (E5) also yielded 
statistically significant AUCs indicative of predictive utility of these individual risk 
factors. 
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5.9 Discussion 
The investigation of the predictive accuracy of the SCJ: Risk necessitated that 
the instrument was analysed in a quantitative manner. For research purposes, the 
system was therefore used in an actuarial way with the goal of achieving a 
probabilistic estimate of the likelihood of future violence (and other behaviours) 
based on judgements made by clinical teams, which were translated into scores. 
However, in `real world' ongoing clinical practice, and adherence to the philosophy 
of the SPJ approach, scores from the SCJ: Risk should not be used in an actuarial 
way. Instead, judgements should be used to create risk management plans with the 
goal of the prevention of undesirable intra-institutional behaviours. 
The findings of the present chapter investigating the predictive validity of the 
HCR-20 within forensic psychiatric samples highlights the value of regular 
assessment of risk variables on behaviour, especially in identifying aggravating or 
mitigating mental health variables (Monahan et al,. 2004). Macpherson et al., (2004) 
found the majority of studies `predicting' intra-institutional violence adopted a 
retrospective-prospective design. Due to the longitudinal nature of risk prediction 
and possible violent behaviour, many studies have adopted such a design (see 
above). A naturalistic or ecologically valid setting for risk assessment is said to be 
"prospective, i. e. the assessment is made before the criteria is observed and 
measured" (Dernevik et al., 2002, p. 94). Dernevik et al., (2002) also argue that it is 
reasonable to assume that an assessor (having made the judgement) may be subject to 
decision-making biases. A retrospective assessor however need not meet the 
individual on whom the judgement has been made, and may rate behaviour without 
the confounding variable of knowledge of the assessment of risk. However, within 
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the context of the current investigation, use of the independent official hospital 
incident recording system was chosen in an attempt to avoid this possible confound. 
However, it may be argued that despite attempts to minimise this confound, 
clinician's prior knowledge of an individual's institutional behaviour may influence 
the outcome of risk predictions. In the context of the present study, although the risk 
judgements were made prior to the manifestation of intra-institutional behaviour, a 
clinician's (or whole clinical team) judgement may be influenced by an individual's 
behaviour prior to completion of the SCJ: Risk. For example, an individual may 
frequently engage in assaultative behaviour, and historically (or immediately prior to 
the assessment) have many recorded incidents of this nature. The design of the 
current investigation may therefore be seen as compromised by decision-making 
biases held by clinical team members as a result of knowledge of an individual's 
previous behaviours. 
A strength of the current investigation was the prospective design of the 
study. de Vogel and de Ruiter (2006) report that only three published studies at the 
time investigated the predictive validity of the HCR-20 utilising a prospective 
design (Belfrage et al., 2000; Demevik, Grann, & Johansson, 2002; Dolan & 
Khawala, 2004, cited in de Vogel and de Ruiter, 2006). A further strength was the 
ecological validity of the investigation and relevance to actual clinical risk 
assessment as part of ongoing clinical practice. The majority of the published 
literature relevant to the HCR-20 described a methodology involving coding of the 
instrument by independent researchers, rather than a multidisciplinary team of 
relevantly trained practicing clinicians. The present investigation did not rely on 
coding of the HCR-20 by reliance of a single rater using file information, but by 
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clinical knowledge of the patient by a range of clinicians. In this way the study has 
remedied a problem raised by Webster, Muller-Isberner, and Fransson (2002) that 
"much more in situ research needs to be accomplished with instruments such as the 
HCR-20" (p. 189). 
5.10 Chapter Summary 
The aim of the present Chapter was to investigate the predictive validity of 
the SCJ: Risk as an adaptation of the HCR-20 within a forensic psychiatric 
population in conditions of high security. The application of descriptive analysis and 
Receiver Operating Characteristic Analysis allowed assessment of the relationship 
between the risk measure and outcome behaviours of interest. In this way, an 
investigation as to the accuracy of subscale and individual risk factor scores 
comprising the SCJ: Risk to predict intra-institutional behaviours of interest was 
achieved. Analyses for the prediction of Violence, Self-harm/Suicide, Escape, 
Vulnerability and Subversion of Security yielded AUCs showing variability in the 
predictive accuracy of subscales and individual items comprising them across the 
various populations within Directorates of a high-secure hospital. Variability of the 
predictive utility of the SCJ: Risk was also observed between the two time periods 
investigated. 
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Chapter Six 
Risk Management 
A Prevention Based Paradigm of Risk 
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6.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters have outlined various approaches to risk assessment 
(Chapter Two), the application of structured professional judgement in practice 
(Chapters Three and Four) and the ability of risk assessment systems to predict 
behaviours of interest (Chapter Five). The predictive accuracy of items and 
subscales related to risk was necessary to validate the efficacy and relevance of a risk 
assessment tool to the population to which it was applied (Chapter Five). However, 
Douglas and Kropp (2002) assert that it is misguided to equate the success of a risk 
assessment tool with the effect size obtained through statistical manipulation of 
variables, and further suggest that the effectiveness of a risk assessment system may 
be evaluated in terms of its relevance to risk management and the prevention of 
behaviours. 
There is a critical issue pertinent to the process of implementing any 
structured clinical judgement of risk, namely the relationship between assessment 
and management of risk. Hart (1998) states that: "Clinicians are bound-morally, 
ethically and legally-to prove themselves wrong when they `predict' violence; they 
must take every reasonable action to ensure that those at high risk for violence do not 
act violently" (p. 123). Dernevik et al., (2002) further explains "... in an ideal world, 
a good practice of risk management should invalidate the risk assessment by averting 
and containing adverse events". Therefore, clinicians' interest is in the prevention of 
violent (and other) behaviour, and it is problematic to see how one can distinguish 
between a valid, reliable risk assessment method and a false positive (prediction 
error, see Chapter Five). 
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The focus of the present chapter was to examine the relationship between the 
identification of patients as high-risk with regard to the occurrence and time to 
manifestation of subsequent intra-institutional behaviour relevant to the security 
needs of a high secure forensic setting. Risk management reflects a shift in 
conceptual thinking from a prediction-based (Chapter Five) to a prevention-based 
paradigm. The current chapter therefore reflects contemporary thinking and 
investigates conceptual developments such as distinctions between static and 
dynamic risk factors, instruments to assess risk, methodological design and statistical 
methods for investigating the prevention-based paradigm to risk management. The 
SCJ: Risk was investigated to ascertain its efficacy as a prevention-based risk 
assessment and management system. 
6.1.1 Risk Management. A Shift from a Prediction to a Prevention-Based 
Paradigm 
The aim of risk management is to identify and manage risks before they 
manifest themselves (Mullen, 2000). The process of risk management may be 
understood as the application of information and knowledge with the aim of 
containment or prevention of undesired behaviours. "It deals with the kinds of 
supervision, interventions, and treatments that are apparently required in the 
particular case in order to minimise. 
.. 
risk" (Webster and Hucker, 2007. p. 16). Via 
effective management, behaviours may be prevented from manifesting. 
A clearly defined method for assessing risk for violence and other behaviours 
in offenders is essential to the criminal justice system. An effective system will 
inform the assessment of risk for community and institutional violence. Fuller et al., 
250 
(1999) suggest, if used correctly in a multidisciplinary way, the assessment may 
inform risk management (such as monitoring, identification of treatment needs, 
supervision levels, and victim safety planning). Due to the nature of the client group 
within the setting of a maximum secure hospital, the management of the risk of 
physical assault toward self, staff and other patients is of significance. Macpherson 
et al., (2004) assert that an effective system of predicting intra-institutional violence 
in a secure hospital setting is therefore critical in reducing the negative correlates of 
inpatient violence (staff burnout; staff hostility and the use of physical restraints). 
The ancient warrior-philosopher Sun Tzu's text The Art of War teaches that 
knowledge of the problem is key to the solution. The two thousand year old text may 
be seen to have relevance to informing strategy within modern forensic institutions. 
The book describes a tale of a family of three brothers who are healers. When asked 
who was most skilled in the art of healing, the brother who achieved fame and wealth 
replied that, of three brothers his name was the most synonymous with science as he 
cured those who were seriously ill by the application of treatment, saying "... from 
time to time my name gets out and is heard among the lords". The remaining two 
brothers were less well known. One brother cured sickness in the early stages of 
manifestation when the sickness was "... still extremely minute, so his name does not 
get out of the neighbourhood". The other brother "... sees the spirit of sickness and 
removes it before it takes shape, so his name does not get out of the house" (Cleary, 
1988). Each was skilled in the art of healing, but the brother who was least well 
known did not achieve fame as he intervened before a significant problem had 
occurred. The application of knowledge and early implementation of intervention 
strategies before an illness could manifest was achieved thus negating the need for 
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the subsequent application of medicine. As the illness was never known, no credit 
was attributed to this brother, compared to his famed sibling who intervened using 
sophisticated techniques after noticeable problems had developed, so alleviating 
suffering. 
This story is analogous to the processes of risk assessment and management 
of offenders, and the differentiation between prevention and treatment (Munoz, 
Mrazek and Haggerty, 1996; cited in Douglas and Kropp, 2002). Academic literature 
has therefore paralleled the status of the famed physician and his relatively unknown 
brother. The attention of clinicians has been directed by the literature in identifying 
and defining risk factors thought to be predictive of risky behaviours. More recently, 
attention has been given to evaluations of the efficacy of the interventions in 
reducing recidivism. The provision of therapeutic intervention may be seen as the 
application of a "cure", in an attempt to reduce an offender's propensity of future risk 
of recidivism. Therapeutic intervention has been the focus of interest within 
forensic psychiatry, psychology and nursing. For example, the Prison Service 
provides many offending behaviour programmes with cognitive behavioural 
underpinnings (for example the Cognitive Self-Change Programme, for violent 
offenders; Enhance Thinking Skills, to teach problem solving and the Sex Offender 
Treatment Programme, for sexual offenders). Each program has as its goal the 
prevention of the target behaviour of interest to minimise future adverse outcomes. 
The efficacy of these interventions has been critiqued within academic literature such 
as the "What Works" research (McGuire, 1995). Efficacy is also dependent upon the 
accurate identification of risk factors specific to the criminogenic needs of the 
individual. The development of "empirically-based structured clinical decision- 
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making schemes" has therefore resulted in a recent focus on the management of 
high-risk behaviours (in particular violence, Macpherson et al., (2004, p. 63); Dolan 
and Doyle, 2000; Douglas and Webster, 1999). Comparatively little attention has 
been given to the prevention of behaviours manifesting. However, the last decade 
has witnessed a shift from a prediction-based paradigm to a preventative paradigm 
toward risk assessment and management of behaviour. 
6.1.2 The Distinction Between Risk Status and Risk State (Douglas and Skeem, 
2005) 
Some authors in the literature assert that early identification of risk factors 
and the management of targeted behaviours may prevent or reduce the probability of 
manifestation of subsequent behaviour. Douglas and Kropp (2002) suggest that 
integral notions of prevention (of violence) include "... reduction of adverse 
outcomes, identification of risk factors, focus on modifiable risk and targeting of 
high-risk populations and persons" (p. 623). By virtue of their containment, the 
population of a high-secure psychiatric hospital have already acted in an antisocial 
manner. Prevention within an offending population has therefore been termed 
`secondary prevention' (as to achieve primary prevention, the antisocial behaviour 
would not have manifest in the first instance). The literature also reflects adherence 
to the notion that these dynamic risk factors are the most promising in the prevention 
of future behaviour. Douglas and Skeem (2005) assert that a distinction may be 
made between risk status, or the emphasis on static (unchangeable) risk factors and 
risk state, emphasising on dynamic (changeable) risk factors. The concept of risk 
state as a construct is relatively new to the field of risk assessment. Risk state may 
be understood as; "an individual's propensity to become involved in violence at a 
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given time, based on particular changes in biological, psychological and social 
variables in his or her life (emphasis added, Skeem and Mulvey, 2002). Central to 
this is a recognition that risk factors vary in the extent to which they are changeable. 
These range from highly static factors such as gender, race and history of violence, to 
highly dynamic such as substance use, weapon availability and opportunity. 
The literature suggests emerging consensus on the notion that dynamic risk 
factors are more useful to violence reduction when compared to static risk. 
However, there are differences between risk state constructs. Heilbrun (1997, cited in 
Douglas and Skeem, 2005) distinguishes between models of risk assessment and 
asserts a difference between violence prediction versus violence reduction, and the 
applicability of risk state to intervention. Identification of relevant risk factors to aid 
violence reduction may be used to target corresponding treatment interventions. The 
correct identification of risk factors via systematic guidelines is therefore important 
to the process of risk management. Andrews, Bonta and Hoge's (1990) responsivity 
principle also asserts that structured guidelines can facilitate the identification of 
high-risk offenders. Once identified, such a population can be targeted for intensive 
treatment, and greater resources may be allocated to respond to the greater risk (or 
criminogenic need). Via the application of appropriate intensity of intervention, 
treatment may be tailored specific to the individual's risk factors in attempt to reduce 
or prevent manifestation of the outcome behaviour of interest. A distinction between 
risk state and causation has been made by Douglas and Skeem (2005). The authors 
agree with the assertion that identifying causal dynamic risk factors for violence is 
critical to developing an effective intervention to reduce risk. They cite an example, 
that the identification of alcohol as a causal risk factor (for violence) may (i) precede 
254 
and increase violence; (ii) may change via intervention; (iii) may predict changes in 
the likelihood of violence when altered. However, drinking may only be a proxy 
variable, for example, peer group or interaction with other medications may also 
factor in the likelihood of violence. Caution must therefore be given when 
identifying a causal variable, due to its uncertainty of interaction with other factors. 
Hanson and Harris (2000, cited in Douglas and Skeem, 2005) add another 
layer to the debate as to risk state constructs, and distinguish between stable and 
acute risk factors. Clinicians may consider stable factors, (such as a trait of 
impulsivity) as unlikely to change over a short period of time, and may also consider 
acute factors (such as drug use) that may change daily. The authors suggest that by 
understanding the distinction, and by identifying and targeting the key dynamic risk 
factors specific to the individual, a schedule of how to assess and monitor risk state 
may be achieved to reduce recidivism. Risk state and risk factors relevant to 
violence and other behaviours within an offending population may therefore be seen 
as multifactorial. Stated another way, it is therefore important for clinicians to 
remain mindful that risk related behaviour has no single cause, and may be seen as a 
transactional process reflecting multiple causal risk factors. 
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6.2 Instruments to Assess Risk State 
Douglas and Skeem (2005) assert that there are no empirically validated 
instruments specifically designed to assess risk state, but suggest there are two 
groups of instruments that will require further investigation as to their applicability. 
These are (i) General Assessment Guides (including dynamic risk factors) such as 
the HCR-20 and (ii) Specific Risk Assessment Guides (that focus on capturing risk 
state). General Assessment Guides adhere to the structured professional judgement 
(SPJ) approach (described in Chapter Two), and so traditionally facilitate clinicians 
to make a summary judgement relating to an overall level of risk (low, medium or 
high), thus allowing the level of intervention to be targeted appropriate to the 
identified risk factors. The HCR-20 has been seen as the most promising system for 
the assessment of dynamic risk. The system adheres to the traditional dichotomy of 
static versus dynamic factors by consideration of historical and current clinical 
factors. In addition, risk factors pertaining to the risk management and future 
behavioural variables are considered. Specific Risk Assessment guides differ from 
General Assessment Guides as they focus specifically on dynamic factors and 
assessing changes in risk state over time, or in response to treatment. Instruments 
with preliminary support for measurement of risk state include the Violence Risk 
Scale (VRS, Wong and Gordon, 1996, see Chapter Two). The VRS has been applied 
to mentally disordered offenders who have completed treatment and are being 
considered for release, and is oriented to assessing treatment progress and informing 
risk management plans. Each of the two assessment approaches may be utilised in 
the study of dynamic risk, and each approach may be investigated by the application 
of a variety of methodologies (outlined below). 
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6.3 Methodologies to Investigate the Prevention-Based Paradigm 
for Risk Assessment and Management 
6.3.1 Single, Dual and Multiple Time-Point Estimates 
Douglas and Skeem (2005) and Douglas and Kropp (2002) have reviewed 
possible methodologies for the investigation of the preventative utility of dynamic 
risk. Douglas and Skeem (2005) present three approaches (i) single time-point 
estimates, (ii) dual time-point estimates and (iii) multiple time-point estimates. The 
first methodology involves the investigation of the presence of risk factors at a single 
time-point, namely the time of violence. Risk factors are estimated in an attempt to 
assess whether their presence predict violence, for example, was the consumption of 
alcohol a factor present at the time of a violent offence? Dual time-point estimates 
involve an investigation of whether changes in risk factors are predictors of violence. 
Individuals are assessed at two points in time, and comparisons are drawn. For 
example scores on dynamic risk factors at time one may be compared with scores for 
the same factors at time two. Any differences in the prevalence of the outcome 
behaviour of interest may be attributable to differences in dynamic risk factors. A 
repeated measures approach is therefore possible within this methodology that may 
have applicability to consideration of treatment / management efficacy. By utilising 
the design it is possible to evaluate whether changes in risk factors relate to 
subsequent changes in behaviour (e. g. reduction or escalation). The design may 
however be seen to have weaknesses in terms of the limitation of only two points in 
time, and is dependent upon the length of time between the two. No agreed criteria 
or guideline exists in terms of recommendations of appropriate follow-up time 
periods. Too short a period may not be sufficient for an individual to respond to 
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treatment effectively, too long a period, and the individual may show recovery then 
decline, and the recovery phase would not be captured sufficiently. 
The third approach of multiple time-point estimates may overcome this 
methodological weakness. By selecting several time-point estimates, understanding 
as to the interaction between individual risk factors and behavioural presentation may 
be ascertained. Methodologies requiring repeated assessments require the allocation 
of additional resources, and may not be practical in the application to a high-secure 
setting with competing operational demands. Mulvey (2002, cited in Douglas and 
Skeem, 2005) conducted twenty-six repeated measurements of dynamic risk factors 
in a sample of one hundred and thirty-five psychiatric patients. The sample was a 
subset of participants identified as high-risk for repeated involvement in violence. 
Patients and informants (staff) were interviewed weekly for six months to assess 
changes in key dynamic factors and their relation to violence. Analyses of the 
relationship among drinking, drug use and violence at a daily level suggested that 
aggressive incidents occurred in acute bursts, and were likely to co-occur. By use of 
multiple time-point estimates, the study was able to show how dynamic risk factors 
changed over time, and how these changes related to violence. The review of the 
three methodologies raises awareness of the need to monitor and ultimately reduce 
risk of undesired behaviours by employing investigations with the most robust 
methodology and statistical techniques possible, and illustrates the need for future 
studies investigating dynamic risk. 
258 
6.4 Inter-Individual and Intra-Individual Variability 
As detailed in Chapter Two the SCJ: Risk system adheres to the structured 
professional judgement approach to risk assessment. The system does not rely 
entirely on the evaluation of an individual's risk status, but also considers risk state 
variables. Compliance with measures focusing on static factors have been 
considered to be of limited utility when monitoring or treating individuals identified 
as high-risk. Focusing on violence as the outcome behaviour of interest, Skeem and 
Mulvey (2002, cited in Douglas and Skeem, 2005) suggested that risk ebbs and flows 
over time within each individual, risk factors are not static, and that the key task of 
reducing violence potential is to; "go beyond evaluating baseline risk status, which 
focuses on inter-individual variability in risk, to assessing risk state, which focuses 
on intra-individual variability in violence potential". 
The key task in risk management may, therefore, be seen to understand and 
differentiate between risk status (static) and risk state (dynamic) by evaluating risk 
factors and their variability over time, rather than assuming that risk is a fixed entity. 
Understanding risk as a state that is likely to change over time therefore has 
implications for understanding responsiveness to treatment interventions. Adhering 
to the concept of risk state, when evaluating the efficacy of a risk assessment system, 
it is necessary to integrate concepts of reassessment and dynamic risk and monitoring 
changes over time. For a system to be effective, the risk assessment may be 
understood as a process of making ongoing decisions about the management and 
treatment of mentally disordered offenders by identification of relevant risk factors 
that may be responsive to change. It is for this reason that the SCJ: Risk system 
should be evaluated in terms of its applicability as a systematic method of assessing 
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changeable aspects of violence and other behaviour relevant to a high-secure 
hospital. 
Sun Tzu (the philosopher referred to above, Cleary, 1988) challenges 
individuals to consider everything before taking action and suggests that critical 
factors are evaluated to determine the highest probability of success. This 
philosophy is applicable within forensic psychiatry. The assessment of relative 
probabilities of specific outcomes to reduce the impact of unknown events is 
fundamental to reducing or ameliorating undesired events. In the context of the 
present study, early identification of risk in relation to the needs of a high secure 
hospital in terms of; (i) the immediate risk of harming others; (ii) the risk of suicide 
or self-harm; (iii) vulnerability to risk from others; (iv) the risk of escape; and (v) the 
risk of organised action in collaboration with others to subvert security and safety via 
completion of a system of structured professional judgement may lead to the 
effective management or reduction of behaviours manifesting. Successful 
management may therefore prevent further escalation that would otherwise require 
additional resources and further interventions. Examination as to the success of risk 
management interventions may be investigated by application of the statistical 
methods described below. 
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6.5 Statistical Methods to Investigate the Prevention-Based 
Paradigm of Risk Assessment and Management 
6.5.1 Kaplin-Meier Survival Analysis 
Douglas and Kropp (2002) suggest that the research design most useful to the 
validation of a risk assessment system is a prospective, repeated measures study to 
identify, firstly, changes in risk factors over time and secondly, the relationship 
between these changes and related intra-institutional behaviour (as examined in 
Chapter Five). 
The most robust statistical method for identifying the time to the first 
manifestation of behaviour is the Kaplin-Meier Survival Analysis proportional 
hazards survival analysis (non-parametric) with time dependent covariates (de Vogel 
and de Ruiter, 2006). Survival analysis may be understood as a time to event 
analysis. Two concepts are critical in understanding the interpretation of this type of 
analyses. The first central concept of survival analysis is the hazard rate. The 
hazard rate may be understood as the probability that the event (intra-institutional 
behaviour) will occur at time t conditional on surviving until time t. The second 
concept related to the hazard rate is the survival function and can be defined as the 
probability of surviving to time t. Hazard function is represented (or modelled) as a 
distribution. An increasing hazard represents a positive duration dependence 
(represented by an upward slope); a decreasing hazard shows negative duration 
dependence (a decreasing slope) a constant hazard showing a process with no change 
over time. 
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When investigating the prevention of intra-institutional behaviour, the 
outcome variable of interest would be the time proportion of patients who display the 
behaviours of interest (violence, self-harm, suicide, vulnerability, escape and 
subversion). Within the context of the present investigation of particular interest was 
the proportion of patients deemed as high risk according to Tilt versus patients not 
deemed as high risk displaying behaviours of interest, and the time to the first 
recorded display of intra-institutional infraction. 
Other outcomes of interest include the median time to violence and the 
severity of violence. Kaplin-Meier Survival Analysis is therefore robust in 
modelling increases or decreases in the survival function for intra-institutional 
behaviour, as affected by; (a) initial risk level (presence or absence of high-risk in a 
Tilt category), and (b) changes in dynamic risk factors (Douglas and Skeem, 2005). 
By modelling these factors, it is possible to examine the increase or decrease of 
survival function, allowing interpretation of the effectiveness of risk management 
plans, and investigation as to whether identified risk factors were indeed important to 
time to the manifestation of subsequent behaviour. 
The analysis avoids errors associated with investigation of differences 
between means between two (or more) time point estimates (such as error from one 
or more measurement period). For example, clinicians involved in the rating of risk 
at time one may differ from the composition of team members at the second rating. 
Consistency of ratings (inter-rater reliability) may therefore be problematic. 
Conversely, the exact same clinical team composition may result in consistency of 
clinician biases. By the nature of the intention of the analysis (to examine changes 
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over time), non-normality is assumed. The duration of the analysis (time) cannot be 
negative, and therefore normality cannot be assumed, hence the normality 
assumption of regression models (such as conventional statistical methods such as 
multiple linear regression) is not appropriate to an investigation of changes in risk 
factors and subsequent intra-institutional behaviour over time. Another advantage of 
the analysis that unequal follow-up periods between patients is controlled. 
6.6 SCJ: Risk as a Prevention-Based Risk Assessment System 
The SCJ: Risk as a system of structured professional judgement may be seen 
as applicable to the prevention-based paradigm of risk assessment. Chapter Two 
outlined that the HCR-20 system contains 10 primarily static factors (Historical) and 
10 dynamic factors (Clinical and Risk). In addition, the SCJ: Risk has 10 additional 
static (Historical) and 15 further dynamic factors (Suicide, Vulnerability and Escape) 
related to Suicide/Self-harm (5); Vulnerability (5) and Escape (5). The SCJ: Risk 
also contains a summary of risk section where a patient deemed to be high risk may 
be identified, and a management plan documented for factors related to violence; self 
harm / suicide; escape; vulnerability and subversion. In this way, patients may be 
divided by risk level, and so corresponding intervention and management strategies 
may be targeted. The HCR-20 Violence Risk Management Companion Guide 
(Douglas et al., 2001) accompanies the HCR-20 manual of item definitions, 
explanations and scoring criteria. For each of the dynamic factors (Clinical and 
Risk) recommendations and guidance as to targeted strategies for treatment and 
intervention efforts to reduce violence is given to supplement standard clinical 
practice. 
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In the context of the present study, patients not defined as high risk did not 
have additional management plans documented to inform clinical teams of how to 
target treatment and interventions specific to the risk identified. For these patients, 
existing treatment and management approaches were be documented as part of 
ongoing clinical practice (see methodology below). 
6.6.1 Aims and Objectives 
For the system of Structured Clinical Judgement to be useful, it was 
necessary to demonstrate that the system effectively informed risk management and 
the reduction of outcome behaviours (detailed in Chapter Five) among individuals 
within a high-secure forensic hospital. Douglas and Kropp (2002) suggest: "Risk 
assessment should be considered successful when we can demonstrate reduced rates 
of violence in connection with risk assessment procedures" (p. 623). This chapter 
reflects the reconceptualisation within the field of risk assessment oward attention to 
the identification of strategies to reduce risk, rather than specification of who will or 
will not display the undesirable outcome behaviour of interest. The investigation into 
the predictive validity of the SCJ: Risk system (Chapter Five) focused on whether 
independent variables (or presence of identified risk factors) predict an event. The 
aims of this research chapter were therefore to determine if independent variables 
explain the time it takes for the dependent variable to occur, and whether risk 
management plans for high risk patients reduce the identified behaviour of interest. 
In an attempt to achieve these aims, the present chapter investigated and compared 
two time periods, reflecting use of the SCJ: Risk system in clinical practice; six 
months prior to an implementation deadline, and six months following the deadline. 
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The rationale for the investigation of two distinct time periods was the same as 
defined in Chapter Five (Section 5.7.3). 
Douglas and Kropp (2002) made a significant contribution to the conceptual 
development toward the prevention-based paradigm. They recommend a model of 
risk assessment and outline validation steps necessary for future empirical research. 
This chapter encompassed the recommendations made for investigating the assertion 
that prevention, not prediction is the goal of risk assessment. By incorporating the 
recommendations made by the authors to the current investigation, methods for 
assessing changeable aspects of violence (and other) risk and systematic methods of 
targeting risk to reduce violence were applied as part of the evaluation of the efficacy 
of the SCJ: Risk system's preventative utility. 
6.6.2 Research Questions 
Two research questions were posed: 
Do final Tilt summary judgements, and the identification of patients as high 
risk impact on the presence of related intra-institutional behaviour (as defined by any 
differences between the two time periods investigated)? 
Do final Tilt summary judgements, and the identification of patients as high- 
risk impact on the time it takes for intra-institutional behaviour to occur (as defined 
by any differences between the two time periods investigated)? 
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6.6.3 Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One 
In relation to the first research question, it was hypothesised that the 
identification of a patient as high risk and the construction of associated risk 
management plans would reduce the presence of corresponding behaviour. Within 
this hypothesis, it was anticipated that any effect of the implementation of a risk 
management plan would be more apparent during the second period of investigation, 
due to a further six months of the risk management plan being embedded within 
clinical practice. 
HAo: There will be no significant differences between patients identified as 
high risk (compared to patients not identified as high risk) in the presence of intra- 
institutional behaviour within each Tilt category of risk. 
HAI: There will be significant differences between patients identified as high 
risk (compared to patients not identified as high risk) in the presence of intra- 
institutional behaviour within each Tilt category of risk. 
Hypothesis Two 
In relation to the second research question, it was hypothesised that patients 
identified as high-risk in any one or more of the five Tilt categories would manifest 
relevant intra-institutional infractions later than patients not identified as high-risk 
(due to the presence of associated risk management plans). The same rationale was 
followed as the first hypothesis. It was anticipated that identified behaviours would 
manifest at a later stage during the follow-up period of the second time period 
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investigated, due to a greater time opportunity for associated risk management plans 
to become embedded within routine clinical practice. 
HBO: There will be no significant differences between patients identified as 
high risk, compared to patients not identified as high risk, in the time to the first 
incident of intra-institutional behaviour within each Tilt category of risk. 
HB I: There will be significant differences between patients identified as high 
risk, compared to patients not identified as high risk, in the time to the first incident 
of intra-institutional behaviour within each Tilt category of risk. 
. 
6.6.4 Method 
6.6.4.1 Procedure 
The same procedure as detailed in Chapter Five (Predictive Validity) was 
utilised. SCJ: Risk documentation was completed as part of ongoing clinical practice, 
and so the same dataset was subject to examination. As described in Chapter Three 
(Implementation) the SCJ: Risk has a risk management section as an integral 
component (see Appendix 1.1). A risk management plan was completed where the 
clinical team judged the patient to present as high risk in any one of the five final Tilt 
high risk summary judgements (related to intra-institutional behaviour indicative of 
risk of violence, suicide/self-harm, escape, vulnerability and subversion of security). 
Official hospital incident report forms (IR1 s) were used to ascertain the 
outcome behaviour of interest (intra-institutional behaviour detailed above). Dual 
time-point methodology (outlined above) was applied to examine the impact of SCJ: 
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Risk identification and subsequent risk management plans, and two six month 
periods were investigated (six months prior to a formal implementation deadline 
(01.07.2006 to 31.12.2006), and six months following the deadline (01.01.2007 to 
30.06.2007). The frequency, characteristics and nature of patients' intra-institutional 
behaviour during a twelve-month period was collated via IRI data that was 
subsequently compared with SCJ: Risk data. The type and prevalence of intra- 
institutional behaviour six months prior to full-scale implementation, and six months 
post implementation of the SCJ: Risk was investigated. 
6.6.4.2 Statistical Analysis 
Interpretation of hazard ratios yielded from Kaplin-Meier survival analysis 
(described above) was used to determine; (i) the presence of relevant intra- 
institutional infraction within patients identified as high risk compared to patients not 
deemed such a risk and; (ii) the time to the manifestation of subsequent intra- 
institutional behaviour for patients identified as high risk compared to patients with 
the absence of this risk status. All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 16. 
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6.7 Results 
The results of the prevalence and time to incidents of intra-institutional 
behaviour relating to the five Tilt factors are presented below. Comparisons between 
patients identified as high risk and patients not judged to be high risk as defined by 
the Tilt High Risk Summary Judgement portion of the SCJ: Risk are reported. 
6.7.1 Prevalence of Patients Identified as High Risk in Each of the Tilt 
Categories. Time One 
During the first period of investigation, fifty (33%) of the total sample of one- 
hundred and fifty-three were identified as presenting a risk in any one of the Tilt 
categories as defined by the SCJ: Risk. The following numbers of individuals were 
identified as high risk in one or more areas as defined by the Tilt summary 
judgement portion of the SCJ: Risk: DSPD, n=9 (32%); PD n=8 (16%); MH n=7 
(8%); LD n=9 (43%); WS n=17 (68%). Table El (Appendix Four) displays the 
prevalence and proportions of patients identified as high risk in each of the Tilt 
categories for each of the two time periods under investigation. 
Just over a quarter (26%, n=37) of the total population were identified as high 
risk of immediate harm to others: DSPD, n=8 (29%); PD, n=5 (10%); MH n=5 
(5%); LD n=8 (38%); WS n=11 (44%). Twenty-seven (18%) of the total population 
were identified as high risk of suicide or self-harm: DSPD, n=5 (18%); PD, n=4 
(8%); MH n=2 (2%); LD n=4 (19%); WS n=12 (48%). Fourteen (9%) of the total 
population were identified as high risk of vulnerability of harm from others: DSPD, 
n=2 (7.1%); PD, n=1 (2%); MH n=0 (0%); LD n=5 (23%); WS n=6 (24%). Eight 
(5%) of the total population were identified as high risk of escape: DSPD, n=2 
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(7.1%); PD, n=1 (2%); MH n=1 (1%); LD n=13 (62%); WS n=4 (16%). Twenty- 
seven (18%) of the total population were identified as high risk of organised action in 
collaboration with others to subvert security and safety: DSPD n=5 (18%); PD n=4 
(67%); MH n=3 (3%); LD n=3 (14%); WS n=12 (48%). 
6.7.2 Presence of Intra-Institutional Behaviour Relevant to Tilt Final Risk 
Judgements. Time One 
A comparison between patients identified as having the presence or absence 
of high risk status in each of the Tilt categories, and subsequent manifestation of 
relevant behaviours is displayed in Figure B1 (Appendix Four). One third of the total 
population were therefore identified by the multidisciplinary team as high risk in one 
or more of the five Tilt categories. Of the fifty patients identified within this 
category eighty-two per cent (n=41) displayed a relevant incident of intra- 
institutional behaviour. The remaining two thirds of patients were not deemed to 
present as high risk, however forty-two per cent (n=43) of this group displayed 
behaviour indicative of risk. Seventy-seven (53%, of the one-hundred and forty-five 
patients included in the analysis) demonstrated violent behaviour. Of the thirty- 
seven patients identified as presenting high risk of immediate harm to others, thirty- 
four (92%) subsequently manifested the corresponding behaviour. Forty-three (40%) 
of the one-hundred and eight patients not identified as high-risk displayed behaviour 
relevant to violence. There were thirty-five recorded incidents of self-harming 
behaviour during this time period. Sixty-seven per cent (n=18) of the high risk group 
manifested relevant behaviour, compared to fourteen per cent of patients not 
identified as high-risk. The prevalence of incidents related to escape were low (see 
Chapter Five), however thirteen per cent (n=1) of patients identified as high-risk and 
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one per cent (n=1) of patients not identified as high-risk subsequently displayed 
behaviour relating to a risk of escape. There were thirteen incidents related to patient 
vulnerability. A greater proportion of incidents were prevalent in the high risk group 
(29%, n=14), compared to the remaining patients (7%, n=9). A higher prevalence of 
incidents relevant to the subversion of security was demonstrated in the group of 
patients identified as high risk (26%, n=7), compared to five per cent (n=6) of 
patients not deemed to present such risk status. 
6.7.3 Prevalence of Patients Identified as High Risk in Each of the Tilt 
Categories. Time Two 
During the second period of investigation, the following numbers of 
individuals were identified as high risk in one or more areas as defined by the Tilt 
summary judgement portion of the SCJ: Risk: Total population n=82 (3 8%); DSPD 
n=24 (86%); PD n=14 (28%); MH n=11 (12%); LD n=12 (57%); WS n=21 (64%). 
Sixty-one (28%) of the total population were identified as high risk of immediate 
harm to others. The highest proportion identified as high risk of immediate harm to 
others was evidenced in LD (n=11,52%), followed by: DSPD (n=71,20%); PD 
(n=8,16%); WS (n=14,11%) and MH (n=8,9%). Thirty-five individuals (16%) 
within the hospital were deemed high risk of suicide or self-harm, sixteen of whom 
were from the Directorate of WS (65%). The remaining Directorates had the 
following trends related to self-harm/suicide: DSPD n=6 (21%); PD n=5 (10%); MH 
n=2 (2%); LD n=6 (29%). Twenty-eight (13%) of the total population were 
identified as presenting as high risk of vulnerability of harm from others: DSPD 
n=10 (36%); PD n=3 (6%); MH n=3 (3%); LD n=4 (19%) and WS n=8 (17%). 
Fifteen (7%) of the patients within the hospital were identified as high risk of escape; 
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DSPD n=3 (11%); PD n=3 (6%); MH n=1 (1%); LD n=1 (5%) and WS n=7 (18%). 
Forty-two (19%) of the total population were identified as high risk of organised 
action in collaboration with others to subvert security and safety: DSPD n=10 (36%); 
PD n=9 (18%); MH n=4 (4%); LD n=4 (19%) and WS n=15 (60%). 
6.7.4 Presence of Intra-Institutional Behaviour Relevant to Tilt Final Risk 
Judgements. Time Two 
A higher proportion of the total population was identified as high risk during 
the second time period of investigation, compared to the first six-month period. 
Comparisons between patients deemed high risk and those with the absence of this 
status for each of the Tilt categories, and subsequent display of associated behaviours 
are displayed in Figure B1 (Appendix Four). One-hundred and twenty-seven (60%) 
of the two-hundred and fifteen patients analysed during this time manifested 
undesirable intra-institutional behaviour, seventy-two of whom were identified as 
high risk. Eighty-eight per cent of this group subsequently displayed relevant 
behaviours, compared with fifty-one per cent (n=55) of the patients not deemed high 
risk. Proportionately, eighty-five per cent of the sixty two individuals identified as 
high risk of immediate harm to others subsequently displayed relevant behaviours, 
compared to forty-four per cent (n=68) of patients not identified as high risk. Eighty- 
six per cent (n=30) of patients identified as high risk of self-harm demonstrated 
relevant behaviours compared to ten per cent (n=18) of the remaining patients. 
Despite the identification of seven per cent (n=15) of patients as high risk of escape, 
there were no recorded incidents relevant to this behaviour. Twenty incidents related 
to vulnerability were recorded, fifteen of which were actualised by patients not 
identified as high risk of vulnerability of risk from others. Proportionately, eighteen 
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per cent (n=5) of patients identified as high risk demonstrated relevant behaviours, 
compared to eight per cent (n=15) of the remaining patients. Of the patients 
identified as high risk of action to subvert security and safety, just over a quarter 
(26%, n=11) displayed subversive behaviour, compared to eleven per cent of patients 
not identified as high risk (n=18). 
6.7.5 Summary of the Prevalence and Presence of Intra-Institutional 
Behaviour Relevant to Tilt Final Risk Judgements. Differences between the 
Two Time Periods of Investigation. 
Overall, patients deemed high risk of behaviours as defined by the Tilt 
categories subsequently displayed relevant behaviours. The majority of patients 
judged to present a high risk in any one of the five Tilt categories were observed to 
display corresponding intra-institutional behaviour (Ti 82%, T2 88%). However, the 
same corresponding behaviours were also found to be present in a proportion of 
individuals not deemed to be high risk (Ti 42%, T2 41%). A similar trend was 
present in the investigation of the prevalence of violence. The majority of patients 
identified as immediate risk of harming others did go onto display violence (Ti 92%, 
T2 85%), indicating the appropriate identification of high risk individuals. However, 
a proportion of individuals deemed not to be high risk of violent behaviour displayed 
such behaviour (Ti 40%, T2 44%). The identification of high risk individuals in 
relation to any intra-institutional violence may therefore be seen as accurate, 
however not all individuals were identified at both time periods. During the first 
time period, just over two-thirds (67%) of patients indentified as high risk of suicide 
or self-harm displayed corresponding behaviour. A higher proportion (86%) 
engaged in associated behaviours in the second time period. There were fewer cases 
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of intra-institutional infraction amongst individuals not identified as high risk for the 
two periods of study (Ti 14%, T2 10%). 
The presence of relevant behaviours in relation to vulnerability, escape and 
subversion was proportionately higher for patients identified as high risk. Twenty- 
nine per cent (Ti) and eighteen per cent (T2) of those identified as vulnerable to risk 
from others were subsequently recorded as having had a risk presented to them. 
Lower occurrences of this behaviour were observed amongst patients not identified 
as vulnerable (T1 7%, T2 8%). Thirteen per cent of individuals identified as high 
risk of escape displayed behaviours of concern during the first period, and no 
incidents were observed during the second time period. Just over a quarter of 
patients indentified as high risk of organised action in collaboration with others to 
subvert security and safety showed evidence of associated behaviours in the months 
following the judgement. Fewer patients not defined as high risk of subversion 
subsequently manifested this intra-institutional infraction (Ti 5%, T2 11%). 
As reported in the previous chapter, variability between the identification of 
risk was apparent between categories of intra-institutional behaviour. In relation to 
the first experimental question and hypothesis, the current investigation has shown 
that there were proportionate differences in the presence of intra-institutional 
infraction for patients identified as high risk compared to patients not defined as high 
risk within each category. The most robust differentiations between patient risk 
status were prevalent for the Tilt categories of immediate risk of harming others and 
risk of suicide or self-harm. Categories relevant to risk of vulnerability, escape or 
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subversion did not show as convincing proportionate differences between the 
presence and absence of behaviour. 
Differences between the two time periods, pre and post implementation were 
therefore observed. During the second period of investigation, a greater proportion 
of individuals identified as high risk in any one of the five Tilt categories 
subsequently displayed corresponding behaviours, compared to the pre- 
implementation period. The same trend was found for patients identified as 
immediate risk of suicide or self-harm. It was anticipated that once behaviours had 
been identified as a risk, the associated risk management plan would constitute an 
intervention that would minimise or ameliorate the manifestation of that behaviour. 
This interpretation may not be seen as applicable any intra-institutional infraction, or 
suicide or self-harm. However, patients identified as high risk of immediate harm to 
others, vulnerability to risk from others, and escape, displayed lower incidents of 
corresponding behaviours during the second time period following the formal 
implementation of the system. 
6.7.6 Time to First Incident of Intra-Institutional Behaviour Relevant to Tilt 
Final Risk Judgements 
6.7.6.1 Any Intra-Institutional Behaviour 
Survival analyses comparing presence versus absence of high risk patient 
status groups on the number of months from assessment to the first incident of any 
intra-institutional behaviour were highly significant. Analyses indicated that the 
survival plots (the proportion of patients who had not displayed any intra- 
institutional behaviour at given points in time) of the two groups were different from 
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one another (Log Rank Ti (n=153) = 58.4, p=0.000; T2 (n=215) = 77.2, p=0.000). 
These values may be understood as representing that during the first time period. 
High risk patients were 58.4 times more likely to display any intra-institutional 
infraction sooner than their counterparts, and 77.2 times more likely during the 
second period of investigation (see Figures 6.1 and 6.2). 
Sixty percent of all patients identified as high risk of any Tilt category of risk 
who displayed relevant behaviours had a first recorded incident within the first two 
months (month one 34% (n=17); month two 26% (n=13)). In comparison, four 
percent of those not identified as high risk showed similar behaviours (month one, 
1% (n=1); month two, 3% (n=3). Of the remaining forty percent of the high risk 
group, the following times to event were observed: Month three, 14% (n=7); month 
four, 3% (n=6); month five, 0% (n=0); month six, 2% (n=1). The remaining eighteen 
percent (n=9) did not manifest the behaviours for which they were identified as high 
risk. The time to event of relevant behaviours was longer for patients not identified 
as high risk, with the majority of incidents occurring in the fifth and fourth month 
respectively (month five, 19%, (n=20); month four, 15% (n=15). Three individuals 
(3%) displayed behaviour during the sixth month under investigation, and one 
individual (1%) during the third month. The remaining proportion did not manifest 
intra-institutional behaviours. 
Forty-three percent (n=35) of the high risk group had displayed relevant 
behaviours during the first two months of the second time period under investigation 
(month seven, 17%, (n=14); month eight, 26%, (n=21)). Fewer incidents were 
recorded during the last four months of investigation (month nine, 11% (n=9); month 
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ten, 12% (n=12); month 11,13% (n=11), and month twelve, 9% (n=7)). This trend 
showed that compared to the first time period of investigation, time to event was 
longer during the second phase of the investigation. 
Similar trends to the first period of investigation were observed within the 
group of patients not identified as high risk, where fewer incidents of behaviour were 
reported during the first three months (month seven, 1.5% (n=2); month eight, 1.5% 
(n=2); month nine, 4% (n=6)). The majority of incidents therefore occurred later 
than the high risk group (month ten, 9% (n=12; month 11,14% (n=18); month 
twelve, 15% (n=11). 
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Figure 6.1 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for Any Intra-Institutional Infraction 
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1 High risk patients were 58.4 times more likely to display any intra-institutional infraction 
sooner than patients not identified as high risk 
2 High risk patients were 77.2 times more likely to display any intra-institutional infraction 
sooner than patients not identified as high risk 
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Time Period to First Recorded Display of Any Intra- 
institutional Behaviour (Months 1-6) 
Time Period to First Recorded Display of Intra-Institutional 
Behaviour Relevant to Any Violence (Months 1-6) 
6.7.6.2 Immediate Risk of Harming Others (Violence) 
The survival analysis for the risk of immediate harm to others (violence) 
showed that there was a difference in the length of time to relevant incidents between 
groups (Log Rank: Ti (n=145) = 88.8, p=0.000; T2 (n=215) = 57.6, p=0.000). 
The survival plots for the two time periods comparing patients identified as high risk 
with patients not deemed high risk show that the time to first incident was shorter for 
high risk patients (Figures 6.3 and 6.4). During the first period of investigation, 
fifty-one percent (n=19) of high risk patients had displayed violent behaviour. A 
lower incidence was observed during the first month of the second period of 
investigation (42%, n=26). The majority of patients within this group who did not 
have violent behaviour recorded at this time subsequently displayed related 
behaviours during the second month period of investigation (Ti, 22% (n=8); T2, 
26% (n=17)). A significant majority of patients identified as high risk who 
subsequently displayed violence therefore did so within close proximity to the 
judgement of high risk. 
Conversely, the comparison group (individuals not judged to be high risk of 
immediate harm to others) who did present relevant behaviours did so later into the 
investigation. The majority of events during the first time period were recorded 
during the forth (15%, n=16) and fifth (18%, n=20) months. During the second time 
period, the majority of events were observed during the eleventh month (24%, n=6). 
This is indicative that although these patients were judged not to be high risk, but 
subsequently displayed violent behaviour, they did so later than their high risk 
counterparts. 
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Figure 6.3 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for Intra-Institutional Violence (Harm to 
Others) during 13 
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Figure 6.4 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for Intra-Institutional Violence (Harm to 
Others) during T24 
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3 High risk patients were 88.8 times more likely to display harm to others (violence) sooner 
than patients not identified as high risk 
° High risk patients were 57.6 times more likely to display harm to others (violence) sooner 
than patients not identified as high risk 
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Time Period to First Recorded Display of Intra-Institutional 
Behaviour Relevant to Any Violence (Months 1-6) 
Time Period to First Recorded Display of Infra-Institutional 
Behaviour Relevant to Any Violence (Months 7-12) 
6.7.6.3 Risk of Suicide or Self-Harm 
Patients identified as high risk of harm to self differed significantly in the 
time to the first event (of self-harming behaviour) compared to patients not identified 
as high risk (Log Rank: Ti (n=145) = 51.1, p=0.000; T2 (n=214) = 71.3, p=0.000). 
The survival plots display the differences between groups (Figures 6.5 and 6.6). 
During the first time period, a third (33%, n=9) of the high risk group had displayed 
relevant behaviours within the first month, compared with one-and-a-half percent 
(n=2) of the low risk group. Similar results were found during the first month of the 
second time period where thirty-seven percent (n=13) of the high risk group had a 
recorded incident related to self-harm, compared to only half a per cent (n=1) of the 
individuals not deemed high risk. 
Differences between the two time periods for subsequent months were 
observed. The high risk group during the first time period did not display much 
variation in the time to event. That is, there was an even spread of behaviour during 
months two, three and five (month two, 7%, (n=2); month three, 7% (n=2); month 
five, 7% (n=2). There was an increase in behaviour at month four, where 13% (n=3) 
displayed self-harming behaviour. Self-harming behaviour amongst high risk 
individuals during the recorded time period was less evenly distributed, with the 
majority of incidents (after the first month reported above) occurring in the second 
and third month (month eight, 11 % (n=4); month nine, 26% (n=9). 
A longer duration of time to incident of self-harming behaviour was observed 
amongst patients not identified as high risk. An even distribution was recorded 
during the first time period (month one, 1.5% (n=2); month two, 3% (n=3); month 
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three, 1.5% (n=2); month four, 1.5% (n=2); month five, 3.5% (n==5); month six, 3% 
(n=3). Within the second time period of investigation, even fewer incidents were 
observed during the first five months of investigation (month seven, 0.5% (n=1); 
month eight, 1% (n=2); month nine, 0% (n=0); month ten, 29%, (n=4); month 
eleven, 0.5% (n=1), with six percent (n=10) occurring in the final month. 
Compared to the high risk group, the presence of incidents was therefore 
lower in the group not identified as high risk of suicide or self-harm, and the time to 
event for those manifesting corresponding behaviours was longer. The two groups 
therefore differed in the number of months from assessment to the occurrence of self- 
harming behaviour for the two time periods investigated. 
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Figure 6.5 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for Intra-Institutional Suicide or Self- 
Harm during TI5 
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Figure 6.6 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for Intra-Institutional Suicide or Self- 
Harm during T26 
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5 High risk patients were 51.1 times more likely to display self-harming behaviour sooner 
than patients not identified as high risk 
6 High risk patients were 71.3 times more likely to display self-harming behaviour sooner 
than patients not identified as high risk 
283 
Time Period to First Recorded Display of Intra-InsthuNonal 
Behaviour Relevant to Self-Harm (Uonths 7-12) 
6.7.6.4 Risk of Escape 
Statistically significant differences between patients identified as high risk 
and patients not deemed high risk were observed during the first period of 
investigation (Log Rank: Ti (n=145) = 8.6, p= <0.05). During the first six-month 
period of investigation, only two incidents related to escape were recorded (see 
Chapter Five). There were no recorded incidents during the second period of 
investigation, and so analyses could be performed. 
Due to the infrequency of behaviour, it was not possible to represent values in 
a survival plot. There were only two recorded incidences related to escape during the 
twelve month investigation, both of which occurred in the first six months. Two 
individuals displayed relevant behaviours, one of whom was deemed high risk, and 
one of whom was not. The high risk patient displayed relevant behaviour three 
months after assessment, and the other individual manifested behaviour during the 
fifth month. The two individuals of opposing risk status therefore differed in the 
number of months from assessment to the occurrence of the incident. However, due 
to the infrequency of incidents related to escape, results are not generalisable. 
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6.7.6.5 Vulnerability to Risk from Others 
Patients judged to be high risk of vulnerability to risk from others differed 
significantly from patients not judged to present as high risk in terms of time to 
incident of corresponding behaviour. Highly significant differences were observed 
during the first time period (Log Rank (n=153) = 10.5, p= 0.001). However, 
significant differences were not shown during the second time period (n=214) = 3.6, 
p=0.005 (p>0.05). The survival plots for the two time periods of investigation show 
the differences between the two groups in terms of the number of days from 
assessment to occurrence of victimisation (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). The time to the first 
relevant incident within the high risk group was sooner than the comparison group. 
During the first period of investigation, incidents within the high risk group occurred 
during the first three months (month one, 7% (n=1); month two, 7% (n=1); month 
three, 14% (n=2). No further incidents were recorded for the remaining months. A 
similar trend was observed during the second time period. Although there were no 
recorded incidents in the first month, incidents occurred in the second and forth 
month (month eight, 14% (n=4), month ten, 4% (n=1)). 
Patients not identified as high risk, but who displayed behaviour relevant to 
vulnerability did so later (when compared to patients identified as high risk). During 
the first period of investigation, there were no recorded incidents during the first two 
months, and behaviours were recorded in latter months (month three, 1% (n=1); 
month four 4% (n=6); month five, 2% (n=2). The largest number of incidents during 
the second period of investigation within the same risk status group was the fifth 
month (month ten) where five percent (n=10) of this group had recorded incidents. 
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Figure 6.7 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for Intra-Institutional Vulnerability 
(Victimisation) during T17 
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Figure 6.8 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for lntra-Institutional Vulnerability 
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286 
Time Period to First Recorded Display of Intra-Institutional 
Behaviour Relevant to Vulnerability (Months 1-6) 
6.7.6.6 Risk of Organised Action in Collaboration with Others to Subvert 
Security 
Highly statistically significant differences were found comparing high versus 
not high risk groups on the number of months from assessment to the first incident of 
subversive behaviour. The survival plots of the two groups for each time period 
represent the differences between groups (Log Rank Ti (n=153) = 14.8, p=0.000; 
T2 (n=214) = 9.1, p<0.01) (Figures 6.9 and 6.10). The time to the first incident of 
subversive behaviour was less amongst individuals identified as high risk. During 
the first time period, all incidents displayed by high risk individuals had occurred 
during the first three months (month one, 7% (n=2); month two, 12% (n=7); month 
three, 7% (n=2)). The majority of high risk individuals within the second time 
period who displayed subversive behaviour did so within the first three months 
(month seven, 7% (n=3); month eight, 10% (n=4); month nine, 5% (n=2)). 
During the first period of investigation, behaviours relevant to subversion 
were displayed by twenty-two per cent of the group identified as not presenting high 
risk; eight percent of whom did so during the first and third month (month one, 4% 
(n=1), month three, 4% (n=1)). The remaining fourteen per cent had an incident of 
subversive behaviour recorded during the last two months (month five, 7% (n=2); 
month six, 7%, (n=2)). During the second period of investigation, the highest 
prevalence of subversive behaviour was observed during the forth month (month ten, 
5% (n=8)), with the outstanding proportion of incidents spread evenly between the 
remaining months (month eight, 0.5% (n=1); month nine, 1.5% (n=2); month eleven, 
2% (n=4) and month twelve, 2% (n=3)). No incidents were observed within the 
group not judged to be high risk during the first month of the second time period. 
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Figure 6.9 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for Intra-Institutional Subversion of 
Security during TI9 
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Figure 6.10 Kaplin-Meier Survival Plot for Intra-Institutional Subversion of 
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9 High risk patients were 14.8 times more likely to display risk of subversive behaviour 
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10 High risk patients were 9.1 times more likely to display risk of subversive behaviour sooner 
than patients not identified as high risk 
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6.7.6.7 Summary of the Time to First Incident of Intra-Institutional Behaviour 
Relevant to Tilt Final Risk Judgements 
It was hypothesised that a patient identified as high risk of intra-institutional 
behaviour as defined by Tilt categories would display relevant behaviours later than 
one not deemed such a risk. Survival analyses comparing patients identified as high 
risk versus patients not identified as high risk showed a differential probability of 
intra-institutional infraction over two specified time periods. Overall, the majority of 
patients judged to present a high risk in any one of the five Tilt categories had an 
incident recorded within the months most proximal to the assessment. Conversely, 
patients not identified as high risk, but who where subsequently involved in an 
incident displayed relevant behaviours as a time later following the assessment. The 
time to an event for patients not identified as high risk was therefore longer. 
Differences of the time to event between two time periods of investigation 
were observed. During the first period of investigation, higher proportions of high 
risk patients had a reported incident of an any intra-institutional infraction during the 
first three months following assessment, compared to the second time period (Ti 
sum of month one to three = 74% (n=37); T2 sum of month seven to nine = 54% 
(n=44))). Time to the first incident was therefore longer during the second period of 
investigation. A possible interpretation of this result may be that at the time of the 
second period of investigation, time had elapsed to allow for the implementation of 
risk management plans (associated with the judgement of high risk). Behaviours for 
this group may therefore have been managed and occurred later than if there was no 
implementation of a risk management plan. 
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Similar trends were observed in the analyses of behaviour related to violence 
where eighty-one percent (n=30) of incidents occurred during the first three months 
of the first period of investigation, compared to seventy-five percent (n=47) during 
the second period. The majority of individuals displaying violent behaviour within 
the group not identified as presenting such a risk did so during the latter three 
months. 
The time to manifestation of self-harming behaviour was sooner within the 
high risk group during both time periods of investigation. However, the trends 
observed in terms of time to the first incident of any behaviour relevant to Tilt 
factors, or violence, were not prevalent for behaviour related to self-harm. During 
the first period of investigation, forty-seven percent of patients identified as high risk 
had an incident of self-harming behaviour recorded within the first three months, 
compared to seventy-four percent during the second period of investigation (months 
seven to nine). The prevalence of self-harming behaviour increased during the 
second phase of investigation as eighty-six percent of individuals identified as high 
risk displayed corresponding behaviours, compared to sixty-seven percent in the first 
phase. The findings indicate that identified behaviours were not effectively managed 
and therefore prevented, particularly during the second time period of investigation. 
No significant trends were observed for behaviour related to escape due to the 
absence of reported incidents (discussed above and in Chapter Five). The time to the 
first incident of vulnerability and subversion were present earlier within groups of 
patients identified as high risk. During the first period of investigation, all patients 
judged to pose a risk of vulnerability from others, who were subsequently involved 
290 
in recorded incidents, experienced associated behaviours within the first three 
months. The proportion of incidents was also concentrated within the earlier months 
following assessment during the second period of investigation. Similarly, all 
patients deemed to high risk of organised action in collaboration with others were 
more likely to display subversive behaviour proximal to the time of assessment. All 
patients within this category of risk displaying relevant behaviours did so within the 
first three months during the first period of investigation, as did seventy-seven 
percent of individuals at the second time period. Patients not judged to be high risk, 
but who had recorded incidents related to vulnerability and subversion were observed 
to show related behaviours in the latter months of each time period investigated. The 
results corresponding to behaviour relevant to vulnerable and subversive behaviour 
therefore reflect the behavioural trends observed and reported for `any' of the five 
Tilt categories and violence. 
Analyses therefore indicated that patients defined as high risk of any, violent, 
vulnerable and subversive behaviour, who were subsequently recorded as 
manifesting related behaviours conducted actions sooner than patients not judged to 
be high risk. 
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6.8 Discussion 
It was anticipated that use of the SCJ: Risk documentation would assist 
clinical teams identify risk factors pertinent to individual patients, and that once 
identified, management strategies could be implemented. It was therefore 
anticipated that the identification of a patient as high risk, and the construction and 
implementation of a risk management plan would minimise the occurrence of the 
associated behaviour, and where behaviours did occur, there would be a longer time 
to the first recorded incident. 
The results show that the occurrence of intra-institutional incidents was 
more prevalent amongst patients identified as high risk. These incidents were 
recorded sooner than a comparison group of patients not deemed high risk. These 
findings are indicative that the SCJ: Risk system effectively facilitates clinical teams 
identify high risk individuals for behaviours relevant to any intra-institutional 
infraction, violence and self-harm. However, these findings do not indicate that 
associated risk management plans for each identified risk were; (i) consistently 
constructed (using a standardised framework) nor (ii) effectively implemented. 
Based on the findings, the three concepts of identification, construction and 
implementation appear to be critical to understanding risk prevention. To lower the 
probability of the identified risk from manifesting, the patient must; (i) correctly be 
identified as high risk; (ii) have a carefully constructed risk management plan and 
(iii) have the plan successfully implemented. Figure 6.11 gives examples illustrating 
this assertion (described below): 
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Figure 6.11 Interactions between the Identification, Construction and 
Implementation of Risk Management Plans to Explain the Occurrence and 
Time to First Incident of Intra-Institutional Infraction 
Patient Intervention required? Effect on behaviour 
identified as: 
I 
Not presenting 
as HIGH risk 
2 
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as HIGH risk 
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No 
intervention required 
No risk management plan 
required 
Routine care plan implemented 
No 
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Routine care plan implemented 
Intervention required 
CONSTRUCTION 
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IMPLEMENTATION 
(ii) Plan not successfully 
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(ii) Plan successfully 
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Incident recorded 
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(a) Proximal time to 
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OCCURRENCE 
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TIME TO EVENT 
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Example 1 is illustrative of an individual not identified as high risk, who 
correspondingly did not manifest the relevant behaviour. The construction and 
implementation of an additional risk management plan within SCJ: Risk 
documentation was therefore not necessary, and behaviour could be managed within 
the guidelines of routine clinical practice. The second example illustrates an 
individual who was not identified as high risk, therefore for whom no risk 
management strategy was constructed or implemented, who during the investigation, 
manifest associated behaviours. This may be interpreted as a prediction error (false 
negative, see Chapter Five). However, caution against this assertion may be 
warranted, as the findings indicate that the time to event for the majority of intra- 
institutional infractions was lower for patients not identified as high risk. Indeed, the 
same outcome may be interpreted as a true positive, as due to the latency of the time 
to first incident, these patients did not present an immediate risk. 
The third and forth examples illustrate possible behavioural outcomes for 
patients identified as high risk. Example three presents a scenario where the high 
risk individual subsequently displays the relevant behaviour, despite the 
identification of a need for additional management strategies being present. This 
outcome may be interpreted as supportive of the predictive utility of the system, but 
rejecting of the assertion of the preventative utility of the SCJ: Risk. Two 
explanations are considered. Firstly, the management plan associated with the 
identified risk may have been poorly constructed. Secondly, the documented risk 
management plan may not have been effectively implemented within clinical 
practice. 
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It is problematic to assert a conclusive statement as to the efficacy of the SCJ: 
Risk system in terms of preventing the probability of indentified behaviours 
occurring. If the interpretation of prevention is equated to the extinction (or absence) 
of identified behaviours, the system may be deemed to lack preventative utility. 
However, if the interpretation of prevention was defined as lengthening the time to 
the first incident, the system may be seen to yield preventative utility. This may be a 
relevant interpretation of findings related to the present investigation, as differences 
between the two time periods were observed (with the exception of incidents related 
to self-harn (at both time periods) and vulnerability (during the second time period). 
The final example represents an individual judged to be high risk, but who 
did not subsequently manifest associated incidents. This could be interpreted as the 
application of the system resulting in a prediction error (false positive, see Chapter 
Five), or conversely, a behavioural management success. Correspondingly, this 
outcome may be interpreted as supportive of the preventative utility of the SCJ: Risk, 
but rejecting of the predictive utility of the system. Patients displaying this 
behavioural outcome (absence of any incident) may have had a well-constructed 
management plan that was successfully implemented by members of the clinical 
team. The present investigation did not include consideration of the prevalence of 
intra-institutional incidents prior to the assessment of patient risk using the SCJ: 
Risk. Future studies may include consideration of incidents for a time period prior to 
assessment of risk. In this way, comparisons may be drawn between the presence of 
behaviour prior to the construction and implementation of a risk management plan. 
If associated behaviours were present in the months preceding the assessment, but 
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absent (or occurring later) in the months following the assessment, and effect may be 
said to be observed. 
An interaction between the correct identification of high risk patients and 
construction and implementation of risk management strategies may therefore be 
said to impact on the subsequent occurrence and time to first incident. No 
standardised framework for the construction of a risk management plan exists within 
the SCJ: Risk system, and the present study did not include an investigation of the 
quality of documented strategies aimed to reduce the presence of the predicted 
behaviour. The Risk Management Planning portion of the SCJ: Risk document 
(Appendix 1.1) details three headings with text boxes to document decisions. These 
sections correspond to: (i) An outline of management of current risk; (ii) monitoring 
(evidence of effective risk management) and (iii) monitoring contingency plan (if 
risk management is not effective). No further explanation or guidance is offered 
within the documentation as to what evidence should be recorded, that is, no 
standardised framework exists. As a result the amount of information recorded is 
dependent upon the judgement of clinical team members, and plans may vary in 
terms of rich, detailed plans, or poor plans of only a couple of sentences that fail to 
capture the complexities of each identified risk. 
Future investigations may include comparisons between the quality of risk 
management plans and the manifestation of subsequent behaviours within patients 
identified as high risk. Factors indicative of a comprehensive plan in terms of the 
first criteria specified within the SCJ: Risk's management plan "outline of a 
management plan of current risk", may, include the following: (i) A detailed 
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description of the likely scenario of future risk likely to be presented in the absence 
of a risk management plan (specifying the conditions and destabilisers that would be 
present to increase the manifestation of behaviour); (ii) an outline of goals in terms 
of targeted behaviours (for example, team members in terms of responsibilities to 
achieve the management of risk, clearly defined by professional grade); (iii) 
specification of appropriate interventions (for example attendance of an offending 
behaviour programme or individual intervention designed to reduce the associated 
behaviour). Comprehensive planning of issues relevant to "monitoring (evidence of 
effective risk management)", may be evaluated in terms of whether clinical teams 
specified how evidence of positive behavioural changes will be recognised. 
Detailed risk management strategies in terms of "monitoring contingency plan (if 
risk management is not effective)", may include evidence of documentation relating 
to how clinical team members would recognise and demonstrate no improvement or 
deterioration of a target risk behaviour (for example by listing behaviours that would 
be indicative of deterioration). Identification of deterioration may therefore flag the 
need for clinical teams to reassess the risk management strategy for that individual. 
Examination of the construction of the risk management plan may therefore 
improve the quality of documentation, and would aid understanding between clinical 
team members. Logic infers that a comprehensive risk management plan (specifying 
the suggested factors above) would increase the probability that the plan would be 
effectively translated into clinical practice, with the result of reducing the occurrence 
of targeted behaviour, or lengthening the time to event. Once an acceptable 
minimum standard of documentation of risk management plans has been established, 
it would then be possible to ascertain if strategies were effectively implemented. 
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It is apparent that successful risk management is entirely dependent upon 
accurate risk assessments. A critical understanding of the interaction between 
individual and situational risk factors allows an informed judgement as to the 
potential (or likelihood and imminence) of an individual to manifest targeted 
behaviours. This judgement subsequently informs an intervention, or management 
strategy to prevent the behaviour from arising again in the future (Risk Management 
Authority, 2007). Clear justification of risk decisions made by the clinical team may 
be demonstrated by construction of a clear clinical formulation of risk. 
Formulation demands the consideration of a number of relevant risk 
(destabilising) and protective factors. The process of formulation requires clinicians 
to consider the dynamic interplay of the individual's history (background), current 
situation (for example psychological vulnerabilities, and cognitive capacities) and the 
resources (internal and external) that may facilitate coping strategies, as well as 
consideration of motivation to engage in a therapeutic alliance to promote change. 
Factors or events that may trigger behaviours, or cognitive distortions contributing to 
the manifestation of incidents of behaviour are also evaluated during the process of 
formulation (Logan, 2008). 
A causal link (or working hypothesis) to explain the manifestation and 
maintenance of behaviours may therefore be constructed. An evaluation of 
protective factors (that have the potential to counterbalance risk) are also considered. 
The working hypothesis may be seen as an attempt to link the identified risk factors 
with the management plan to target factors (via treatment, monitoring and 
supervision) to prevent the manifestation of behaviour. 
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Current thinking within the risk assessment and management field promotes 
the inclusion of formulation to the goal of preventing the occurrence, frequency and 
severity of intra-institutional behaviour and general recidivism (Logan (2007), 
Webster (2008), Douglas (2008), Hart (2009) and Douglas (2009)). SCJ: Risk 
documentation does not explicitly outline a process of formulation, and it is unlikely 
that all professional disciplines within the multidisciplinary team would be familiar 
with the approach. To reflect best practice, it would be beneficial to include 
guidelines within future versions of the SCJ: Risk illustrating how to construct a 
clinical formulation with the goal of preventing intra-institutional incidents to the 
benefit of the patient, staff and society. 
6.9 Chapter Summary 
Contemporary literature reflects thinking that there should be a move toward 
a prevention-based paradigm of risk management, and that an integrated model of 
risk assessment and management/treatment procedures, such as the SCJ: Risk will 
inform strategies for the prevention of undesired behaviours. 
The identification of risk factors by means of application of valid and reliable 
structured professional guidelines have been recognised as essential to the 
subsequent management of risk (see Chapter Five). The Tilt high risk summary 
judgements of the SCJ: Risk facilitated decision-making and documentation of a 
statement as to the probability of high risk behaviour manifesting. Mulvey and Lidz 
(1995: cited in Douglas and Kropp, 2002) characterised such statements as 
"... concerns rather than fixed probability statements". Within the context of the 
present investigation, the manifestation of predicted behaviour was not a certainty. 
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The judgement of high risk status may therefore have prevented behaviour as a result 
of the implementation of management strategies. In this way, the identification of 
high risk patients may have served to reduce prediction estimates. 
An empirical investigation was conducted to ascertain the preventative utility 
of the system of Structured Clinical Judgement: Risk. Survival analyses showed that 
patients identified as high risk of intra-institutional behaviours according to defined 
Tilt categories were more likely than their counterparts (not deemed as high risk) to 
manifest relevant behaviour. Patients judged to be high risk were also shown to 
display intra-institutional infractions earlier than patients not deemed high risk. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions and Suggestions for 
Future Research 
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7.1 Summary of Investigations and Suggestions for Future 
Research 
The investigations reported in this thesis have presented, for the first time, 
how an adaptation of an existing validated system of structured professional 
judgement was implemented to meet the security requirements of a high-secure 
forensic hospital. Prior to the implementation of the SCJ: Risk system, there was an 
absence of a standardised framework for the discussion, documentation and 
communication of risk between various disciplines comprising multidisciplinary 
teams. The implementation of the system has therefore addressed these needs within 
the setting for which it was designed. 
This thesis has examined the application and validation of a system of 
structured professional judgement within clinical practice. A series of investigations 
examined the clinical, predictive and preventative utility of the system. The research 
presented has contributed to the empirical evidence-base of risk assessments by 
validation of a novel risk assessment system designed to meet the security 
requirements of a high secure forensic hospital. In this way, the empirical 
investigations reported aimed to provide a union between research evidence and 
clinical practice. 
The HCR-20 was originally developed as a scheme for assessing risk of 
violence. The system was informed by empirical literature, and the succinct 
operationally defined coding system facilitated clarity of decision-making. Another 
advantage of the instrument was its practical use, particularly due to its brevity and 
structure, allowing a vast range of evidence to be recorded within twenty items 
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relevant to past, present and future behaviour. Conversely, the SCJ: Risk was 
developed to fulfil the requirements of a security review as a scheme for assessing; 
(i) the risk of violence (immediate risk of harming others); (ii) the risk of suicide or 
self-harm; (iii) vulnerability to risk from others; (iv) the risk of escape; and (v) the 
risk of organised action in collaboration with others to subvert security and safety. A 
significant strength of the system was that the HCR-20 was chosen as the `backbone' 
on which the additional risk factors were added. By utilising a similar framework, 
risk factors were operationalised in a way that would replicate the system on which it 
was based. The identification of risk behaviours in addition to violence resulted in 
the SCJ: Risk comprising a further ten static, and twenty dynamic items. In addition, 
the system necessitated a final risk judgement for each of the Tilt areas, and 
construction of risk management plans to be made. Each of the sections 
supplementary to the HCR-20 demanded additional resources of time and 
consideration from each clinical team member. The introduction of the system 
therefore reduced the brevity of the original documentation, and introduced the need 
to source further clinical information to evidence the additional risk factors. In 
comparison to the HCR-20, the construction of the risk factors within the SCJ: Risk 
was not reliably informed by a wealth of referenced empirical literature, but rather by 
the knowledge and experience of senior clinicians within one forensic institution. 
It was therefore necessary to investigate the use of the system within clinical 
practice, and evaluate if the SCJ: Risk (as an adaptation of the HCR-20) achieved the 
objective of assisting clinical teams make and document risk-related decisions, to 
fulfil the security objectives defined by the Tilt review. To achieve this goal, it was 
critical to establish the processes necessary to successfully implement a system of 
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structured professional judgement, and investigate if the system was used by clinical 
teams as part of ongoing clinical practice (Chapter Three). It was identified that a 
suitable indicator of successful implementation would be demonstration of 
compliance in use. Overall, compliance in use of the system in clinical practice was 
shown to be present. The first investigation therefore demonstrated that the SCJ: 
Risk, as a structured professional guideline, was successfully implemented within a 
forensic psychiatric setting. 
Interpretation and discussion of the findings highlighted that compliance may 
not necessarily be indicative of clinical team members acceptance of the system. 
Two interpretations for the successful implementation were proposed. Firstly, that an 
implementation deadline ensured that documentation was completed (and so the 
imposition of an operational directive ensured excellent compliance rates). The 
second interpretation proposed that, the system was beneficial to assisting clinical 
teams identify and manage high risk patients, and so was used within clinical 
practice (demonstrated by compliance of use). Compliance of use was therefore not 
a clear indicator of the acceptance of the system. Nonetheless, the investigation has 
merit in that the processes necessary to achieving the objective of use of the system 
within clinical practice were identified, and recommendations for future 
investigations to ensure continued fidelity of use of the system were presented. An 
important outcome of the present investigation was that the SCJ: Risk system has 
formed a significant component of the comprehensive extended assessment of all 
patients within all Directorates of a high-secure forensic hospital since December 
2006. 
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Understanding the processes necessary to ensure compliance of use of the 
system of structured professional judgement within clinical practice was therefore 
critical to the subsequent academic evaluation of the utility of the SCJ: Risk system 
in addressing the security needs of a high secure forensic setting. The investigation 
presented in Chapter Four aimed to examine clinical team members use and 
perception of the SCJ: Risk. Two central questions were posed. Firstly, was the 
SCJ: Risk perceived as usable within clinical practice? Secondly, was the SCJ: Risk 
perceived as useful to clinical practice? The perceived usability and utility of the 
SCJ: Risk was ascertained by means of surveying clinical team members on a range 
of questions related to use of the system in clinical practice. Due to the increase in 
operational demands, it was anticipated that, despite the use of the system 
(demonstrated by excellent compliance rates), the introduction of the system may 
have been met with opposition. However, findings showed that the system was 
perceived as efficient and effective, and that user satisfaction was high. The practical 
use of the system overall was also reflected by respondent's positive ratings 
following the pilot and implementation phases. 
The investigation confirmed that implementation of the system significantly 
impacted on existing clinical resources. 
, 
However, the SCJ: Risk system was 
perceived to be beneficial in providing a framework for clinical team discussions 
relevant to risk, in providing an aid to communication of patient information between 
multidisciplinary team members, and ensuring the representation of the views of 
each professional grade. In this way, it was the perception of clinical team members 
that the SCJ: Risk system was useful and usable overall to the task of the risk 
assessment and management of patients according to the security needs of a high 
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secure forensic setting. Findings from the present investigation will assist in the 
maintenance and improvement of the perceived clinical usability and utility of the 
system within future clinical practice. 
An important finding of the study of the utility and usability of the system 
was that clinical team members perceived the HCR-20 (Historical, Clinical, Risk) 
total subscales to have greater relevance overall than the additional subscale of the 
SCJ: Risk (Suicide, Vulnerability, Escape). This finding was seen to have a 
potentially critical impact on clinical service implications. It was suggested that the 
completion of SCJ: Risk documentation demanded greater time resources than the 
HCR-20, and that if the additional items of the SCJ: Risk were perceived to have less 
relevance, their inclusion in the system of structured clinical judgement may be 
problematic. It was therefore necessary to establish in an empirical fashion, the 
actual relevance of the original items of the HCR-20, and the additional items of the 
SCJ: Risk in facilitating the accurate identification (prediction) and management 
(prevention) of possible problematic intra-institutional behaviours within a high 
secure forensic setting, as defined by the Tilt security review. 
The empirical investigation presented in Chapter Five therefore examined the 
utility of the SCJ: Risk in predicting intra-institutional behaviours relevant to the 
security needs of a high-secure hospital. The central research question posed was: 
Are SCJ: Risk subscales and individual risk factors that comprise subscales 
predictive of future intra-institutional behaviour? Base rates of intra-institutional 
incidents were established, and the occurrence of incidents relevant to violence and 
self-harm/suicide were frequent. Each of these behaviours had sufficient numbers of 
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recorded incidents from which the predictive accuracy of the SCJ: Risk could be 
ascertained. However, official reporting of incidents of behaviours relevant to the 
risk of escape, vulnerability or subversion were low. As the prevalence of these 
behaviours was low, prediction was problematic. The proportion of the sample that 
was identified (predicted) to manifest the corresponding behaviours of escape, 
vulnerability or subversion exceeded the proportion of the sample that actually 
presented the predicted behaviour. Margins of error were therefore apparent for 
individuals identified as at high risk from manifesting behaviours with a low base 
rate. 
Receiver Operating Characteristic Analyses indicated variability in the 
predictive accuracy of the subscales and individual items within subscales 
comprising the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk. The findings of the present investigation 
provide support for the existing empirical evidence base for the predictive ability of 
the Historical, Clinical, Risk and Total subscales of the HCR-20 in relation to 
violence. The predictive utility of SCJ: Risk subscales relevant to Vulnerability, 
Escape and Total Scores were also indicative of violence. This was an unexpected 
finding, as these subscales, and individual items comprising subscales were not 
originally designed to predict violent behaviour. Similarly, an unexpected finding 
was that subscales of the HCR-20 correctly identified behaviours for which it was 
not originally designed. The Risk and HCR-20 Total subscales were predictive of 
behaviour related to suicide/self-harm, and the Clinical scale was predictive of 
behaviour related to the subversion of security. Statistically robust relationships 
between SCJ: Risk subscale items and the corresponding behaviours of interest in 
relation to suicide/self were established. However, validity 
-may be said to be 
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indiscriminate, as the additional subscales of the Historical (H11-20), Vulnerability 
and Escape items were also predictors of suicide/self-harm (as were SCJ: Risk 
Totals). The Escape subscale and SCJ: Risk Totals were also found to be robust 
predictors of the subversion of security. 
The present investigation provides empirical support for the application of 
subscale items of the HCR-20 within a high-secure forensic hospital in relation to the 
prediction of violence. In addition, empirical support was also demonstrated for the 
application of the Suicide/Self-Harm subscale of the SCJ: Risk and the prediction of 
corresponding behaviour. However, due to the problems of base rates (above), the 
same relationship between subscale items and behaviours were not found for 
incidents related to vulnerability or escape. Significant differences were therefore 
found between the predictive utility of subscales of the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk and 
the presence of intra-institutional behaviour, and so the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The investigation also revealed variability in the predictive accuracy of 
individual risk items comprising the subscales of the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk. A 
greater number of Historical items from the HCR-20 were predictive of any violence 
when compared to the additional ten historical factors of the SCJ: Risk. Statistically 
significant relationships were established for individual risk factors of the SCJ: Risk 
designed to be indicative of self-harming/suicidal behaviour, showing the predictive 
utility of these items. However, robust relationships were not shown for the majority 
of the remaining factors of the SCJ: Risk in relation to escape, vulnerability or 
subversion (for the reasons described above). The investigation demonstrated that 
there were significant differences between the predictive utility of the individual risk 
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factors of the HCR-20 and SCJ: Risk and the presence of intra-institutional 
behaviour, and so, the null hypothesis was rejected. 
Findings indicate that the perceived relevance (Chapter Four) and predictive 
utility (Chapter Five) of the HCR-20, were more robust than those of the SCJ: Risk. 
The subscale items, and individual risk items comprising the subscales of the HCR- 
20 were perceived (by clinical team members) to have greater relevance, and were 
empirically established to have greater predictive utility, compared to the SCJ: Risk. 
These findings may be interpreted as indicative of the SCJ: Risk system lacking both 
relevance, and ability to correctly identify corresponding behaviours relevant to 
escape, vulnerability and subversion (compared to behaviours relevant to violence 
and self-harm). This interpretation has significant clinical service implications. The 
findings lead to the question: Do the additional items of the SCJ: Risk (in response 
to the requirements of the Tilt review) actually add anything to the original HCR-20 
risk assessment? Findings illustrate, that the predictive utility of the HCR-20 in 
predicting the intra-institutional behaviour for which it was designed (violence) was 
replicated within a high-secure service. However, the predictive utility of the SCJ: 
Risk in predicting the intra-institutional behaviour for the majority of incidents for 
which it was designed (to fulfil the security objectives defined by the Tilt review) in 
relation to escape, vulnerability and subversion was not demonstrated. 
However, these findings relevant to the predictive utility of the HCR-20 and 
SCJ: Risk systems have their limitations. Results and interpretations were based on 
the summation of actuarial scores (a practice discouraged within clinical practice). 
During a recent keynote speech, Douglas (2009), acknowledged that currently, 
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"... empirical evaluations of structured professional judgement approaches are rooted 
in a nomothetic research base" and asserted that there is a need for the `next 
generation' of (violence) risk assessment and management to accomplish: 
"... Operationalising, quantifying, and measuring the ideographic relevance of 
nomothetically-supported risk factors". For the purpose of academic evaluation, 
future studies may continue to adopt a nomothetic approach, whereby cohorts of 
individuals are studied, of which one individual may be seen as representing a 
specific population of interest (e. g. all individuals identified as high risk). This 
tendency to generalise will therefore continue to be useful to comparing populations 
and explaining the processes and outcomes of risk assessment and management 
within forensic settings at a group level. However, it will be necessary for future 
research to go beyond generalised understandings of behaviours for which norms 
have been established. A subjective, qualitative understanding of each individual, 
that distinguishes him or her apart from other individuals, must therefore be 
developed and integrated within the identification and management of risk. The task 
of the clinical team within future forensic practice, and the task of future empirical 
evaluations will therefore be to identify the subjective relevance of risk factors at an 
individual level. 
The findings of the study investigating the predictive utility of the system of 
structured professional judgement did not make a distinction between the scores of 
patients identified by clinical team members as high risk (versus patients not 
identified as high risk), and the subsequent manifestation of intra-institutional 
behaviour. One interpretation of the findings above was that the presence of risk 
factors culminated in the clinical decision to identify a patient as high risk for the 
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corresponding behaviour. The documentation and implementation of associated risk 
management plans may therefore be seen as instrumental to the reduction or 
amelioration of corresponding behaviours. 
This interpretation formed the basis for the final investigation, by means of 
study of the preventative utility of the system (Chapter Six). Two research questions 
were posed. The first question investigated: Do final Tilt summary judgements, and 
the identification of patients as high risk impact on the presence of related intra- 
institutional behaviour (as defined by any differences between the two time periods 
investigated)? It was anticipated that the identification of a patient as high risk, and 
the construction of risk management plans would minimise the presence of the 
predicted intra-institutional infraction. In this way, the identification and 
management of high risk individuals would reduce prediction estimates. However, 
findings indicated that the presence of specific behaviours of interest were more 
prevalent within the group of patients deemed high risk of behaviours relevant to any 
intra-institutional infraction, violence and self-harm. Significant differences between 
the occurrences of intra-institutional infraction between patients identified as high 
risk, compared to patients not identified as high risk within each Tilt category of risk 
were therefore found, so the null hypothesis was rejected. 
The second of the two research questions investigated: Do final Tilt summary 
judgements, and the identification of patients as high-risk impact on the time it takes 
for intra-institutional behaviour to occur (as defined by any differences between the 
two time periods investigated)? It was anticipated that the identification of high risk 
individuals would lengthen the time to the first recorded incident relevant to the Tilt 
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requirements. However, Kaplin-Mayer survival analyses showed the time to 
manifestation of intra-institutional behaviour for patients identified as high risk was 
shorter when compared to patients with the absence of this risk status. Significant 
differences between the time to the first incident of intra-institutional infraction 
between patients identified as high risk, compared to patients not deemed as high risk 
within each Tilt category of risk were observed, and so the null hypothesis was 
rejected. 
The latter study allowed the prospective examination of the relationship 
between the identification of risk status and behavioural presentation. Patients 
identified as high-risk were found to display a higher prevalence and earlier 
incidence of relevant intra-institutional behaviour. The presence of relevant intra- 
institutional behaviours over a twelve-month period following the implementation of 
the SCJ: Risk was measured. Future investigations may benefit from a longer 
follow-up period. A more prolonged duration of study may allow time for an 
individual to respond to risk management plans and associated interventions. 
Multiple time-point estimates would also allow any relationships between risk status 
and behaviour to be evaluated with a greater degree of detail than was adopted 
during the present investigation. The influence of dynamic risk factors and repeated 
involvement in intra-institutional behaviour could therefore be ascertained by 
adopting such a methodology. 
Overall, the findings suggest that the SCJ: Risk as a structured professional 
guideline can facilitate the identification of high risk offenders. The thesis 
acknowledged that the identification of dynamic risk state factors has the potential to 
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help reduce undesirable behaviours by application of corresponding targeted risk 
management strategies. However, the thesis did not include investigation of the 
nature, frequency or intensity of treatment interventions or management strategies 
applied to individuals in an attempt to reduce or ameliorate the identified risk. It 
would be of interest for future studies to investigate the efficacy of targeted 
interventions in reducing specific risk. 
The present investigation did not include an evaluation of the risk 
management strategies applied to patients not deemed high risk. Additional risk 
management plans were not constructed for this patient population during normal 
completion of the SCJ: Risk. This is not to say however, that this patient group had a 
total absence of risk management plan. A risk management plan may exist within 
routine clinical practice, independent of the SCJ: Risk. Indeed, such a patient group 
may be identified as not presenting as high risk due to the successful implementation 
of a risk management plan and appropriate targeted intervention(s) that pre-dated the 
implementation of the SCJ: Risk. Any existing plans may therefore have been 
instrumental in the management of the risk of intra-institutional infractions. 
7.2 Implications for Forensic Clinical Services and 
Recommendations for Future Use of the SCJ: Risk 
The purpose of the development and implementation of the SCJ: Risk was to 
document risk related decisions within a high secure forensic setting, according to 
the security objectives defined by the Tilt review. The Tilt review necessitated that a 
procedure for the identification of high risk patients be implemented within each 
high secure forensic hospital in the UK (Fallon et al, 1999). In this regard, findings 
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of the present thesis illustrate the efficacy of the SCJ: Risk in identifying high risk 
patients in relation to the five Tilt factors. The SCJ: Risk system may therefore be 
seen to fulfil the security requirements of the Tilt review, as it facilitated the correct 
identification of patients subsequently manifesting relevant behaviours. 
The review also specified that, following the identification of patients as high 
risk, appropriate provisions should be made to increase the procedural security 
arrangements for such a population (Fallon et al, 1999). Completion of SCJ: Risk 
documentation provided an opportunity for clinical teams to construct additional risk 
management plans for patients identified as high risk. However, the findings of the 
current investigation illustrate that the efficiency of the SCJ: Risk in documenting the 
processes necessary to increase the procedural security arrangements within this 
population may be questionable (as identified high risk behaviour was subsequently 
displayed). In this way, the SCJ: Risk system may not be seen to adequately fulfil 
the security requirements of the Tilt review. 
Collectively, the findings presented within this thesis calls into question the 
appropriateness of use of a risk assessment system (the SCJ: Risk) that has been 
shown to yield less perceived relevance, predictive and preventative utility than the 
original system on which it was based (the HCR-20). In evaluating this assertion, it 
is important to consider the question: Were the original five areas of risk identified 
within the Tilt review of security actually relevant to the needs of a high secure 
forensic setting? The findings illustrate that only two of the five identified areas 
were shown to have prevalence of a degree to allow statistically robust relationships 
of the predictive and preventative utility of the system to be established, namely; (i) 
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the immediate risk of harming others (violence) and; (ii) the risk of suicide or self- 
harm. The investigation has shown that behaviours relevant to the three remaining 
Tilt factors; (iii) vulnerability to risk from others, (iv) the risk of escape and (v) 
subversion, occurred relatively infrequently within a high secure setting. 
These findings have important implications for forensic clinical services, 
particularly within institutions in which the documentation of high risk patients, 
according to the objectives defined by the Tilt review are an auditable requirement. 
The implementation of the SCJ: Risk was found to significantly impact on existing 
clinical resources. The reduced brevity of the original documentation resulted in an 
increased time of completion of the SCJ: Risk (when compared to the HCR-20). 
Findings illustrate that clinical teams are required to consider and document the 
relevance of fifteen individual dynamic risk factors (5 Vulnerability, 5 Escape, 5 
Subversion), and ten individual static risk factors (10 Historical), developed to be 
indicative of relatively infrequent associated behaviours within a high secure setting. 
On the basis of these findings, it is questionable as to whether it is an 
appropriate use of clinical resources to devote time to the discussion, identification 
and documentation of the risk of behaviours for which recorded incidents are 
infrequent (relative to violence and self-harm). Nevertheless, it remains a 
requirement of high-secure forensic hospitals to make and document risk related 
decisions relevant to the five Tilt areas. It is argued (above) that the additional items 
of the SCJ: Risk do not `add value' to the original HCR-20 documentation. Findings 
have shown the perceived and actual utility of the HCR-20 within a high secure 
setting. The original subscales were shown to have relevance to the identification of 
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violence (all subscales), suicide (Risk and HCR-20 Total subscales) and subversion 
(Clinical subscale). By comparison, only the Suicide subscale of the SCJ: Risk was a 
robust indicator of corresponding behaviours. 
The results of the empirical investigations within this thesis suggest that, 
when investigated in an empirical manner, the utility of the individual risk factors 
designed to be associated with behaviours relevant to vulnerability, escape and 
subversion are limited. The findings clearly illustrate that the extended risk 
assessment of the SCJ: Risk adds very little to the parental version of the HCR-20. 
Supported by evidence presented within this thesis, it is recommended that 
the organisation revises documentation in attempt to increase efficacy of future use 
within forensic clinical practice. Two recommendations are made. Either, the 
organisation reverts back to the HCR-20, (with the addition of Tilt High Risk 
Summary Sheet, and associated Risk Management Plans) or that the SCJ: Risk 
undergoes a significant revision. In a revision of the SCJ: Risk, an edited form of the 
document may be developed, piloted and evaluated. The twenty additional items of 
the SCJ: Risk shown to yield low perceived, predictive and preventative utility ought 
to be removed from a revised version (5 Vulnerability, 5 Escape and 10 Historical). 
The individual factors comprising the Suicide/Self-harm subscale may remain, due to 
their utility in the identification of high risk patients. To fulfil the security objectives 
of the Tilt review, all other sections of the SCJ: Risk may remain. 
In effect, the remaining document would comprise the original risk factors of 
the HCR-20, plus the Suicide/Subversion subscale, Risk Scenario Planning Section, 
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High Risk Summary Sheet, and associated Risk Management Plans. Future 
evaluations would include the perceived usability and utility, predictive and 
preventative utility. Comparisons between evaluations of the original SCJ: Risk and 
revised version could be drawn, and conclusions as to efficacy of use within clinical 
practice stated. It is suggested that these steps will re-instate a greater degree of 
brevity, increase the perceived relevance (usability and utility) and actual predictive 
and preventative utility of the revised system. In this way, the revised SCJ: Risk 
system may continue to provide a structured professional judgement framework for 
clinical team discussions relevant to the assessment and management of risk within 
high secure forensic services. 
7.2 Conclusions 
The investigations reported in this thesis examined the application of a risk 
assessment system of structured professional judgement to meet the security needs of 
a high secure forensic psychiatric service. The usability and operational viability of 
the SCJ: Risk was established. The system was implemented successfully, and 
comprised a regular process of routine clinical care within the framework of clinical 
governance, multidisciplinary working and evidence-based practice. Receiver 
Operator Characteristic analyses revealed variability in the predictive accuracy of 
individual risk factors and subscale scores. Statistically significant relationships 
between the risk measure and behaviours of interest were robust for behaviours with 
a high prevalence. The ability of the system to provide a framework to facilitate the 
identification of patients as high risk of specific behaviours was demonstrated. 
Survival Analyses showed the identification of high risk behaviours was not 
observed to yield preventative utility. The findings indicate the SCJ: Risk as a 
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framework of decision making facilitated the identification of risk, but not the 
management of behaviours identified as high risk. Specifically the predictive utility 
of the system was found to be more robust than the preventative utility of the system 
within forensic psychiatric practice. Overall, the utility of the original system of 
structured professional judgement (the HCR-20) was shown be more robust than the 
SCJ: Risk. The findings presented have important implications for the future use of 
the system within forensic clinical services to achieve the overall goals of clarity of 
risk communication, identification and management of high risk patients. 
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Appendix 1.1 
Structured Clinical Judgement: Risk 
Multidisciplinary Assessment of Risk 
A System for Structuring Clinical Judgements of Risk Related to High 
Security Hospital Needs 
SCJ: Risk 
Clare Richardson and Todd Hogue 
Rampton Hospital, Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust 
Please do not use or copy this instrument without first contacting the authors 
The following system is based on the use of structured clinical judgement for making risk decisions. The format of structuring 
judgements Is based on, and includes within it, the HCR-20 (Webster, Douglas, Eaves & Hart, 1997) tool for assessing risk. Clinicians 
using this system of structuring clinical judgements of risk should be familiar with the literature on clinical risk prediction, have read the 
HCR-20 manual and had specific training on applying this system within a forensic Institutional context. Users are directed to the 
following publications for further clarification or explication: 
Webster, C. D., Eaves, D., Douglas, K. S., and Wintrup, A. (1995). The HCR-20: the Assessment of Dangerousness and Risk. 
Vancouver, Canada: Simon Fraser University and British Colombia Forensic Psychiatric Services Commission. 
Webster, C. D., Douglas, KS., Eaves, D., (1997). HCR-20: Assessing risk of violence (version 2). Vancouver. Mental Health 
Law and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University. 
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HISTORICAL ITEMS 
PREVIOUS VIOLENCE: For a definition of violence please refer to HCR-20 guidance notes. The scoring scheme for 
this item is intended to capture the density of previous violence. Therefore the number of past violent acts is combined 
H1with 
their severity to differentiate between a YES/MAYBE score. A NO would indicate no previous acts of violence. A 
MAYBE score would be given if there were one or two acts of possible/less erious violence. Moderately severe violence would 
include slapping, pushing, and other behaviours unlikely to cause serious or permanent injury to victims. A YES score would be 
given for three or more acts of serious previous violence, or any acts of severe violence. Acts of severe violence include, but is not 
limited to, those that cause death or serious injury to or maiming of the victim. All violence up to and including the time of the 
assessment is included as "previous violence. " This would include the index offence, violence during incarceration or hospitalisation, 
or violence directed at the assessor during interview. 
H 2YOUNG AGE AT FIRST VIOLENT INCIDENT: Age is established by considering the date of the first known violent 
incident, which is not necessarily the index offence. A NO score is allotted if there are no known acts of violence, or the 
patient was 40 years and older at first known violent act. A MAYBE score would be given if the patient was between 20 
and 39 years of age. A YES score is allotted if the patient was under 20 years at the first known violent act. 
RELATIONSHIP INSTABILITY: This refers only to `romantic, intimate, or non-platonic partnerships and does not 
include relationships with friends or family. This item is geared toward whether the individual is able to form and 
H3maintain 
long-term, stable relationships given the opportunity. "Instability" would include many short-term relationships; 
absence of any relationships or presence of conflict within a long-term relationship. A NO score would indicate a relatively stable 
and conflict-free relationship pattern, a MAYBE possible/less serious unstable and/or conflictual relationship pattern, and a YES 
score where there is evidence of definite/serious unstable and/or conflictual relationship patterns or the absence of a relationship. 
EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS: A NO should be given if there is no evidence of employment problems. A MAYBE score 
is given for possible/less erious employment problems. A YES score should be coded if the individual has refused to 
H4seek 
legitimate employment, has a history of many short-term jobs, or of frequently being sacked or quitting. A reduction 
from YES to MAYBE may be warranted if economic, physical, or mental problems preclude employment but caution is 
recommended as the item focuses on employment problems rather than employability. Institutional work programmes may be 
considered. 
H 5SUBSTANCE USE PROBLEMS: Included in this item is the misuse of prescription drugs and glue or solvents. Whilst 
psychiatric diagnosis of substance abuse ought to be taken seriously their mere presence does not warrant a yes score 
without corroboration. Score NO for no substance use problems. A MAYBE score should be given for possible/less 
serious substance use problems. A YES score applies to where substance use problems cause impairment of functioning in areas 
such as health, employment, recreation or interpersonal relationships that are attributable to substances. Examples would include, (but are not limited to): being late for work; irate with others; being severely hung over, an inability to concentrate whilst working or 
driving or doing so whilst under the influence; substance related arrests; having difficulties within interpersonal relationships; and 
denying problems despite strong evidence to the contrary. 
MAJOR MENTAL ILLNESS: A diagnosis of major mental illness should conform to an official nosological system such 
as DSM-IV or ICD-10. The item is scored on the basis of past history and is unaffected by whether the disorder is 
H6currently 
active or in remission. The item applies to illnesses involving disturbances of thought and affect (e. g., 
psychotic illnesses, manic mood, organic illnesses, etc). Less serious mental illnesses, such as anxiety disorders, somatoform 
disorders, paraphilias or sleep disorders should be coded NO. A MAYBE score is appropriate if the evidence is equivocal (e. g., 
course or severity is unclear). A YES score would be given when the evidence of major mental illness is unequivocal. 
PSYCHOPATHY: It must be stressed that this rating is to be made on the basis of an informed and trained 
psychopathy assessment using the PCL-R or PCL: SV. The item is not to be used until such a rating is available. If no 
H7score 
is available, please leave the H7 rating blank until a score is obtained. Appropriate codings are as follows: NO for 
a score of under 20 on the PCL-R, or under 13 on the PCL: SV; MAYBE for a score between 20 and 29 on the PCL-R, or 13-17 on 
the PCL: SV; YES for a score between 30-40 on the PCL-R, or 18-24 on the PCL: SV. 
EARLY MALADJUSTMENT: Violence can be predicted through childhood victimisation as well as through being a 
childhood victimiser or delinquent. No maladjustment is coded NO. A MAYBE score should be given if there is evidence 
H8of 
possible/less erious maladjustment. A YES score should be given if maladjustment has occurred in at least two of 
the three domains of home, school, and community. If the maladjustment was very severe in one domain, (e. g., severe and 
prolonged childhood abuse) then a yes score is also justified. 
PERSONALITY DISORDER: Adiagnosis of personality disorder should conform to an official nosological system such 
as DSM-IV or ICD-10; this is scored on the basis of past history and is unaffected by whether the disorder is currently 
H9active 
or in remission. A NO score is given to indicate no formal diagnosis of personality disorder. A MAYBE score 
should be given if there is a possible/less erious diagnosis of personality disorder, including personality disorder traits. A YES score 
would be given when there is definite vidence of personality disorder. 
PRIOR SUPERVISION FAILURE: Failures during any institutional or community placement are relevant here. A H10 NO is given if the individual has never had a period of institutional, or community supervision or if there are no prior 
supervision failures. A MAYBE score is given for less serious failures such as returning late when released on a 
pass, causing a disturbance, failing to take medication as prescribed, or using alcohol or drugs whilst prohibited. A YES score is 
given if the act resulted in (re-) apprehension, (re-) institutionalisation by a correctional or mental health agency, escape from a 
correctional facility, elopement from a maximum secure hospital, abscondance whilst on an escorted official visit (e. g., funeral), re- 
offence during probation, revocation of parole, or failure to attend for psychiatric treatment as ordered by a court or tribunal. 
The above definitions are abbreviated versions of the HCR-20. Users should refer to the HCR-20 manual and companion guide. 
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HC-1 HISTORICAL CODINGS 
H1 Previous violence plus institutional Evidence: 
violence 
NO MAYBE YES 
IF] F-1 F-1 
H2 Young age at first violent incident Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
QQQ 
H3 Relationship instability Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
171 F1 
H4 Employment problems Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
F7 
H5 Substance use problems Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
171 F] F-I 
H6 Major mental disorder or illness Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
QQQ 
H7 Psychopathy Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
QQQ 
H8 Early maladjustment Evidence: 
NO MAYBE 
, 
YES 
H9 Personality Disorder Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
H10 Prior supervision failure plus escape Evidence: 
and abscondance 
NO MAYBE YES 
EJ 
I- 
F-71, D 
Patient Name: Hospital Number. 
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HISTORICAL ITEMS 
CHILD PROTECTION: NO 
- 
no known evidence indicating harmful behaviour proven to be distressing to 
children. MAYBE 
- 
if there is no consensus or unsubstantiated allegations or evidence requiring investigation. YES 
- 
clear evidence of any previous harmful behaviour proven to be distressing to children. The individual may have 
been considered to be a Schedule 1 Offender or is considered a Risk to Children (convicted under the 1983 Schedule 1 Offences 
Act (Policy 13)). Any specific and additional reasons why this individual should be considered a particular isk to children. 
Other considerations if forming a yes/maybe response: indecent exposure, association with paedophile ring, inappropriate 
interest in children i. e. collecting printed or intemet material or has been sexually inappropriate or disinhibited in behaviour in 
connection with mental state. 
SEX OFFENDING: NO 
- 
there is no known evidence to suggest that the patient may have sexually offended. 
MAYBE 
- 
there is unsubstantiated evidence/information or they are under investigation for sex offending. YES 
H12there 
is evidence/information that suggests that the patient has sexually offended against another person, has 
been convicted of a sexual offence, or was sexually motivated in other offending. Evidence of sexually inappropriate behaviours 
examples include grooming, or creating opportunities to gain access to potential victims. Sexual compulsivity 
- 
sexually deviant 
and/or compulsive behaviour. Evidence of victimisation i. e., stalking. History of behaviour relating to deviation 
- 
excessive 
masturbation, frequent use of prostitutes, indecent exposure, promiscuity or one night stands. Frequent use of pornography or 
sexual fantasies, accumulation of a large collection of pornography material written or from internet. Evidence of a sexual offending 
cycle. Evidence of connection to vice rings and pimping. 
SUICIDE ATTEMPT: NO 
- 
no known evidence of suicidal attempts. MAYBE 
- 
this could include self-statements 
with no corroborative vidence i. e. overdose at home, no intervention by any agency, no witnesses. YES 
- 
there is 
H13evidencerinformation 
that suggests a past history of suicidal attempts. This may include increasing serious self- 
harming behaviour that may have been life threatening. 
Other Considerations: Increasing serious self-harm incidents. Connections of behaviour to specific events, anniversaries or 
bereavement or loss. Evidence of intellectual deficit, expression of ideation regarding suicide. Has made plans in the past. Poor 
physical and mental health i. e. physical disability, chronic physical illness, pre-senile dementia, depression, anxiety, sleep disorder, 
especially recovering from severe depression. Expression of unworthiness, hopelessness, helplessness and despair. 
SELF-HARM: NO 
- 
no known attempts of self-harm. MAYBE 
- 
there are concerns but not substantiated 
evidence. YES 
- 
there is evidence/information suggesting a past history of self-harm that would not be considered H14a 
suicide attempt.. 
Other Considerations: Self-harm may include superficial cutting, swallowing, burning or inserting foreign objects into the body in 
some cases this may be enforced starvation or hunger strikes. 
ARSON: NO 
- 
no known evidence of arson. MAYBE 
- 
no substantiated evidence available or is under 
investigation regarding an arson act, has expressed an interest in fire setting or has verbalised fantasies of fire 
H15sefting. 
YES 
- 
if there is information available that suggests past history or conviction for arson. 
HOSTAGE TAKING: Has the person detained someone against their will in an attempt o get something they 
want? NO 
- 
no known evidence of hostage taking. MAYBE 
- 
unsubstantiated vidence or is being investigated for 
H16possible 
hostage taking, has expressed a wish to or threatened to take hostages but not done so. YES 
- 
there is 
evidence/information that there has been hostage taking activity which may include conviction of holding against will. 
WEAPONS: NO 
- 
no known use of weapons. MAYBE 
- 
patient has fantasies re: weapons or has threatened to 
use weapons. YES 
- 
there is instrumental use of an object through threat of violence or (instrumentally) there is 
H17evidence/information 
that weapons have been used, carried, made and concealed, will readily pick up weapons, 
but as yet has not used them. 
Other Consideration: Weapons include anything that may be used to threaten or harm e. g. pen, bottle, chair. 
CONCERTED INDISCIPLINE: NO 
- 
no known evidence. MAYBE 
- 
makes threats to disrupt or there is a 
possibility that the patient colludes with others to disrupt. YES 
- 
evidence/information that the patient has been 
H18involved 
or planned indiscipline in any establishment which may include noting, roof top demonstration, key 
compromise, barricading, eneral disruption etc. 
H19 HIGH PUBLIC OR POLITICAL INTEREST: NO - no press/public interest MAYBE -some/localised press interest. YES - high national press/public interest of some political concern likely. 
ESCAPE/ABSCOND HISTORY: NO 
- 
no evidence to escape/abscond. MAYBE 
- 
some evidence that the patient H20 has absconded/plannedfintent or suspicion to escapelabscond. YES 
- 
clear evidence that the patient has previously escaped or absconded from custody or any institution in a correctional or mental health facility. 
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HC-2 HISTORICAL CODINGS 
H11: Child Protection Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
H12: Sex offendin g Evidence: 
NO MAYBE 
F] 
YES 
m 
H13: Suicide Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
H14: Self-harm Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
H15: Arson Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
El 
H16: Hostage takin Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
H17: Weapons Evidence: 
NO 
F] 
MAYBE 
- 
Fý 
YES 
F-I 
H18: Concerted Indiscipline Evidence: 
NO MAYBE 
- 
YES 
H19: High Public or Political Interest Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
QQQ 
H20: Escape/Abscond History Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
El F-I F-I 
Patient Name: Hospital Number. 
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CLINICAL RISK FACTORS 
The following items are relevant to the previous three months and must be scored with that in mind. 
Prior to completing the following risk judgements please give a brief description of the current care environment and care 
programme, including treatment programmes/medication regimes. 
LACK OF INSIGHT: This item refers to the degree to which the patient fails to acknowledge and comprehend his or 
her mental disorder and its effect on others. This lack of insight can be expressed in many ways. Some patients may 
violent manner without regular use of prescribed medication. Individuals may have difficulty realizing the importance that a well- 
structured support group may have in averting violence. Yet others may have little insight into their, generally, high levels of anger 
and dangerousness. A score of NO should be given for no lack of insight; MAYBE for a possible/less serious lack of insight and 
YES should be given for definite/serious lack of insight. 
NEGATIVE ATTITUDES: This item refers to recent evidence of pro-criminal nd antisocial attitudes connected to a 
higher propensity for violence. Most people could be said to have negative attitudes of some kind but this item relates to 
C2entrenched 
antisocial and negative attitudes and beliefs. Sadistic, homicidal, or paranoid attitudes which do not stem 
from mental illness may be counted under this item as can evidence of remorselessness, a current unwillingness to abide by rules 
and regulations, evidence of splitting behaviour, boundary pushing, callousness and lack of empathy. A NO score is given for no 
negative attitudes; MAYBE for possible/less erious negative attitudes and YES for definite evidence of negative attitudes. 
C 3ACTIVE SYMPTOMS OF MAJOR MENTAL ILLNESS: Assessors should follow an official nosological system such as 
the DSM-IV or ICD-10 for definitions of psychotic symptoms. 
This item should be coded: NO if there are no active symptoms of major mental illness; MAYBE for possible/less erious 
active symptoms of major mental illness; YES should be given for definite/serious active symptoms of major mental illness. 
CIMPULSIVITY: Impulsivity refers to dramatic day-to-day, hour-to-hour fluctuations in mood or presentation. It is an 4inability to remain composed and directed when under the pressure to act. Impulsive people are quick to (over-) react to real, or imagined slights, insults and disappointments, when they do their action may appear to be exaggerated or 
overdone. The item, therefore, measures behavioural and affective instability and should be scored NO for no evidence of 
impulsivity, MAYBE for possible/less erious impulsivity and YES for evidence of impulsivity. 
UNRESPONSIVE TO TREATMENT: This item refers to any treatment designed to ameliorate criminal, psychiatric, 
psychological, social, or vocational problems. It is vital to know if the individual has sought help and accepted it, rejected 
C5it 
out of hand, or agreed to it merely to speed their transfer or "look good" to a court, Mental Health Review Tribunal or 
other authority. A NO score is given if the patent is responsive to treatment. A MAYBE score is given if there is possiblefless 
serious unresponsiveness to treatment. A YES score is given to individuals who respond poorly, or not at all, to treatment attempts. 
Patients may also lack motivation to begin or continue with treatment or merely pay lip service to treatment or complete treatment 
but fail to benefit from it. 
The above definitions are abbreviated versions of the HCR-20. Users should refer to the HCR-20 manual and companion guide. 
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CR-1 CLINICAL CODINGS 
Clinical factors influencing current risk 
Prior to completing the following risk judgements please give a brief description of the current care environment and care 
programme, including treatment programmes/medication regimes. 
Current care environment and care-programme: 
Cl: Lack of insight NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
C2: Negative attitudes NO MAYBE Li I YES 
Evidence: 
Cl Active symptoms of Major Mental Illness NO Ej MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
C4: Impulsivity NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
C5: Unresponsive to treatment plus medication, NO MAYBE YES 
psychology, day care, relate to hospital 
Evidence: 
Patient Name: 
SUICIDE ATTEMPT OR SELF-HARM ITEMS 
The following items are relevant to the previous three months and must be scored with that in mind. 
SUICIDAL IDEATION: Suicidal ideation can be expressed verbally or non-verbally as would be the case with individuals S1 
who ruminate xtensively. A NO score should be given when there is no evidence of suicidal ideation. A MAYBE score 
may be allocated where there is unsubstantiated evidence of suicidal ideation. Maybe scores should also be treated 
seriously and indicate that close monitoring of the patient should take place until any concerns are considered unjustified by the 
clinical team. A YES score should be allocated if suicidal ideation is present, and should warrant serious concern and monitoring. 
HOPELESSNESS: This item is designed to elucidate depressive symptomatology associated with the possibility of 
future suicide or self-harming episodes. A score of NO would indicate no evidence of hopelessness. A MAYBE would be 
S2given 
for possible/less erious evidence of hopelessness. Individuals who score YES on this item will increasingly seek 
support from staff or peers, frequently be observed to be tearful or, have dulled affect and attempt to isolate themselves. Feelings of 
despair and an inability to see a way out of their current situation would also score highly. 
FREQUENCY: This item is present to assess whether or not there is an escalation or persistently high rate of 
behaviours associated with self-harm, which would be indicative of the patient becoming increasingly distressed, or 
S3maintaining 
a high level of distressed behaviour, to the point where he/she is compromising their physical well-being. A 
NO indicates no self harming behaviours. A MAYBE score would indicate less frequent or less serious increase in behaviour. A YES 
score would be given to demonstrate a definite increase in frequency or maintenance of high-frequency behaviour (e. g., daily). 
SEVERITY: Individuals who score NO on this item indicate no self harming behaviours A MAYBE score would be given 
for possible/less erious self-injurious behaviour such as superficial scratching or burning self with a cigarette. 
S41ndividuals 
who score YES on this item will have harmed themselves to the extent that their life could have been 
endangered should they have not received attention, or there are regular episodes of (attempted) self-injurious 
behaviour. 
PLANNING: This item is included to elucidate any attempts at preparation that may have been made to facilitate self- harm or suicide. It could involve the tearing of sheets in order to make a ligature, storing or concealing of any object that 
S5could 
be used to self-injure, the writing of suicide notes or any other indication that preparations are being put in place. 
The absence of any of the above would warrant a NO score. A MAYBE score would be given for a clinical judgement that suicide or 
self-harm preparations were taking place but there was uncorroborated evidence to support this, and a YES score for any evidence 
of planning. 
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SR-1 SUICIDE OR SELF-HARM CODINGS 
Si: Suicidal Ideation NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
S2: Hopelessness NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
S3: Frequency NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
S4: Severity NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
S5: Piannin NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
Include any other information below: - 
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VULNERABILITY ITEMS 
The following items are relevant to the previous three months and must be scored with that in mind. 
This section serves to elucidate risk factors that relate to the likelihood of the individual being victimised, taken advantage 
of or exploited by others. 
MENTAL STATE: Vulnerability in this area may appertain to any mental state symptoms which make the individual V1 
more vulnerable to victimisation from others. These may include, episodes of psychosis including; paranoia/persecutory 
ideation where the individual feels he/she is being conspired against, believes that someone wants to harm or kill them, 
or has feelings that they are being followed or watched. Command hallucinations may also submit the patient to attack by others. 
Symptoms of clinical depression may also be considered under this item, feelings of worthlessness orinappropriate guilt (which may 
be delusional) anxiety, helplessness or hopelessness. A NO score should be given if there is no evidence that this applies. A 
MAYBE score should be allotted if there is some evidence that the above applies. A YES score should be given where there is clear 
evidence that the above applies to the patent's current mental state. 
PHYSICALIPHYSIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS: Physical problems may be used by others to separate the individual out 
for bullying. Examples might include obesity, small stature, an inability to effectively communicate, or anything that might 
differentiate the patient from the "norm". Physiological problems, for example endocrine disorders or neurological 
features including mental impairment, stroke or other organic brain dysfunction may be included. NO should be scored in the 
absence of any evidence of the above, a MAYBE score should be given if some evidence of the above applies and a YES if clear 
evidence exists. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS: Consider any pervasive pattern of psychological symptoms. These may include, 
characteristics of a disorder of personality, unstable emotional control or extremes in emotional behaviour, excessive 
V3passivity, 
expression of thoughts, emotions or behaviours that are outside normal cultural and social constraint. Other 
characteristics may include low self esteem, poor social skills such as lack of assertiveness, self-image sensitivity; oversensitivity to 
comments from others relating to physical, social or psychological self. He/she may be overdisclosing, revealing intimate or highly 
personal information inappropriately to others. Is the patient naive, taking people at 'face value' being unaware of the intentions of 
other people? A NO score should be recorded if there is no evidence of the above. A MAYBE score should be allocated if there is 
evidence of possiblefless erious psychological problems. A YES score should be given if there is evidence of definite/serious 
psychological problems. 
V 4SOCIAL PROBLEMS: This item is present to highlight the possibility of external stressors which may impact upon the 
patient's vulnerability. Is there evidence of any recent trauma or current life difficulties or events (e. g., bereavement, divorce, separation), financial worries, legal problems, social or medical strains or burdens or evidence of multiple 
problems. Also consider forthcoming anniversary dates such as index offence. No evidence of the above should be scored NO, 
some evidence MAYBE and clear evidence YES. 
EXPLOITATION: Is the patient vulnerable to exploitation by others? This may be in the context of financial exploitation, V5 
physical (bullying) or sexual exploitation (the individual may constitute a sexual preference by others who are predatory in their sexual behaviour). The patent may be 'put upon' by others, being frequently asked to carry out menial tasks on their behalf. Finally ask "has anything been brought to the teams attention which indicates that the individual is vulnerable in their 
current situation? " No evidence of the above should be scored NO, some evidence MAYBE and clear evidence YES. 
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VR-1 VULNERABILITY CODINGS 
VI: Mental State NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
V2: Physical/Physiological Problems NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
V3: Psychological Problems NO MAYBE YES 
-LJ Evidence: 
V4: Social Problems NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
V5: Exploitation NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
Patient Name: Hospital Number: 
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ESCAPE AND SUBVERSION ITEMS 
The following items are relevant to the previous three months and must be scored with that in mind. 
Escape in this context includes abscondance from an authorised period of escorted leave. 
El 
PLANNING: Is there evidence to suggest the patient has planned/is planning to escape or has he/she expressed a
desire to do so? Consider also whether there is any evidence of internal or external support that may facilitate an escape 
attempt. A NO score should be allocated if there is no evidence of the above. A MAYBE score on this item should be 
given if there is any self-reporting of thoughts, humorous remarks or other indications of a desire to escape. A YES score should be 
recorded for any clear evidence of planning. 
INCENTIVE: This item appertains to external events or internal stressors which increase the individual's desire to 
escape. Events uch as the death of someone close, stressors from the potential breakdown of a relationship or some 
E2other 
external event that may lead to an increased desire to escape. Internal stressors could be in the form of a 
notification of extended or renewed status under the Mental Health Act or peer/staff pressure from which there is a desire to escape. 
A NO score should be allocated if there is no evidence of the above. A MAYBE score on this item should be given if there is some 
evidence. A YES score should be recorded for any clear evidence of a current incentive to escape. 
INTEREST IN SECURITY: Evidence of thinking about, or overt expressions of an interest in security features or 
practices will be included here. Questions regarding keys, locks, CCTV, fences or staff habits and shift patterns hould E3all be considered when scoring this item. A NO score should be allotted for no evidence of an interest in security features 
or practices. A MAYBE score can be given if the clinical team is unsure that the motivating factor for such an interest is directly 
related to security compromise, however if this is the case, further investigation may be necessary to ascertain whether the item can 
be scored YES. A YES coding should be recorded for any clear evidence of an interest in security. 
MENTAL DISORDER: Might the patient's mental disorder directly impact upon his/her desire to escape? Examples of 
this might include the content of command hallucinations, threat/control-override symptoms, paranoia associated with 
E4current 
admittance, or other delusions or compulsions allied to a desire to escape. A NO score indicates that the 
patient's mental disorder does not impact on a desire to escape. A MAYBE score should be given if the content of any such 
delusions are not immediately apparent. A YES score should be assigned to indicate definite/serious active symptoms of major 
mental illness impacting upon the patent's desire to escape. 
SUBVERSIVE BEHAVIOUR: This item will include all types of behaviour that, either intentionally or unintentionally, give 
cause for concern with regard to safety or security. Clear examples would include a barricading incident (e. g. dining 
E5room/day 
room protest), attempts to isolate staff, any attempts to take anyone hostage, rooftop protest, voiced intents to 
carry out actions that would put others at risk of harm or jeopardise security. There are many more examples that could be included 
so the above are by no means exhaustive and assessors are encouraged to score the item according to their clinical judgement. A
NO score should be allotted if there is no evidence of subversive behaviour illustrated above. A MAYBE would be given in the case 
of unsubstantiated vidence, third party information or suspicion that the individual is attempting to manipulate others thereby putting 
safety or security at risk. A YES score should be allocated for clear evidence of subversive behaviours. 
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ER-1 ESCAPEIABSCONDANCE AND SUBVERSION CODINGS 
El: Planning NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
E2: Incentive NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
E3: Interest in Security NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
E4: Mental Disorder NO MAYBE YES 
Evidence: 
E5: Subversive Behaviour NO MAYBE YES- Li 
Evidence: 
Patient Name: Hospital Number. 
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RISK MANAGEMENT I EMS 
This section centres on forecasting how individuals will adjust to future circumstances. Clinical Teams are asked to rate the 
individual using the same item definitions to assess two distinct scenarios. 
The following Risk Management i em definitions (R1-5) are therefore used to assess two points in time: (RM1) Current Care Environment 
(RM2) Risk Scenario Planning 
(RMI) RISK MANAGEMENT CODINGS 
The following ratings are to be made with regard to a suggested care plan as outlined below. When scoring the item bear this 
proposed plan in mind, with its associated risks and the likely response of the individual to it. The section centres on forecasting 
how individuals will adjust to future circumstances. 
Use this section to forecast how individuals might manage in their CURRENT CARE ENVIRONMENT during the next six 
months. 
PLANS LACK FEASIBILITY: Lack of feasibility may be due to the fact that community agencies/RSU's are unwilling R1 (due to the patient's behaviour) or unable (due to lack of resources) to provide assistance. Alternatively, the patient may have played no role in making plans or be uninvolved with peers or family. Finally, family and peers may be unable or 
unwilling to help. A NO indicates that there is a low probability that plans will not succeed, MAYBE for a moderate probability that 
plans will not succeed and score YES for a high probability that plans will not succeed. 
EXPOSURE TO DESTABILIZERS: This term appertains to risk increasing factors. In the majority of cases the patient 
may be exposed to destabilizers because of inadequate professional supervision. Assessors should consider whether 
R2the 
patient would be attending specialized support programmes such as alcohol or substance use sessions for 
assistance with abstaining from destabilizers. A NO indicates that there is a low probability of exposure to destabilizers. A MAYBE 
for a moderate probability and a YES score should be given if there is a high probability of exposure to destabilizers. 
LACK OF PERSONAL SUPPORT: A NO should indicate that the individual will have appropriate support. A MAYBE 
score is given if there is a moderate probability of lack of personal support and a YES score on this item would appertain 
R3to 
an individual who would lack emotional, financial, or physical support from friends or family, or if such support is 
available but the individual is unwilling to accept it. It is important o look beyond "good intentions" of friends and family and ensure 
that they are not just being "used" to secure release. 
R 4NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REMEDIATION ATTEMPTS: This item should be construed broadly to include remediation 
attempts in both therapeutic and supervision/management r alms. A NO indicates that there is a low probability of 
noncompliance with remediation attempts. A MAYBE score should be given if the probability of non-compliance with 
remediation attempts is judged to be moderate and a YES score on this item should be given to individuals who it is felt have little 
motivation to succeed and unwillingness to comply with medication or therapy, or refuse to follow rules in the future. 
STRESS: This item can be coded NO to indicate a low probability of stress. A MAYBE score would indicate a 
moderate probability of stress. A YES score should be allocated if the individual is likely to be exposed to serious 
R5stressors, 
or if the individual has been judged to cope poorly with stressful situations. 
The above definitions are abbreviated versions of the HCR-20. Users should refer to the HCR-20 manual and companion guide. 
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RM-1 RISK MANAGEMENT CODINGS 
The following ratings are to be made with regard to a suggested care plan as outlined below. When scoring the item bear this 
proposed plan in mind, with its associated risks and the likely response of the individual to it. The section centres on forecasting 
how individuals will adjust to future circumstances. Use this section to forecast how individuals might manage in their 
CURRENT CARE ENVIRONMENT during the next six months. 
Proposed care plan: 
RI: Plan lacks feasibility Evidence: 
NO 
171 
MAYBE 
F1 
YES 
El 
R2: Exposure to destabilizers Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
1-1 F-I 
R3: Lack of personal support Evidence: 
N0 
El 
MAYBE 
F-71 
YES 
F-I 
R4: Non-compliance with Evidence: 
remediation attempts 
NO MAYBE YES 
EJ F71 F-I 
R5: Stress Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
QQQ 
Patient Name: 
- 
Hospital Number. 
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RISK MANAGEMENT ITEMS 
(RM2) RISK SCENARIO PLANNING 
Whilst the items are speculative, they will serve to stimulate the development of appropriate management plans. The Scenario 
Planning process is important in this section as it allows assessors to assess risk according to where the patent will, or can be 
expected to live in the near future (i. e., within high secure, medium secure, low secure or community settings, institutional leave 
etc). 
The Risk Management ratings (R1-5) are again to be made, but with regard to a suggested care plan as outlined by the clinical 
team. When scoring the items bear this proposed plan in mind, with its associated risks and the likely response of the individual to 
it. This section centres on forecasting how individuals will adjust to future circumstances. 
Use this section to forecast how individuals might manage in a future scenario. (e. g., move to a medium secure, low secure or 
community settings, ground privileges, escorted visit, emergency hospital visit, etc). 
PLANS LACK FEASIBILITY: Lack of feasibility may be due to the fact that community agencies/RSU's are unwilling R1 (due to the patient's behaviour) or unable (due to lack of resources) to provide assistance. Altematively, the patient may have played no role in making plans or be uninvolved with peers or family. Finally, family and peers may be unable or 
unwilling to help. A NO indicates that there is a low probability that plans will not succeed, MAYBE for a moderate probability that 
plans will not succeed and score YES for a high probability that plans will not succeed. 
R 2EXPOSURE TO DESTABILIZERS: This term appertains to risk increasing factors. In the majority of cases the patient 
may be exposed to destabilizers because of inadequate professional supervision. Assessors should consider whether 
the patient would be attending specialized support programmes uch as alcohol or substance use sessions for 
assistance with abstaining from destabilizers. A NO indicates that there is a low probability of exposure to destabilizers. A MAYBE 
for a moderate probability and a YES score should be given if there is a high probability of exposure to destabilizers. 
R 3LACK OF PERSONAL SUPPORT: A NO should indicate that the individual will have appropriate support. A MAYBE 
score is given if there is a moderate probability of lack of personal support and a YES score on this item would appertain 
to an individual who would lack emotional, financial, or physical support from friends or family, or if such support is 
available but the individual is unwilling to accept it. It is important o look beyond "good intentions" of friends and family and ensure 
that they are not just being "used" to secure release. 
R 4NONCOMPLIANCE WITH REMEDIATION ATTEMPTS: This item should be construed broadly to include remediation 
attempts in both therapeutic and supervision/management r alms. A NO indicates that there is a low probability of 
noncompliance with remediation attempts. A MAYBE score should be given if the probability of non-compliance with 
remediation attempts is judged to be moderate and a YES score on this item should be given to individuals who it is felt have little 
motivation to succeed and unwillingness to comply with medication or therapy, or refuse to follow rules in the future. 
STRESS: This item can be coded NO to indicate a low probability of stress. A MAYBE score would indicate a 
moderate probability of stress. A YES score should be allocated if the individual is likely to be exposed to serious 
R5stressors, 
or if the individual has been judged to cope poorly with stressful situations. 
The above definitions are abbreviated versions of the HCR-20. Users should refer to the HCR-20 manual and companion guide. 
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RM-2 RISK SCENARIO PLANNING 
The following ratings are to be made with regard to a suggested care plan as outlined below. When scoring the item bear this 
proposed plan in mind, with its associated risks and the likely response of the individual to it. This section centres on forecasting 
how individuals will adjust to future circumstances. Use this section to forecast how individuals might manage in a future 
scenario (e. g., move to a medium secure, low secure or community settings, ground privileges, escorted visit, emergency hospital 
visit, etc). 
Future scenario: 
RI: Plan lacks feasibility 
NO MAYBE YES 
R2: Exposure to destabilizers Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
QQQ 
R3: Lack of personal support Evidence: 
NO 
Q 
MAYBE 
Q 
YES 
Q 
R4: Non-compliance with Evidence: 
remediation attempts 
NO MAYBE YES 
QQQ 
R5: Stress Evidence: 
NO MAYBE YES 
F 
Patent Name: Hospital Number. 
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SCJ-1 
(Copy to Security Department) 
Name: 
Ward: 
Consultant: 
SCJ: Risk 
- 
High Risk Summary Sheet 
Hospital Number: 
Date: 
On the basis of the information collected in this document he clinical team is asked to make the following five judgements. This 
should be done as a multi disciplinary team decision where the overall rating is influenced by and embedded in current clinical 
knowledge of the patient. 
Where the clinical team judge the patient to present a high risk in any category they must for each risk 
identified: 
" Document a risk management plan for the patent as part of ongoing clinical case management. (Attach sheet titled 
'Management Plan') 
" Indicate a date to formally review the risk and related risk management plan (recommended every 3 months to be 
clinically relevant 
- 
if viable) 
" Record their reasons for coming to that conclusion 
" 
Give consideration as to whether the patient is to be confined to their room at night 
" 
Consider if the recording of patient's calls should be included in the risk management plan 
" 
During the decision making process have the following statements must be considered 
If the patient is defined to be a high risk in any of the above categories a security liaison nurse must be notified and be involved 
in developing the appropriate risk management plan, including the decisions regarding the need to monitor telephone calls and 
confine the patent in their room at night. 
1. The patient has had a high risk level identified In at YES Q NO 
least one area of concern 
Com lete section 1.1 
-1.5 
Does the patient present a... 
1.1 High risk of immediate harm to others? YES NO 
Review: H1-H20, C1-C5 & R1-R5 
Reason for high risk conclusion: 
1.2 High risk of harm to self? Review: S1-S5, YES TNO 
H3, H5, H6, H8, H9, H13, H14, H15, H17, C1-C5 & R1-R5 
Reason for high risk conclusion: 
1.3 High risk of escape? YES Q NO 
Review: E1-E10, H10, H16, H18, C1-C5 & R1-R5 EJ Reason for high risk conclusion: 
1.4 High risk of being assaulted or vulnerability? YES Q NO Q 
Review Items: VI-V5, HI, H3, H4, H5, H6, H8, H9, H13, H14, 
H17, C1-C5 & R1-R5 
Reason for high risk conclusion: 
Patient Name: Hospital Number. 
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1.5 High risk of action to subvert security and safety? YES NO Q 
Review Items: E1-El O, H1, H5, H6, H7, H9, H10, H15, H16, H17 
, 
H18, C1-C5 & WAS 
Reason for high risk conclusion: 
2. There is a management plan documented to address YES NO Q [the identified risk issues 
11 
3. Date of risk management plan: 
_I_I- 
Date for review of risk management plan: 1_I 
4. The patient should be confined in their room at night YES NO 
as part of their risk management plan EJ 
Reason for this conclusion: 
5. The patient will have some of their telephone calls YES NO 
monitored as part of their risk management plan 
Reason for this conclusion: 
Decision making team members: 
Signature Designation 
Signature Designation 
Signature Designation 
Signature Designation 
Signature Designation 
Signature Designation 
Signature Designation 
Date of decision: Date for next review: 
Patient Name: Hospital Number. 
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Risk Management Plan 
Risk Management Plan (must be completed where the clinical team judge the patient to present a high risk and must 
record and address each of the high risk areas identified. Teams may document multiple risk management plans for each 
area of risk identified) 
Management Plan of Current Risk 
Monitoring (Evidence of effective risk management) 
Monitoring Contingency Plan (if risk management is not effective) 
Date of risk management plan: I Date for review of risk management plan: 
_J_, 
J_ 
Signature on behalf of the clinical team Designation 
Patient Name: Hospital Number. 
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Appendix 1.2 
SCJ: Risk Computerised Interface 
Patient Entry and Case Summary 
General Entry Information 
Pati. nt Information: 
Search Patient: 
Name: 
Client ID. 
Consultant: 
ward: 
MHAStabas: Sect 37/41 Hospital Order with 
Restrictions 
Summary of Case Including Index Offence: 
14 ºJ ºi º« 
September 1987 convicted of indecent 
ult X2 (agedle) and sentenced to 15 yrs 
i custody. 
t to court of appeal on 12th Dec 1988, and 
snce quashed replaced by hospital order with 
t offence occurred on 20th Sept 1986,8.30 
-Victim aged 26 accordng to witness 
ements on the 16th, 17th, 19th Sept victim 
seen PA standing in the same place on her 
home from work. He stared at her but did 
speak. On the night of the offence she was 
king to meet a friend when he grabbed her 
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Appendix 1.4 
Figure Al. Graphical Representation of Compliance of Use of the SCJ: Risk 
System for the Total Population 
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1.1 Hospital Total Compliance Trends 
September 2006 
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Figure A2. Graphical Representation of Compliance of Use of the SCJ: Risk 
System for the Peaks Unit (DSPD) 
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1.2 The Peaks Unit Compliance Trends 
September 2006 
- 
July 2008 
00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 00 0 
v 
`a ä 
363 
Figure A3. Graphical Representation of Compliance of Use of the SCJ: Risk 
System for the Directorate of Personality Disorder 
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Figure A4. Graphical Representation of Compliance of Use of the SCJ: Risk 
System for the Directorate of Mental Health 
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Figure A5. Graphical Representation of Compliance of Use of the SCJ: Risk 
System for the Directorate of Learning Disability 
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Figure A6. Graphical Representation of Compliance of Use of the SCJ: Risk 
System for the Directorate of Women's Services 
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Appendix 2.1 
Evaluation Questionnaire SCJ: Risk (Structured Clinical Judgement) 
Directorate: 
........................................... Ward: 
................................ 
All responses will be treated in confidence and respondents will not be identified in any 
report or correspondence manating from the data collected. 
1.1 1 have attended aSCJ training session (please circle each session attended) 
Oct 2003 
- 
West Retford Hotel 
Nov 2004 
- 
Rampton Hospital 
Local training 2005 
- 
Delivered on ward location 
I have not received formal training, but use the SCJ 
1.2 Refresher t aining should be provided 
II Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
If relevant specify how often refresher training should be provided (please circle) 
Annually 
6 monthly 
3 monthly 
1.3 How many times have you used the SCJ (how many cases)? 
1- 
13 
4-6 7-10 11-13 14+ 
2.1 Overall the SCJ risk assessment system is useful 
Strongly 
I 
agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
2.2 The SCJ assists clinical teams in making and documenting risk related decisions 
II Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
2.3 The SCJ is useful in documenting the Tilt security review recommendations of related judgements 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
2.4 The SCJ is useful in constructing a risk management plan 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
367 
2.5 The SCJ is useful in informing clinical practice 
II Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
2.6 The SCJ is useful in informing patient care 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
2.7 The SCJ accurately assesses a patient's risk 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
3.1 The SCJ is more user friendly than previous risk assessment systems 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
3.2 It has been feasible for the clinical team to review the SCJ for each patient every three 
months 
i Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
If relevant, could you suggest ways to ensure completions every three months / why is it 
currently not 
possible? 
....................................................................................................................................... 
4.1 All components ofthe SCJ should be completed in a multi-disciplinary format 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
4.2 In my clinical team, all components ofthe SCJ are completed in a multi-disciplinary 
format. 
Strongly 
I 
agree 
- 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
Please circle any relevant statements below: 
The entire SCJ is completed by one or two MDT members 
- 
specify position 
role 
....................... 
368 
Certain sections of the SCJ are completed by one or two MDT members 
- 
specify member 
grade I position and SCJ 
section(s) 
............................................................................................. The entire completion of the SCJ falls on one discipline within the team 
- 
specify 
........................ Certain sections of the SCJ falls on one discipline within the team- 
specify 
.............................. Other 
comments 
............................................................................................................. 
4.3 Piloting the SCJ has improved MDT working 
II Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
4.4 1 feel as though I make a positive contribution to the SCJ risk decision making process 
II Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
4.5 Within the team there is a resistance to using the SCJ 
Strongly 
I 
agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
If relevant, please circle relevant statements: 
Low motivation 
Resistance to change 
Lack of support from other team members 
Other please 
specify 
........................................................................................... 
4.6 The management plan agreed during MDT discussions i being implemented for each 
patient assessed 
Strongly 
I 
agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
5.1 Completion of the SCJ has put a significant strain on current clinical resources 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
If relevant, is the strain to (please circle the relevant choice).: 
Particular individuals 
- 
please specify 
The whole team 
Other 
comments 
.................................................................................................. 
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5.2 It would be beneficial to have a regular designated time to discuss the SCJ where all MDT 
members are present. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disag 
lee 
5.3 The SCJ integrates features of other clinical and risk assessment tools (excluding the 
HCR-20) 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
If relevant agree please specify which tools 
.................................................. Comments 
................................................................................................ 
6.1 Additional resources are necessary to successfully document the SCJ risk system 
Strongly agree 
.. area Neutral Disagree Strongly disag 
lee 
If relevant, please specify the resources that would be helpful (e. g. additional admin 
resources) 
............................................................................................................... 
6.2 The SCJ risk system should be embedded in policy 
Strongly 
I 
agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
6.3 It is useful to have a contact person (SCJ coordinator external to the team) to assist 
clinical team implementation a d assist clinical risk decisions. 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
6.4 It is useful for the clinical team to have a nominated contact(s) to liaise with the SCJ 
coordinator 
Strongly 
I 
agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
6.5 Which profession do you think should hold position of 'nominated contact' (MDT member 
to liaise with SCJ coordinator / take overall responsibility for SCJ completions) 
Please state 
profession(s) 
........................................................................................... 
7.1 It is important that elements of the SCJ are evaluated 
Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
370 
7.2 It is important that outcomes of evaluations are communicated back to clinical teams 
II Strongly agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly disagree 
7.3 What changes would you make to any aspect of the SCJ? 
7.4 Any other comments? 
371 
Appendix 2.2 
SCJ: RISK SERVICE EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Directorate: Dlease indicate 
Mental Health JI 
. 
Learning Disability D 
I The Peaks Unit 
Personality Disorder 0 
Women's Service 
Profession: please enter 
Ward(s): please enter 
On a scale of I to 5, please could you indicate the extent to which you agree or 
disagree with the following statements related to the SCJ: Risk 
The scale is as follows: 
I= Strongly Agree. 2= Agree. 3= Neutral. 4= Disagree. 5= Strongly Disagree. 
Please indicate your oninion 
The SCJ....... QEl QI-x I LJ 
oaa®o is useful overall ED 17-1 OF ED F-I 
assists clinical teams make and document risk decisions QQQQ 
facilitates documentation of the Tilt security requirements ED[DF-1=r--1 
allows the effective construction of risk management plans = -11: 1 El 
informs clinical practice EI EJ EI EU 
Accurately assesses a patient's risk LJ EJ a1 EJ 
helps plan for future scenarios a=Ea 
is more user-friendly than previous risk assessment systems (e. g. 
CRAFT, Tilt returns) 
a 
should be possible to review every 3 months =F-I=F-1[D 
should be possible to review every 12 months 71 a 
should be reviewed every 3 months if a patient is identified as high- 
risk J F 
is completed with the majority of MDT members present QD 
has improved MDT working = LJ UJ EJ a 
puts a significant strain on current clinical resources =F QF-101-1 
contact person (external to the clinical team) is a useful resource QQQDQ 
Directorate representative is a useful liaison link with the SCJ team QDLILD 
evaluations should be communicated back to clinical teams 1 QQnQQ 
should be provisionally completed before a patient is admitted 
. 
Q Q Q Q 
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is unclear in certain sections 
If you have stated agree or strongly agree please specify which 
sections or specific items or definitions / explanations are 
problematic, and suggestions as to how to aid clarity... 
is irrelevant in certain instances 
If you have stated agree or strongly agree please specify which 
sections or specific items or definitions / explanations are 
problematic... 
The following sections of the SCJ are helpful I relevant to assessing and managing 
nafipnt risk: 
Historical IF 1 IF 
Clinical IF -171 F-Iý 
Risk IF-]F--]F--]a 
Suicide/ Self-harm 1 1_II_II_II_Ii_I 
Vulnerability IF-]F--]F--]F-]a Escape 
aa a Scenario Planning I II ii II II I Tilt High risk Summary aoaoo I Risk Management Planning a a a a o 
The following questions relate to your use of the SCJ: 
1-5 6 15+ 
0 15 
[ 
How many SCJ discussions have you participated a Q Q Q Q 
in? 
How many times have you accessed patient case notes Q Q ý Q ý 
via RiO? 
How many times have you accessed RiO to review SCJ QQaQQ 
records? 
The following questions relate to identification of SCJ training needs: 
I have attended SCJ training via... (indicate all that you have attended, or Indicate If 
you have not received training) 
A formal training day (1 day session) 
Training delivered by SCJ team on ward location a 
I have not attended formal training, but use the SCJ 
Other 
Should SCJ training be mandatory? YES NO 
373, 
Initial training for new members of staff should be delivered via: 
Formal delivery facilitated by a trainer r 
Participation during ongoing SCJ discussions 0 
E-Teaming 0 
Combination 0 
Refresher training should be provided: 
Strongly Agree (please answer next 2 questions) 0 
Agree (p lease answer next 2 questions) 
Neutral (please disregard next 2 questions) Q 
Disagree (please disregard next 2 questions) 0 
Strongly Disagree (please disregard next 2 questions) 
If agree to question above. Please indicate how often refresher training should be 
completed? 
F-3 monthly 0 
6 monthly 0 
Annually 0 
Every 2 years II 
Every 3 years 0 
Refresher training for new members of staff should be delivered via: (tick all that 
apply) 
Formal delivery facilitated by a trainer 
Participation during ongoing SCJ discussions I1 
iI E-leaming 
Combination 11 
What changes, if any, can you suggest that would improve the SCJ? (e. g. document 
definitions, clinical use, computerised system, other) 
If you have any other comments on the SCJ: Risk system, please write them below. 
Please save your completed survey and return either a paper copy by post to 
Clare Richardson, 
SCJ: Risk Project Manager, Room 112, William Tuke House, or electronically to Clare. Richardson as riottshc. nhs. uk 
Thank you 
374 
Appendix 2.3 
Table B1. Summary of the Number and Proportion of Responses Following the 
Pilot and Implementation Phase 
0.1 Freauency of use of the P I L 0 T T 0 T A L 
SCJ: Risk s stem. 
Number of discussions 1-3 4-6 7-10 14+ - 0 1-5 6-10 10-15 15+ 
% 16 50 16 17 0 20 21 10 49 
1. Training PILOT TOTAL 
Proportion of respondents trained in 
the use of the SCJ: Risk 
100% 89% 
1.1 Mode of training delivery 
received 
P I L 0 T T 0 TI A L 
% 1 2 3 4 
- 
1 2 3 4 
- 
70 30 0 0 
- 
51 38 9 2 
- 
1= Formal trainine dav. 2= Trainine onward location by SCJ: Risk staff. 3= Not attende d tra inine. but use SCJ: Risk. 
4= Other 
1.2 If SCJ: Risk training should be 
mandatory 
P I L O T T O T A L 
% 1 2 
- - - 
1 2 
- - - 
- - - 
83 17 
- - 
1= Yes to mandatory training. 2-No to mandatory training 
1.3 How initial training should be 
delivered 
P I L O T T O T A L 
% 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
- 
- - - - 
4 
42 25 7 25 
1= Formal training day. 2- Training on ward location. 3= E-learning. 4-Combination 
1.4 If refresher training should be 
provided 
P I L 0 T 0 T A L 
1 2 3 4 5 
E 
2 3 4 5 
62 8 30 0 0 23 44 16 15 2 
1= Strongly agree. 2= Disagree. 3= Neutral. 4= Disagree. 5- Strongly Disagree 
1.4.1 How often refresher training 
should be completed 
P I L 0 T T 0 T A L 
% 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
0 20 80 0 0 0 3 35 48 14 
1- 3 monthly. 2- 6 monthly. 3- Annually. 4- Every 2 years. 5- Every 3 years 
1.4.2 How refresher training should 
be delivered 
P 1 L 0 T T 0 T A L 
% 1 2 3 4 
- 
1 2 3 4 
- 
- - - - - 
45 37 6 2 
- 
1= Formal training day. 2- Training onward location. 3= E-learning. 4-Combination 
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2. Perception of the SCJ: Risk P I L 0 T T 0 T A L 
system 
If the SCJ: Risk system 
... 
: % 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
2.1 was perceived as useful? 46 50 4 0 0 31 59 5 5 0 
2.2 assisted clinical teams make 46 50 4 0 0 29 57 8 6 0 
and document risk related 
decisions? 
2.3 was useful in documenting 32 64 4 0 0 26 52 17 5 0 
the Tilt security review 
recommendations? 
2.4 was useful to construction of 44 48 8 0 0 21 51 23 5 0 
a risk management plan? 
2.5 was useful to informing 32 64 4 0 0 15 63 17 5 0 
clinical practice? 
2.6 was useful to informing 24 56 20 0 0 
- - - - - 
patient care? 
2.7 accurately assessed a patient's 24 48 24 4 0 14 46 28 12 0 
risk? 
2.8 helps plan for future scenarios 
- - - - - 
17 53 23 7 0 
I=Strongly agree. 2= Agree. 3=Neutral. 4=Disagree. 5=Strongly Disagree 
3. Usability of the SCJ: Risk P I L 0 T T O T JA L 
s stem 
% 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
3.1 Was the SCJ: Risk more 44 32 24 0 0 32 36 24 8 0 
user-friendly than previous risk 
assessments? 
3.2 Was it feasible for the 4 24 28 36 8 17 35 25 17 6 
clinical team to review every 
three months? 
3.2.1 Was it feasible for the 
- - - - - 
32 48 9 7 4 
clinical team to review every 
twelve months? 
3.2.2 Should the SCJ: Risk be 
- - - - - 
35 46 15 2 2 
reviewed every three months if a 
patient was identified as high- 
risk? 
i=strongly agree. 1= Agree. 3=Neutral. 4=Disagree. 5=Strongly Disagree 
4. Team functioning and P I L 0 T T 0 T A L 
multidisciplinary workin 
If the SCJ: Risk system...: % 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
4.1 should be completed in a 52 36 12 0 0 
- - - - 
multi-disciplinary- format (all 
components) 
4.2 was completed in a 40 32 8 20 0 25 50 15 10 0 
multidisciplinary 
format 
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4.3 improved MDT working 8 40 40 12 0 12 38 39 10 1 
4.4 facilitated the respondent in 27 58 4 7 4 
- - - - - 
feeling they made a positive 
contribution 
4.5 *encountered a resistance 8 13 13 63 3 
- - - - - 
within the clinical team 
4.6 and the associated risk 8 60 24 8 0 
- - - - - 
management was being 
implemented 
1=Strongly agree. 2= Agree. 3=Neutral. 4=Disagree. S=Strongly Disagree 
5. Pilotine / implementation and P I L O T T O T A L 
support 
% 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
5.1 Had completion of the SCJ 8 36 32 24 0 3 17 43 32 5 
put a significant strain on current 
clinical resources? 
5.2 If it was beneficial to have a 54 33 13 0 0 
- - - - - 
regular designated time to discuss 
the SCJ: Risk where all MDT 
members were present? 
i=atrungiy agree. c= r%gree. 
.. 
=rveuIraI. %=uisagree. 3=strongly Disagree 
6. Additional resources, P I L 0 T T 0 T A L 
Policies, procedures and 
nominated contacts 
% 1 2 3 4 5 1 1 -2 3 4 5 
6.1 Were additional resources 0 52 36 12 0 
necessary to successfully 
document the SCJ risk system? 
6.2 Should the SCJ: Risk system 29 45 22 4 0 
be embedded in policy? 
6.3 Was it useful to have a 34 58 8 0 0 15 33 45 6 1 
contact person (SCJ: Risk 
coordinator external to the team) 
to assist clinical team 
implementation and assist 
clinical risk decisions. 
6.4 Was it useful for clinical 28 56 8 8 0 21 34 33 12 0 
teams to have a nominated 
contact(s) to liaise with the SCJ: 
Risk project manager? 
6.5 Should the SCJ: Risk be 
- - - - - 
25 46 18 8 3 
provisionally completed before a 
patient's admission? 
I Sirnn lv AorPP I. Aar-P 'ä=Ua.. 1.. n1 A- 
____ 
__ 
r ... ý. 
-o -b. --. ", b"ýý. uýaý. , -ulsdgrec. a=Strongty Disagree 
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7. Onioint! evaluation and P I L 0 T T 0 T A L 
access of electronic records 
% 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
If it was important to respondents 
that...: 
7.1 elements of the SCJ were 42 58 0 0 0 - - - - - 
evaluated 
7.2 the outcomes of evaluations 48 52 0 0 0 23 51 18 7 1 
were communicated back to 
clinical teams 
I=Strongly agree. 2= Agree. 3=Neutral. 4=Disagree. 5=Strongly Disagree 
P I L O T T O T A L 
- - - - - 
0 1-5 6-10 10-15 15+ 
7.5 Frequency of access of % 
- - - - - 
1 5 3 7 84 
patient case notes via RiO 
7.6 Frequency of access % 
- - - - - 
30 23 13 8 26 
within RiO to review SCJ: 
Risk records 
1= 0 times accessed 2- 1-5 times accessed 3- 6-10 times accessed 4=10-15 times accessed 5-15+ times accessed 
8. Perceived clarity and relevance P I L 0 T T 0 T A L 
of SCJ: Risk document 
H 
% 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 
.4 5 
*8.1 is unclear in certain sections 
- - - - - 
3 15 40 30 12 
*8.2 is irrelevant in certain sections 
- - - - - 
1 8 37 44 10 
I=Strongly agree. 2- Agree. 3=Neutral. 4=Disagree. 5=Strongly Disagree 
9. Relevance of HCR-20/ SCJ: 
Risk total subscales 
P I L O T T O T A L 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
9.3 Respondents were asked to 
indicate which subscales were 
helpful / relevant to assessing and 
managing patient risk by scale: 
9.1 Historical (H) 48 48 2 1 1 
9.2 Clinical (C) 46 44 9 2 0 
9.3 Risk (R) 52 41 6 1 0 
9.4 Suicide / Self-harm (S) 40 47 10 3 0 
9.5 Vulnerability (V) 39 45 16 
,1 1 9.6 Escape (E) 44 46 7 2 1 
9.7 Scenario Planning 31 43 18 6 2 
9.8 Tilt High Risk Summa 45 39 7 7 2 
9.9 Risk Management Planning 37 45 10 7 1 
9.10 TOTAL AVERAGE 
RESPONSE HCR 
49 44 6 1 0 
9.11 TOTAL AVERAGE 
RESPONSE SVE 
41 45 11 2 1 
9.12 TOTAL AVERAGE 
RESPONSE SCJ: RISK 
DOCUMENTATION 
42 44 9 3 1 
I =Strongly agree. '2=Agree. ' 3=Neutral. 4=Disagree. 5=Strongly Disagree 
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Table Dl. Frequencies of any intra-institutional behaviour over a 12 month period2 
Any 
incident 
Tl 
IRIS 
T2 IR1 s 
n % mean SE SD Range n % mean SE SD Range 
Total 119 55 4.37 
. 
612 9.01 0-62 129 59, 5.99 
. 
812 11.96 0-82 
DSPD 26 93 5.89 1.087 5.89 0-22 25 89 9.18 2.22 11.78 0-46 
PD 24 47 3.02 1.06 7.59 0-48 29 57 4.82 1.51 10.84 0-69 
MH 30 33 1.07 
. 
227 2.17 0-11 32 35 1.03 
. 
198 1.89 0-10 
LD 19 91 5.57 1.06 4.88 0-17 19 91 7.00 1.28 5.89 0-21 
WS 20 80 16.56 3.64 18.23 0-62 24 96 22.16 4.29 21.49 0-82 
2 Descriptors and frequencies (baserates) of categories within levels related to each defined 
incident of intra-institutional behaviour measured by use of IRls. Ti refers to IRI 
information submitted in the six months prior to full SCJ: Risk implementation (between 
01.07.2006 and 31.12.06). T2 refers to the second time period of interest reflecting a six 
month period following SCJ: Risk implementation (between 01.01.2007 and 20.06.2007) 
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